Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly paired with activation-based monitoring to detect and prevent harmful behaviors that may not be apparent at the surface-text level. However, existing activation safety approaches, trained on broad misuse datasets, struggle with poor precision, limited flexibility, and lack of interpretability. This paper introduces a new paradigm: rule-based activation safety, inspired by rule-sharing practices in cybersecurity. We propose modeling activations as cognitive elements (CEs), fine-grained, interpretable factors such as ''making a threat'' and ''payment processing'', that can be composed to capture nuanced, domain-specific behaviors with higher precision. Building on this representation, we present a practical framework that defines predicate rules over CEs and detects violations in real time. This enables practitioners to configure and update safeguards without retraining models or detectors, while supporting transparency and auditability. Our results show that compositional rule-based activation safety improves precision, supports domain customization, and lays the groundwork for scalable, interpretable, and auditable AI governance. We will release GAVEL as an open-source framework and provide an accompanying automated rule creation tool.

Recent interest in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) for practical applications is moderated by the significant challenge of hallucination or the inconsistency between the factual information and the generated text. In this paper, we first perform an in-depth analysis of hallucinations and discover several novel insights about how and when LVLMs hallucinate. From our analysis, we show that: (1) The community's efforts have been primarily targeted towards reducing hallucinations related to visual recognition (VR) prompts (e.g., prompts that only require describing the image), thereby ignoring hallucinations for cognitive prompts (e.g., prompts that require additional skills like reasoning on contents of the image). (2) LVLMs lack visual perception, i.e., they can see but not necessarily understand or perceive the input image. We analyze responses to cognitive prompts and show that LVLMs hallucinate due to a perception gap: although LVLMs accurately recognize visual elements in the input image and possess sufficient cognitive skills, they struggle to respond accurately and hallucinate. To overcome this shortcoming, we propose Visual Description Grounded Decoding (VDGD), a simple, robust, and training-free method for alleviating hallucinations. Specifically, we first describe the image and add it as a prefix to the instruction. Next, during auto-regressive decoding, we sample from the plausible candidates according to their KL-Divergence (KLD) to the description, where lower KLD is given higher preference. Experimental results on several benchmarks and LVLMs show that VDGD improves significantly over other baselines in reducing hallucinations. We also propose VaLLu, a benchmark for the comprehensive evaluation of the cognitive capabilities of LVLMs.

The Mental Health Question Answer (MHQA) task requires the seeker and supporter to complete the support process in one-turn dialogue. Given the richness of help-seeker posts, supporters must thoroughly understand the content and provide logical, comprehensive, and well-structured responses. Previous works in MHQA mostly focus on single-agent approaches based on the cognitive element of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), but they overlook the interactions among various CBT elements, such as emotion and cognition. This limitation hinders the models' ability to thoroughly understand the distress of help-seekers. To address this, we propose a framework named Multi-Agent Deductive Planning (MADP), which is based on the interactions between the various psychological elements of CBT. This method guides Large Language Models (LLMs) to achieve a deeper understanding of the seeker's context and provide more personalized assistance based on individual circumstances. Furthermore, we construct a new dataset based on the MADP framework and use it to fine-tune LLMs, resulting in a specialized model named MADP-LLM. We conduct extensive experiments, including comparisons with multiple LLMs, human evaluations, and automatic evaluations, to validate the effectiveness of the MADP framework and MADP-LLM.

Humans ponder before articulating complex sentence elements, enabling deeper cognitive processing through focused effort. In this work, we introduce this pondering process into language models by repeatedly invoking the forward process within a single token generation step. During pondering, instead of generating an actual token sampled from the prediction distribution, the model ponders by yielding a weighted sum of all token embeddings according to the predicted token distribution. The generated embedding is then fed back as input for another forward pass. We show that the model can learn to ponder in this way through self-supervised learning, without any human annotations. Our method is straightforward and can be seamlessly integrated with various existing language models. Experiments across three widely used open-source architectures-GPT-2, Pythia, and LLaMA-and extensive downstream task evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and generality of our method. For language modeling tasks, pondering language models achieve performance comparable to vanilla models with twice the number of parameters. On 9 downstream benchmarks, our pondering-enhanced Pythia models significantly outperform the official Pythia models. Notably, pondering-enhanced Pythia-1B is comparable to TinyLlama-1.1B, which is trained on 10 times more data. The code is available at https://github.com/LUMIA-Group/PonderingLM.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Escape rooms present a unique cognitive challenge that demands exploration-driven planning: players should actively search their environment, continuously update their knowledge based on new discoveries, and connect disparate clues to determine which elements are relevant to their objectives. Motivated by this, we introduce VisEscape, a benchmark of 20 virtual escape rooms specifically designed to evaluate AI models under these challenging conditions, where success depends not only on solving isolated puzzles but also on iteratively constructing and refining spatial-temporal knowledge of a dynamically changing environment. On VisEscape, we observed that even state-of-the-art multimodal models generally fail to escape the rooms, showing considerable variation in their levels of progress and trajectories. To address this issue, we propose VisEscaper, which effectively integrates Memory, Feedback, and ReAct modules, demonstrating significant improvements by performing 3.7 times more effectively and 5.0 times more efficiently on average.

Current role-playing agents (RPAs) are typically constructed by imitating surface-level behaviors, but this approach lacks internal cognitive consistency, often causing out-of-character errors in complex situations. To address this, we propose Character-R1, a framework designed to provide comprehensive verifiable reward signals for effective role-aware reasoning, which are missing in recent studies. Specifically, our framework comprises three core designs: (1) Cognitive Focus Reward, which enforces explicit label-based analysis of 10 character elements (e.g., worldview) to structure internal cognition; (2) Reference-Guided Reward, which utilizes overlap-based metrics with reference responses as optimization anchors to enhance exploration and performance; and (3) Character-Conditioned Reward Normalization, which adjusts reward distributions based on character categories to ensure robust optimization across heterogeneous roles. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Character-R1 significantly outperforms existing methods in knowledge, memory and others.

Computer use agents automate digital tasks by directly interacting with graphical user interfaces (GUIs) on computers and mobile devices, offering significant potential to enhance human productivity by completing an open-ended space of user queries. However, current agents face significant challenges: imprecise grounding of GUI elements, difficulties with long-horizon task planning, and performance bottlenecks from relying on single generalist models for diverse cognitive tasks. To this end, we introduce Agent S2, a novel compositional framework that delegates cognitive responsibilities across various generalist and specialist models. We propose a novel Mixture-of-Grounding technique to achieve precise GUI localization and introduce Proactive Hierarchical Planning, dynamically refining action plans at multiple temporal scales in response to evolving observations. Evaluations demonstrate that Agent S2 establishes new state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on three prominent computer use benchmarks. Specifically, Agent S2 achieves 18.9% and 32.7% relative improvements over leading baseline agents such as Claude Computer Use and UI-TARS on the OSWorld 15-step and 50-step evaluation. Moreover, Agent S2 generalizes effectively to other operating systems and applications, surpassing previous best methods by 52.8% on WindowsAgentArena and by 16.52% on AndroidWorld relatively. Code available at https://github.com/simular-ai/Agent-S.

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to the cognitive ability to infer and attribute mental states to oneself and others. As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated for social and cognitive capabilities, it remains unclear to what extent these models demonstrate ToM across diverse languages and cultural contexts. In this paper, we introduce a comprehensive study of multilingual ToM capabilities aimed at addressing this gap. Our approach includes two key components: (1) We translate existing ToM datasets into multiple languages, effectively creating a multilingual ToM dataset and (2) We enrich these translations with culturally specific elements to reflect the social and cognitive scenarios relevant to diverse populations. We conduct extensive evaluations of six state-of-the-art LLMs to measure their ToM performance across both the translated and culturally adapted datasets. The results highlight the influence of linguistic and cultural diversity on the models' ability to exhibit ToM, and questions their social reasoning capabilities. This work lays the groundwork for future research into enhancing LLMs' cross-cultural social cognition and contributes to the development of more culturally aware and socially intelligent AI systems. All our data and code are publicly available.

Despite significant advancements in image segmentation and object detection, understanding complex scenes remains a significant challenge. Here, we focus on graphical humor as a paradigmatic example of image interpretation that requires elucidating the interaction of different scene elements in the context of prior cognitive knowledge. This paper introduces HumorDB, a novel, controlled, and carefully curated dataset designed to evaluate and advance visual humor understanding by AI systems. The dataset comprises diverse images spanning photos, cartoons, sketches, and AI-generated content, including minimally contrastive pairs where subtle edits differentiate between humorous and non-humorous versions. We evaluate humans, state-of-the-art vision models, and large vision-language models on three tasks: binary humor classification, funniness rating prediction, and pairwise humor comparison. The results reveal a gap between current AI systems and human-level humor understanding. While pretrained vision-language models perform better than vision-only models, they still struggle with abstract sketches and subtle humor cues. Analysis of attention maps shows that even when models correctly classify humorous images, they often fail to focus on the precise regions that make the image funny. Preliminary mechanistic interpretability studies and evaluation of model explanations provide initial insights into how different architectures process humor. Our results identify promising trends and current limitations, suggesting that an effective understanding of visual humor requires sophisticated architectures capable of detecting subtle contextual features and bridging the gap between visual perception and abstract reasoning. All the code and data are available here: https://github.com/kreimanlab/HumorDB{https://github.com/kreimanlab/HumorDB}

Despite progress in perceptual tasks such as image classification, computers still perform poorly on cognitive tasks such as image description and question answering. Cognition is core to tasks that involve not just recognizing, but reasoning about our visual world. However, models used to tackle the rich content in images for cognitive tasks are still being trained using the same datasets designed for perceptual tasks. To achieve success at cognitive tasks, models need to understand the interactions and relationships between objects in an image. When asked "What vehicle is the person riding?", computers will need to identify the objects in an image as well as the relationships riding(man, carriage) and pulling(horse, carriage) in order to answer correctly that "the person is riding a horse-drawn carriage". In this paper, we present the Visual Genome dataset to enable the modeling of such relationships. We collect dense annotations of objects, attributes, and relationships within each image to learn these models. Specifically, our dataset contains over 100K images where each image has an average of 21 objects, 18 attributes, and 18 pairwise relationships between objects. We canonicalize the objects, attributes, relationships, and noun phrases in region descriptions and questions answer pairs to WordNet synsets. Together, these annotations represent the densest and largest dataset of image descriptions, objects, attributes, relationships, and question answers.

This document presents endeavors to represent emotion in a computational cognitive architecture. The first part introduces research organizing with two axes of emotional affect: pleasantness and arousal. Following this basic of emotional components, the document discusses an aspect of emergent properties of emotion, showing interaction studies with human users. With these past author's studies, the document concludes that the advantage of the cognitive human-agent interaction approach is in representing human internal states and processes.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

The article identified 42 cognitive architectures for creating general artificial intelligence (AGI) and proposed a set of interrelated functional blocks that an agent approaching AGI in its capabilities should possess. Since the required set of blocks is not found in any of the existing architectures, the article proposes a new cognitive architecture for intelligent systems approaching AGI in their capabilities. As one of the key solutions within the framework of the architecture, a universal method of knowledge representation is proposed, which allows combining various non-formalized, partially and fully formalized methods of knowledge representation in a single knowledge base, such as texts in natural languages, images, audio and video recordings, graphs, algorithms, databases, neural networks, knowledge graphs, ontologies, frames, essence-property-relation models, production systems, predicate calculus models, conceptual models, and others. To combine and structure various fragments of knowledge, archigraph models are used, constructed as a development of annotated metagraphs. As components, the cognitive architecture being developed includes machine consciousness, machine subconsciousness, blocks of interaction with the external environment, a goal management block, an emotional control system, a block of social interaction, a block of reflection, an ethics block and a worldview block, a learning block, a monitoring block, blocks of statement and solving problems, self-organization and meta learning block.

Multimodal large-scale models have significantly advanced the development of web agents, enabling perception and interaction with digital environments akin to human cognition. In this paper, we argue that web agents must first acquire sufficient knowledge to effectively engage in cognitive reasoning. Therefore, we decompose a web agent's capabilities into two essential stages: knowledge content learning and cognitive processes. To formalize this, we propose Web-CogKnowledge Framework, categorizing knowledge as Factual, Conceptual, and Procedural. In this framework, knowledge content learning corresponds to the agent's processes of Memorizing and Understanding, which rely on the first two knowledge types, representing the "what" of learning. Conversely, cognitive processes correspond to Exploring, grounded in Procedural knowledge, defining the "how" of reasoning and action. To facilitate knowledge acquisition, we construct the Web-CogDataset, a structured resource curated from 14 real-world websites, designed to systematically instill core knowledge necessary for web agent. This dataset serves as the agent's conceptual grounding-the "nouns" upon which comprehension is built-as well as the basis for learning how to reason and act. Building on this foundation, we operationalize these processes through a novel knowledge-driven Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning framework, developing and training our proposed agent, the Web-CogReasoner. Extensive experimentation reveals its significant superiority over existing models, especially in generalizing to unseen tasks where structured knowledge is decisive. To enable rigorous evaluation, we introduce the Web-CogBench, a comprehensive evaluation suite designed to assess and compare agent performance across the delineated knowledge domains and cognitive capabilities. Our code and data is open sourced at https://github.com/Gnonymous/Web-CogReasoner

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

Conceptual combination is a cognitive process that merges basic concepts, enabling the creation of complex expressions. During this process, the properties of combination (e.g., the whiteness of a peeled apple) can be inherited from basic concepts, newly emerge, or be canceled. However, previous studies have evaluated a limited set of properties and have not examined the generative process. To address this gap, we introduce the Conceptual Combination with Property Type dataset (CCPT), which consists of 12.3K annotated triplets of noun phrases, properties, and property types. Using CCPT, we establish three types of tasks to evaluate LLMs for conceptual combination thoroughly. Our key findings are threefold: (1) Our automatic metric grading property emergence and cancellation closely corresponds with human judgments. (2) LLMs, including OpenAI's o1, struggle to generate noun phrases which possess given emergent properties. (3) Our proposed method, inspired by cognitive psychology model that explains how relationships between concepts are formed, improves performances in all generative tasks. The dataset and experimental code are available at https://github.com/seokwon99/CCPT.git.

There has been a surge of interest in language model agents that can navigate virtual environments such as the web or desktop. To navigate such environments, agents benefit from information on the various elements (e.g., buttons, text, or images) present. It remains unclear which element attributes have the greatest impact on agent performance, especially in environments that only provide a graphical representation (i.e., pixels). Here we find that the ordering in which elements are presented to the language model is surprisingly impactful--randomizing element ordering in a webpage degrades agent performance comparably to removing all visible text from an agent's state representation. While a webpage provides a hierarchical ordering of elements, there is no such ordering when parsing elements directly from pixels. Moreover, as tasks become more challenging and models more sophisticated, our experiments suggest that the impact of ordering increases. Finding an effective ordering is non-trivial. We investigate the impact of various element ordering methods in web and desktop environments. We find that dimensionality reduction provides a viable ordering for pixel-only environments. We train a UI element detection model to derive elements from pixels and apply our findings to an agent benchmark--OmniACT--where we only have access to pixels. Our method completes more than two times as many tasks on average relative to the previous state-of-the-art.

This comprehensive report distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost "human-like" cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles in Cognitive Architecture Theory (CAT). We present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions associated with CAT (i.e. memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and meta-cognition) and identify gaps in the research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and meta-cognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions informed by active inference and global workspace theory to address them. We further introduce Epistemic World Models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied across video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

A characteristic feature of human semantic cognition is its ability to not only store and retrieve the properties of concepts observed through experience, but to also facilitate the inheritance of properties (can breathe) from superordinate concepts (animal) to their subordinates (dog) -- i.e. demonstrate property inheritance. In this paper, we present COMPS, a collection of minimal pair sentences that jointly tests pre-trained language models (PLMs) on their ability to attribute properties to concepts and their ability to demonstrate property inheritance behavior. Analyses of 22 different PLMs on COMPS reveal that they can easily distinguish between concepts on the basis of a property when they are trivially different, but find it relatively difficult when concepts are related on the basis of nuanced knowledge representations. Furthermore, we find that PLMs can demonstrate behavior consistent with property inheritance to a great extent, but fail in the presence of distracting information, which decreases the performance of many models, sometimes even below chance. This lack of robustness in demonstrating simple reasoning raises important questions about PLMs' capacity to make correct inferences even when they appear to possess the prerequisite knowledge.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

This paper reviews the architecture and implementation methods of agents powered by large language models (LLMs). Motivated by the limitations of traditional LLMs in real-world tasks, the research aims to explore patterns to develop "agentic" LLMs that can automate complex tasks and bridge the performance gap with human capabilities. Key components include a perception system that converts environmental percepts into meaningful representations; a reasoning system that formulates plans, adapts to feedback, and evaluates actions through different techniques like Chain-of-Thought and Tree-of-Thought; a memory system that retains knowledge through both short-term and long-term mechanisms; and an execution system that translates internal decisions into concrete actions. This paper shows how integrating these systems leads to more capable and generalized software bots that mimic human cognitive processes for autonomous and intelligent behavior.

Metacognitive knowledge refers to humans' intuitive knowledge of their own thinking and reasoning processes. Today's best LLMs clearly possess some reasoning processes. The paper gives evidence that they also have metacognitive knowledge, including ability to name skills and procedures to apply given a task. We explore this primarily in context of math reasoning, developing a prompt-guided interaction procedure to get a powerful LLM to assign sensible skill labels to math questions, followed by having it perform semantic clustering to obtain coarser families of skill labels. These coarse skill labels look interpretable to humans. To validate that these skill labels are meaningful and relevant to the LLM's reasoning processes we perform the following experiments. (a) We ask GPT-4 to assign skill labels to training questions in math datasets GSM8K and MATH. (b) When using an LLM to solve the test questions, we present it with the full list of skill labels and ask it to identify the skill needed. Then it is presented with randomly selected exemplar solved questions associated with that skill label. This improves accuracy on GSM8k and MATH for several strong LLMs, including code-assisted models. The methodology presented is domain-agnostic, even though this article applies it to math problems.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

We analyse perception and memory, using mathematical models for knowledge graphs and tensors, to gain insights into the corresponding functionalities of the human mind. Our discussion is based on the concept of propositional sentences consisting of subject-predicate-object (SPO) triples for expressing elementary facts. SPO sentences are the basis for most natural languages but might also be important for explicit perception and declarative memories, as well as intra-brain communication and the ability to argue and reason. A set of SPO sentences can be described as a knowledge graph, which can be transformed into an adjacency tensor. We introduce tensor models, where concepts have dual representations as indices and associated embeddings, two constructs we believe are essential for the understanding of implicit and explicit perception and memory in the brain. We argue that a biological realization of perception and memory imposes constraints on information processing. In particular, we propose that explicit perception and declarative memories require a semantic decoder, which, in a simple realization, is based on four layers: First, a sensory memory layer, as a buffer for sensory input, second, an index layer representing concepts, third, a memoryless representation layer for the broadcasting of information ---the "blackboard", or the "canvas" of the brain--- and fourth, a working memory layer as a processing center and data buffer. We discuss the operations of the four layers and relate them to the global workspace theory. In a Bayesian brain interpretation, semantic memory defines the prior for observable triple statements. We propose that ---in evolution and during development--- semantic memory, episodic memory, and natural language evolved as emergent properties in agents' process to gain a deeper understanding of sensory information.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

We present the COGnitive Neural GENerative system (CogNGen), a cognitive architecture that combines two neurobiologically-plausible, computational models: predictive processing and hyperdimensional/vector-symbolic models. We draw inspiration from architectures such as ACT-R and Spaun/Nengo. CogNGen is in broad agreement with these, providing a level of detail between ACT-R's high-level symbolic description of human cognition and Spaun's low-level neurobiological description, furthermore creating the groundwork for designing agents that learn continually from diverse tasks and model human performance at larger scales than what is possible with current systems. We test CogNGen on four maze-learning tasks, including those that test memory and planning, and find that CogNGen matches performance of deep reinforcement learning models and exceeds on a task designed to test memory.

The abilities to perceive, learn, and use generalities, similarities, classes, i.e., semantic memory (SM), is central to cognition. Machine learning (ML), neural network, and AI research has been primarily driven by tasks requiring such abilities. However, another central facet of cognition, single-trial formation of permanent memories of experiences, i.e., episodic memory (EM), has had relatively little focus. Only recently has EM-like functionality been added to Deep Learning (DL) models, e.g., Neural Turing Machine, Memory Networks. However, in these cases: a) EM is implemented as a separate module, which entails substantial data movement (and so, time and power) between the DL net itself and EM; and b) individual items are stored localistically within the EM, precluding realizing the exponential representational efficiency of distributed over localist coding. We describe Sparsey, an unsupervised, hierarchical, spatial/spatiotemporal associative memory model differing fundamentally from mainstream ML models, most crucially, in its use of sparse distributed representations (SDRs), or, cell assemblies, which admits an extremely efficient, single-trial learning algorithm that maps input similarity into code space similarity (measured as intersection). SDRs of individual inputs are stored in superposition and because similarity is preserved, the patterns of intersections over the assigned codes reflect the similarity, i.e., statistical, structure, of all orders, not simply pairwise, over the inputs. Thus, SM, i.e., a generative model, is built as a computationally free side effect of the act of storing episodic memory traces of individual inputs, either spatial patterns or sequences. We report initial results on MNIST and on the Weizmann video event recognition benchmarks. While we have not yet attained SOTA class accuracy, learning takes only minutes on a single CPU.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

Reasoning is a distinctive human capacity, enabling us to address complex problems by breaking them down into a series of manageable cognitive steps. Yet, complex logical reasoning is still cumbersome for language models. Based on the dual process theory in cognitive science, we are the first to unravel the cognitive reasoning abilities of language models. Our framework employs an iterative methodology to construct a Cognitive Tree (CogTree). The root node of this tree represents the initial query, while the leaf nodes consist of straightforward questions that can be answered directly. This construction involves two main components: the implicit extraction module (referred to as the intuitive system) and the explicit reasoning module (referred to as the reflective system). The intuitive system rapidly generates multiple responses by utilizing in-context examples, while the reflective system scores these responses using comparative learning. The scores guide the intuitive system in its subsequent generation step. Our experimental results on two popular and challenging reasoning tasks indicate that it is possible to achieve a performance level comparable to that of GPT-3.5 (with 175B parameters), using a significantly smaller language model that contains fewer parameters (<=7B) than 5% of GPT-3.5.

In most current research, large language models (LLMs) are able to perform reasoning tasks by generating chains of thought through the guidance of specific prompts. However, there still exists a significant discrepancy between their capability in solving complex reasoning problems and that of humans. At present, most approaches focus on chains of thought (COT) and tool use, without considering the adoption and application of human cognitive frameworks. It is well-known that when confronting complex reasoning challenges, humans typically employ various cognitive abilities, and necessitate interaction with all aspects of tools, knowledge, and the external environment information to accomplish intricate tasks. This paper introduces a novel intelligent framework, referred to as OlaGPT. OlaGPT carefully studied a cognitive architecture framework, and propose to simulate certain aspects of human cognition. The framework involves approximating different cognitive modules, including attention, memory, reasoning, learning, and corresponding scheduling and decision-making mechanisms. Inspired by the active learning mechanism of human beings, it proposes a learning unit to record previous mistakes and expert opinions, and dynamically refer to them to strengthen their ability to solve similar problems. The paper also outlines common effective reasoning frameworks for human problem-solving and designs Chain-of-Thought (COT) templates accordingly. A comprehensive decision-making mechanism is also proposed to maximize model accuracy. The efficacy of OlaGPT has been stringently evaluated on multiple reasoning datasets, and the experimental outcomes reveal that OlaGPT surpasses state-of-the-art benchmarks, demonstrating its superior performance. Our implementation of OlaGPT is available on GitHub: https://github.com/oladata-team/OlaGPT.

This article presents the Cogni-CISMeF project, which aims at improving medical information search in the CISMeF system (Catalog and Index of French-language health resources) by including a conversational agent to interact with the user in natural language. To study the cognitive processes involved during the information search, a bottom-up methodology was adopted. Experimentation has been set up to obtain human dialogs between a user (playing the role of patient) dealing with medical information search and a CISMeF expert refining the request. The analysis of these dialogs underlined the use of discursive evidence: vocabulary, reformulation, implicit or explicit expression of user intentions, conversational sequences, etc. A model of artificial agent is proposed. It leads the user in its information search by proposing to him examples, assistance and choices. This model was implemented and integrated in the CISMeF system. ---- Cet article d\'ecrit le projet Cogni-CISMeF qui propose un module de dialogue Homme-Machine \`a int\'egrer dans le syst\`eme d'indexation de connaissances m\'edicales CISMeF (Catalogue et Index des Sites M\'edicaux Francophones). Nous avons adopt\'e une d\'emarche de mod\'elisation cognitive en proc\'edant \`a un recueil de corpus de dialogues entre un utilisateur (jouant le r\^ole d'un patient) d\'esirant une information m\'edicale et un expert CISMeF af inant cette demande pour construire la requ\^ete. Nous avons analys\'e la structure des dialogues ainsi obtenus et avons \'etudi\'e un certain nombre d'indices discursifs : vocabulaire employ\'e, marques de reformulation, commentaires m\'eta et \'epilinguistiques, expression implicite ou explicite des intentions de l'utilisateur, encha\^inement conversationnel, etc. De cette analyse, nous avons construit un mod\`ele d'agent artificiel dot\'e de capacit\'es cognitives capables d'aider l'utilisateur dans sa t\^ache de recherche d'information. Ce mod\`ele a \'et\'e impl\'ement\'e et int\'egr\'e dans le syst\`eme CISMeF.

Large language models handle single-turn generation well, but multi-turn interactions still require the model to reconstruct user intent and task state from an expanding token history because internal representations do not persist across turns. This token-first paradigm leads to drift, inconsistent reasoning modes, and growing prompts as conversations deepen. We propose CORE, a concept-first interaction layer that improves multi-turn stability without modifying model weights. CORE combines a small library of universal cognitive operators with a persistent Local Concept - a compact semantic state capturing the task, constraints, preferences, and intermediate results. Each model call receives only this concept state, the user's latest instruction, and the selected operator, eliminating the need to replay full history. A preliminary prototype simulating CORE's behavior shows about 42% reduction in cumulative prompt tokens, though this number reflects prototype conditions and should not be interpreted as a real-world performance estimate. CORE offers a model-agnostic mechanism that separates conceptual reasoning from language generation, suggesting a scalable direction for more stable multi-turn systems.

Temporal context is essential for robotic manipulation because such tasks are inherently non-Markovian, yet mainstream VLA models typically overlook it and struggle with long-horizon, temporally dependent tasks. Cognitive science suggests that humans rely on working memory to buffer short-lived representations for immediate control, while the hippocampal system preserves verbatim episodic details and semantic gist of past experience for long-term memory. Inspired by these mechanisms, we propose MemoryVLA, a Cognition-Memory-Action framework for long-horizon robotic manipulation. A pretrained VLM encodes the observation into perceptual and cognitive tokens that form working memory, while a Perceptual-Cognitive Memory Bank stores low-level details and high-level semantics consolidated from it. Working memory retrieves decision-relevant entries from the bank, adaptively fuses them with current tokens, and updates the bank by merging redundancies. Using these tokens, a memory-conditioned diffusion action expert yields temporally aware action sequences. We evaluate MemoryVLA on 150+ simulation and real-world tasks across three robots. On SimplerEnv-Bridge, Fractal, and LIBERO-5 suites, it achieves 71.9%, 72.7%, and 96.5% success rates, respectively, all outperforming state-of-the-art baselines CogACT and pi-0, with a notable +14.6 gain on Bridge. On 12 real-world tasks spanning general skills and long-horizon temporal dependencies, MemoryVLA achieves 84.0% success rate, with long-horizon tasks showing a +26 improvement over state-of-the-art baseline. Project Page: https://shihao1895.github.io/MemoryVLA

Human beings primarily understand the world through concepts (e.g., dog), abstract mental representations that structure perception, reasoning, and learning. However, how large language models (LLMs) acquire, retain, and forget such concepts during continual pretraining remains poorly understood. In this work, we study how individual concepts are acquired and forgotten, as well as how multiple concepts interact through interference and synergy. We link these behavioral dynamics to LLMs' internal Concept Circuits, computational subgraphs associated with specific concepts, and incorporate Graph Metrics to characterize circuit structure. Our analysis reveals: (1) LLMs concept circuits provide a non-trivial, statistically significant signal of concept learning and forgetting; (2) Concept circuits exhibit a stage-wise temporal pattern during continual pretraining, with an early increase followed by gradual decrease and stabilization; (3) concepts with larger learning gains tend to exhibit greater forgetting under subsequent training; (4) semantically similar concepts induce stronger interference than weakly related ones; (5) conceptual knowledge differs in their transferability, with some significantly facilitating the learning of others. Together, our findings offer a circuit-level view of concept learning dynamics and inform the design of more interpretable and robust concept-aware training strategies for LLMs.

How humans and machines make sense of current inputs for relation reasoning and question-answering while putting the perceived information into context of our past memories, has been a challenging conundrum in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Inspired by human brain's memory system and cognitive architectures, we propose a PMI framework that consists of perception, memory and inference components. Notably, the memory module comprises working and long-term memory, with the latter endowed with a higher-order structure to retain more accumulated knowledge and experiences. Through a differentiable competitive write access, current perceptions update working memory, which is later merged with long-term memory via outer product associations, averting memory overflow and minimizing information conflicts. In the inference module, relevant information is retrieved from two separate memory origins and associatively integrated to attain a more comprehensive and precise interpretation of current perceptions. We exploratively apply our PMI to improve prevailing Transformers and CNN models on question-answering tasks like bAbI-20k and Sort-of-CLEVR datasets, as well as relation calculation and image classification tasks, and in each case, our PMI enhancements consistently outshine their original counterparts significantly. Visualization analyses reveal that memory consolidation, along with the interaction and integration of information from diverse memory sources, substantially contributes to the model effectiveness on inference tasks.

The web provides a rich, open-domain environment with textual, structural, and spatial properties. We propose a new task for grounding language in this environment: given a natural language command (e.g., "click on the second article"), choose the correct element on the web page (e.g., a hyperlink or text box). We collected a dataset of over 50,000 commands that capture various phenomena such as functional references (e.g. "find who made this site"), relational reasoning (e.g. "article by john"), and visual reasoning (e.g. "top-most article"). We also implemented and analyzed three baseline models that capture different phenomena present in the dataset.

The rapid development and adoption of Generative AI (GAI) technology in the form of chatbots such as ChatGPT and Claude has greatly increased interest in agentic machines. This paper introduces the Autonomous Cognitive Entity (ACE) model, a novel framework for a cognitive architecture, enabling machines and software agents to operate more independently. Drawing inspiration from the OSI model, the ACE framework presents layers of abstraction to conceptualize artificial cognitive architectures. The model is designed to harness the capabilities of the latest generative AI technologies, including large language models (LLMs) and multimodal generative models (MMMs), to build autonomous, agentic systems. The ACE framework comprises six layers: the Aspirational Layer, Global Strategy, Agent Model, Executive Function, Cognitive Control, and Task Prosecution. Each layer plays a distinct role, ranging from setting the moral compass and strategic thinking to task selection and execution. The ACE framework also incorporates mechanisms for handling failures and adapting actions, thereby enhancing the robustness and flexibility of autonomous agents. This paper introduces the conceptual framework and proposes implementation strategies that have been tested and observed in industry. The goal of this paper is to formalize this framework so as to be more accessible.

A hallmark of intelligence is the ability to autonomously learn new flexible, cognitive behaviors - that is, behaviors where the appropriate action depends not just on immediate stimuli (as in simple reflexive stimulus-response associations), but on contextual information that must be adequately acquired, stored and processed. While many meta-learning algorithms can design agents that autonomously learn new tasks, cognitive tasks adds another level of learning and memory to typical ``learning-to-learn'' problems. Here we evolve neural networks, endowed with plastic connections and neuromodulation, over a sizable set of simple cognitive tasks adapted from a computational neuroscience framework. The resulting evolved networks can automatically modify their own connectivity to acquire a novel simple cognitive task, never seen during evolution, from stimuli and rewards alone, through the spontaneous operation of their evolved neural organization and plasticity system. Our results emphasize the importance of carefully considering the multiple learning loops involved in the emergence of intelligent behavior.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

Recent advances in AI -- including generative approaches -- have resulted in technology that can support humans in scientific discovery and decision support but may also disrupt democracies and target individuals. The responsible use of AI increasingly shows the need for human-AI teaming, necessitating effective interaction between humans and machines. A crucial yet often overlooked aspect of these interactions is the different ways in which humans and machines generalise. In cognitive science, human generalisation commonly involves abstraction and concept learning. In contrast, AI generalisation encompasses out-of-domain generalisation in machine learning, rule-based reasoning in symbolic AI, and abstraction in neuro-symbolic AI. In this perspective paper, we combine insights from AI and cognitive science to identify key commonalities and differences across three dimensions: notions of generalisation, methods for generalisation, and evaluation of generalisation. We map the different conceptualisations of generalisation in AI and cognitive science along these three dimensions and consider their role in human-AI teaming. This results in interdisciplinary challenges across AI and cognitive science that must be tackled to provide a foundation for effective and cognitively supported alignment in human-AI teaming scenarios.

Mathematical reasoning serves as a cornerstone for assessing the fundamental cognitive capabilities of human intelligence. In recent times, there has been a notable surge in the development of Large Language Models (LLMs) geared towards the automated resolution of mathematical problems. However, the landscape of mathematical problem types is vast and varied, with LLM-oriented techniques undergoing evaluation across diverse datasets and settings. This diversity makes it challenging to discern the true advancements and obstacles within this burgeoning field. This survey endeavors to address four pivotal dimensions: i) a comprehensive exploration of the various mathematical problems and their corresponding datasets that have been investigated; ii) an examination of the spectrum of LLM-oriented techniques that have been proposed for mathematical problem-solving; iii) an overview of factors and concerns affecting LLMs in solving math; and iv) an elucidation of the persisting challenges within this domain. To the best of our knowledge, this survey stands as one of the first extensive examinations of the landscape of LLMs in the realm of mathematics, providing a holistic perspective on the current state, accomplishments, and future challenges in this rapidly evolving field.

Cognitive textual and visual reasoning tasks, such as puzzles, series, and analogies, demand the ability to quickly reason, decipher, and evaluate patterns both textually and spatially. While LLMs and VLMs, through extensive training on large amounts of human-curated data, have attained a high level of pseudo-human intelligence in some common sense reasoning tasks, they still struggle with more complex reasoning tasks that require cognitive understanding. In this work, we introduce a new dataset, NTSEBench, designed to evaluate the cognitive multi-modal reasoning and problem-solving skills of large models. The dataset comprises 2,728 multiple-choice questions comprising of a total of 4,642 images across 26 categories sampled from the NTSE examination conducted nationwide in India, featuring both visual and textual general aptitude questions that do not rely on rote learning. We establish baselines on the dataset using state-of-the-art LLMs and VLMs. To facilitate a comparison between open source and propriety models, we propose four distinct modeling strategies to handle different modalities (text and images) in the dataset instances.

In this paper, we present an investigative study on how Mental Sets influence the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. LLMs have excelled in diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks, driven by advancements in parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) and emergent capabilities like in-context learning (ICL). For complex reasoning tasks, selecting the right model for PEFT or ICL is critical, often relying on scores on benchmarks such as MMLU, MATH, and GSM8K. However, current evaluation methods, based on metrics like F1 Score or reasoning chain assessments by larger models, overlook a key dimension: adaptability to unfamiliar situations and overcoming entrenched thinking patterns. In cognitive psychology, Mental Set refers to the tendency to persist with previously successful strategies, even when they become inefficient - a challenge for problem solving and reasoning. We compare the performance of LLM models like Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct and GPT-4o in the presence of mental sets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to integrate cognitive psychology concepts into the evaluation of LLMs for complex reasoning tasks, providing deeper insights into their adaptability and problem-solving efficacy.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

We are born with the ability to learn concepts by comparing diverse observations. This helps us to understand the new world in a compositional manner and facilitates extrapolation, as objects naturally consist of multiple concepts. In this work, we argue that the cognitive mechanism of comparison, fundamental to human learning, is also vital for machines to recover true concepts underlying the data. This offers correctness guarantees for the field of concept learning, which, despite its impressive empirical successes, still lacks general theoretical support. Specifically, we aim to develop a theoretical framework for the identifiability of concepts with multiple classes of observations. We show that with sufficient diversity across classes, hidden concepts can be identified without assuming specific concept types, functional relations, or parametric generative models. Interestingly, even when conditions are not globally satisfied, we can still provide alternative guarantees for as many concepts as possible based on local comparisons, thereby extending the applicability of our theory to more flexible scenarios. Moreover, the hidden structure between classes and concepts can also be identified nonparametrically. We validate our theoretical results in both synthetic and real-world settings.

While Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) generate extensive chain-of-thought reasoning, we lack a principled framework for understanding how these thoughts are structured. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach by applying Schoenfeld's Episode Theory, a classic cognitive framework for human mathematical problem-solving, to analyze the reasoning traces of LRMs. We annotated thousands of sentences and paragraphs from model-generated solutions to math problems using seven cognitive labels (e.g., Plan, Implement, Verify). The result is the first publicly available benchmark for the fine-grained analysis of machine reasoning, including a large annotated corpus and detailed annotation guidebooks. Our preliminary analysis reveals distinct patterns in LRM reasoning, such as the transition dynamics between cognitive states. This framework provides a theoretically grounded methodology for interpreting LRM cognition and enables future work on more controllable and transparent reasoning systems.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

A defining feature of human intelligence is the ability to adapt to changing environments by inferring latent task structure from sparse observations. Neuroscientific research indicates that this capability relies on the hippocampus constructing abstract representations, expressed as low-dimensional, approximately orthogonal manifolds in neural state space. However, the internal mechanisms of large language models (LLMs) remain largely opaque, making it unclear whether they form comparable abstract representations or instead rely on task-specific statistical regularities when performing comparable reasoning tasks. Here we adapt a contextual reversal-learning paradigm to a text-based setting and compare humans and LLMs at both the Behavioural and representational levels. We report that although LLMs exhibit generalizable reasoning less frequently than humans, when such inference occurs, their internal states exhibit abstract geometric structures that resemble those reported in the hippocampus. Notably, this representational geometry is not uniformly distributed but is organized hierarchically across model depth: whereas lower layers show early, stable encoding of stimulus identity, higher layers form a hippocampal-like functional band enriched for abstract context geometry associated with inference. Furthermore, complementary intervention experiments mechanistically implicate geometry in reasoning: task-sequence language modelling induces geometric disentanglement, whereas geometric regularization of higher layers increases the emergence of generalizable inference. Together, these findings establish abstract representational geometry as a mechanistic principle supporting inference in large language models.

Large language models are powerful systems that excel at many tasks, ranging from translation to mathematical reasoning. Yet, at the same time, these models often show unhuman-like characteristics. In the present paper, we address this gap and ask whether large language models can be turned into cognitive models. We find that -- after finetuning them on data from psychological experiments -- these models offer accurate representations of human behavior, even outperforming traditional cognitive models in two decision-making domains. In addition, we show that their representations contain the information necessary to model behavior on the level of individual subjects. Finally, we demonstrate that finetuning on multiple tasks enables large language models to predict human behavior in a previously unseen task. Taken together, these results suggest that large, pre-trained models can be adapted to become generalist cognitive models, thereby opening up new research directions that could transform cognitive psychology and the behavioral sciences as a whole.

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance by incorporating functional symbolic representations that abstractly describe graph traversal algorithms and step-by-step reasoning in few-shot learning settings. However, it remains unclear how LLMs genuinely understand the abstract meaning of each reasoning step and the overall algorithm from only a limited number of demonstrations. This work aims to localize the attention heads responsible for individual reasoning steps and characterize the types of information transferred among them. We first align constituent reasoning steps with their corresponding token logits under a symbolic-aided Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting framework. Our analysis shows that token positions that steer the reasoning process are associated with low confidence scores caused by constraints on satisfying reasoning behavior patterns in demonstrations. We then adopt causal mediation analysis techniques to identify the attention heads responsible for these patterns. In addition, our findings indicate that LLMs retrieve factual and rule-based information for individual sub-reasoning tasks through specialized attention heads (approximately 3% total heads), whereas higher layers predominantly facilitate information integration and the emergence of global reasoning strategies (e.g., graph traversal algorithms) that coordinate multiple intermediate reasoning steps to solve the overall task.

Traditionally, theory and practice of Cognitive Control are linked via literature reviews by human domain experts. This approach, however, is inadequate to track the ever-growing literature. It may also be biased, and yield redundancies and confusion. Here we present an alternative approach. We performed automated text analyses on a large body of scientific texts to create a joint representation of tasks and constructs. More specifically, 385,705 scientific abstracts were first mapped into an embedding space using a transformers-based language model. Document embeddings were then used to identify a task-construct graph embedding that grounds constructs on tasks and supports nuanced meaning of the constructs by taking advantage of constrained random walks in the graph. This joint task-construct graph embedding, can be queried to generate task batteries targeting specific constructs, may reveal knowledge gaps in the literature, and inspire new tasks and novel hypotheses.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in solving mathematical reasoning tasks, leveraging Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data as a vital component in guiding answer generation. Current paradigms typically generate CoT and answers directly for a given problem, diverging from human problem-solving strategies to some extent. Humans often solve problems by recalling analogous cases and leveraging their solutions to reason about the current task. Inspired by this cognitive process, we propose MetaLadder, a novel framework that explicitly prompts LLMs to recall and reflect on meta-problems, those structurally or semantically analogous problems, alongside their CoT solutions before addressing the target problem. Additionally, we introduce a problem-restating mechanism to enhance the model's comprehension of the target problem by regenerating the original question, which further improves reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the model can achieve reasoning transfer from analogical problems, mimicking human-like "learning from examples" and generalization abilities. Extensive experiments on mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that our MetaLadder significantly boosts LLMs' problem-solving accuracy, largely outperforming standard CoT-based methods (10.3\% accuracy gain) and other methods. Our code and data has been released at https://github.com/LHL3341/MetaLadder.

We introduce a new language learning setting relevant to building adaptive natural language interfaces. It is inspired by Wittgenstein's language games: a human wishes to accomplish some task (e.g., achieving a certain configuration of blocks), but can only communicate with a computer, who performs the actual actions (e.g., removing all red blocks). The computer initially knows nothing about language and therefore must learn it from scratch through interaction, while the human adapts to the computer's capabilities. We created a game in a blocks world and collected interactions from 100 people playing it. First, we analyze the humans' strategies, showing that using compositionality and avoiding synonyms correlates positively with task performance. Second, we compare computer strategies, showing how to quickly learn a semantic parsing model from scratch, and that modeling pragmatics further accelerates learning for successful players.

When do machine learning systems fail to generalize, and what mechanisms could improve their generalization? Here, we draw inspiration from cognitive science to argue that one weakness of machine learning systems is their failure to exhibit latent learning -- learning information that is not relevant to the task at hand, but that might be useful in a future task. We show how this perspective links failures ranging from the reversal curse in language modeling to new findings on agent-based navigation. We then highlight how cognitive science points to episodic memory as a potential part of the solution to these issues. Correspondingly, we show that a system with an oracle retrieval mechanism can use learning experiences more flexibly to generalize better across many of these challenges. We also identify some of the essential components for effectively using retrieval, including the importance of within-example in-context learning for acquiring the ability to use information across retrieved examples. In summary, our results illustrate one possible contributor to the relative data inefficiency of current machine learning systems compared to natural intelligence, and help to understand how retrieval methods can complement parametric learning to improve generalization.

Language models have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various natural language processing tasks, yet they struggle with planning tasks requiring multi-step simulations. Inspired by human cognitive processes, this paper investigates the optimal planning power of language models that can construct a cognitive map of a given environment. Our experiments demonstrate that cognitive map significantly enhances the performance of both optimal and reachable planning generation ability in the Gridworld path planning task. We observe that our method showcases two key characteristics similar to human cognition: generalization of its planning ability to extrapolated environments and rapid adaptation with limited training data. We hope our findings in the Gridworld task provide insights into modeling human cognitive processes in language models, potentially leading to the development of more advanced and robust systems that better resemble human cognition.

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

Memory is the process of encoding, storing, and retrieving information, allowing humans to retain experiences, knowledge, skills, and facts over time, and serving as the foundation for growth and effective interaction with the world. It plays a crucial role in shaping our identity, making decisions, learning from past experiences, building relationships, and adapting to changes. In the era of large language models (LLMs), memory refers to the ability of an AI system to retain, recall, and use information from past interactions to improve future responses and interactions. Although previous research and reviews have provided detailed descriptions of memory mechanisms, there is still a lack of a systematic review that summarizes and analyzes the relationship between the memory of LLM-driven AI systems and human memory, as well as how we can be inspired by human memory to construct more powerful memory systems. To achieve this, in this paper, we propose a comprehensive survey on the memory of LLM-driven AI systems. In particular, we first conduct a detailed analysis of the categories of human memory and relate them to the memory of AI systems. Second, we systematically organize existing memory-related work and propose a categorization method based on three dimensions (object, form, and time) and eight quadrants. Finally, we illustrate some open problems regarding the memory of current AI systems and outline possible future directions for memory in the era of large language models.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) provide a new opportunity to address the long-standing question of how concepts are represented and organized in the mind, which is central to unravelling the nature of human cognition. Here, we reframed the classic reverse dictionary task to simulate human concept inference in context and investigated the emergence of human-like conceptual representations within LLMs. We found that LLMs were able to infer concepts from definitional descriptions and construct representation spaces that converge towards a shared, context-independent structure. These representations effectively predicted human behavioural judgments and aligned well with neural activity patterns in the human brain, offering evidence for biological plausibility. These findings demonstrate that human-like conceptual representations and organization can naturally emerge from language prediction, even without real-world grounding. Our work supports the view that LLMs serve as valuable tools for understanding complex human cognition and paves the way for better alignment between artificial and human intelligence.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional performance in planning the use of various functional tools, such as calculators and retrievers, particularly in question-answering tasks. In this paper, we expand the definition of these tools, centering on conceptual tools within the context of dialogue systems. A conceptual tool specifies a cognitive concept that aids systematic or investigative thought. These conceptual tools play important roles in practice, such as multiple psychological or tutoring strategies being dynamically applied in a single turn to compose helpful responses. To further enhance the reasoning and planning capability of LLMs with these conceptual tools, we introduce a multi-persona collaboration framework: Think-Plan-Execute (TPE). This framework decouples the response generation process into three distinct roles: Thinker, Planner, and Executor. Specifically, the Thinker analyzes the internal status exhibited in the dialogue context, such as user emotions and preferences, to formulate a global guideline. The Planner then generates executable plans to call different conceptual tools (e.g., sources or strategies), while the Executor compiles all intermediate results into a coherent response. This structured approach not only enhances the explainability and controllability of responses but also reduces token redundancy. We demonstrate the effectiveness of TPE across various dialogue response generation tasks, including multi-source (FoCus) and multi-strategy interactions (CIMA and PsyQA). This reveals its potential to handle real-world dialogue interactions that require more complicated tool learning beyond just functional tools. The full code and data will be released for reproduction.

What do large language models actually model? Do they tell us something about human capacities, or are they models of the corpus we've trained them on? I give a non-deflationary defence of the latter position. Cognitive science tells us that linguistic capabilities in humans rely supralinear formats for computation. The transformer architecture, by contrast, supports at best a linear formats for processing. This argument will rely primarily on certain invariants of the computational architecture of transformers. I then suggest a positive story about what transformers are doing, focusing on Liu et al. (2022)'s intriguing speculations about shortcut automata. I conclude with why I don't think this is a terribly deflationary story. Language is not (just) a means for expressing inner state but also a kind of 'discourse machine' that lets us make new language given appropriate context. We have learned to use this technology in one way; LLMs have also learned to use it too, but via very different means.

Generative recommendation models in the OneRec family have been widely deployed in many real-world services, such as short-video, live-streaming, advertising, and e-commerce. However, these generative models can only benefit from the scaling advantage, while their reasoning ability is hard to activate, since we cannot construct meaningful Chain-of-Thought (CoT) sequences consisting of itemic tokens only. Inspired by the success of the reasoning-style ``think before answer'' paradigm in the LLM field, we conduct preliminary studies (i.e., OneRec-Think, OpenOneRec) to explore reasoning capability in generative recommendation. Nevertheless, we notice an unexpected phenomenon: the thinking mode does not show advantages over the non-thinking mode. Drawing insights from recent findings on CoT robustness in multi-modal language models, we argue that effective reasoning in recommendation rests on two factors: perception, the ability to ground itemic tokens in their underlying language semantics, and cognition, the ability to reorganize a user's behavior sequence into coherent latent interest points. We therefore propose OneReason, which includes: (1) strong itemic token perception in pre-training, (2) a three-level cognition-enhanced CoT format for recommendation tasks in SFT, and (3) a specialize-then-unify training recipe in RL to enhance the thinking ability.

Understanding how humans conceptualize and categorize natural objects offers critical insights into perception and cognition. With the advent of Large Language Models (LLMs), a key question arises: can these models develop human-like object representations from linguistic and multimodal data? In this study, we combined behavioral and neuroimaging analyses to explore the relationship between object concept representations in LLMs and human cognition. We collected 4.7 million triplet judgments from LLMs and Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) to derive low-dimensional embeddings that capture the similarity structure of 1,854 natural objects. The resulting 66-dimensional embeddings were stable, predictive, and exhibited semantic clustering similar to human mental representations. Remarkably, the dimensions underlying these embeddings were interpretable, suggesting that LLMs and MLLMs develop human-like conceptual representations of objects. Further analysis showed strong alignment between model embeddings and neural activity patterns in brain regions such as EBA, PPA, RSC, and FFA. This provides compelling evidence that the object representations in LLMs, while not identical to human ones, share fundamental similarities that reflect key aspects of human conceptual knowledge. Our findings advance the understanding of machine intelligence and inform the development of more human-like artificial cognitive systems.

We propose cognitive prompting as a novel approach to guide problem-solving in large language models (LLMs) through structured, human-like cognitive operations such as goal clarification, decomposition, filtering, abstraction, and pattern recognition. By employing systematic, step-by-step reasoning, cognitive prompting enables LLMs to efficiently tackle complex, multi-step tasks. We evaluate the effectiveness of cognitive prompting on Meta's LLaMA models, comparing performance on arithmetic reasoning tasks using the GSM8K dataset and on commonsense reasoning benchmarks. Our analysis includes comparisons between models without cognitive prompting, models with a static sequence of cognitive operations, and models using reflective cognitive prompting, where the LLM dynamically self-selects the sequence of cognitive operations. The results show that cognitive prompting, particularly when dynamically adapted, significantly improves the performance of larger models, such as LLaMA3.1 70B, and enhances their ability to handle multi-step reasoning tasks. This approach also improves interpretability and flexibility, highlighting cognitive prompting as a promising strategy for general-purpose AI reasoning.

This paper revisits Ramon Llull's Ars combinatoria - a medieval framework for generating knowledge through symbolic recombination - as a conceptual foundation for building a modern Llull's thinking machine for research ideation. Our approach defines three compositional axes: Theme (e.g., efficiency, adaptivity), Domain (e.g., question answering, machine translation), and Method (e.g., adversarial training, linear attention). These elements represent high-level abstractions common in scientific work - motivations, problem settings, and technical approaches - and serve as building blocks for LLM-driven exploration. We mine elements from human experts or conference papers and show that prompting LLMs with curated combinations produces research ideas that are diverse, relevant, and grounded in current literature. This modern thinking machine offers a lightweight, interpretable tool for augmenting scientific creativity and suggests a path toward collaborative ideation between humans and AI.

Recent studies of the applications of conversational AI tools, such as chatbots powered by large language models, to complex real-world knowledge work have shown limitations related to reasoning and multi-step problem solving. Specifically, while existing chatbots simulate shallow reasoning and understanding they are prone to errors as problem complexity increases. The failure of these systems to address complex knowledge work is due to the fact that they do not perform any actual cognition. In this position paper, we present Cognitive AI, a higher-level framework for implementing programmatically defined neuro-symbolic cognition above and outside of large language models. Specifically, we propose a dual-layer functional architecture for Cognitive AI that serves as a roadmap for AI systems that can perform complex multi-step knowledge work. We propose that Cognitive AI is a necessary precursor for the evolution of higher forms of AI, such as AGI, and specifically claim that AGI cannot be achieved by probabilistic approaches on their own. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for large language models, adoption cycles in AI, and commercial Cognitive AI development.

The first generation of Large Language Models - what might be called "Act I" of generative AI (2020-2023) - achieved remarkable success through massive parameter and data scaling, yet exhibited fundamental limitations in knowledge latency, shallow reasoning, and constrained cognitive processes. During this era, prompt engineering emerged as our primary interface with AI, enabling dialogue-level communication through natural language. We now witness the emergence of "Act II" (2024-present), where models are transitioning from knowledge-retrieval systems (in latent space) to thought-construction engines through test-time scaling techniques. This new paradigm establishes a mind-level connection with AI through language-based thoughts. In this paper, we clarify the conceptual foundations of cognition engineering and explain why this moment is critical for its development. We systematically break down these advanced approaches through comprehensive tutorials and optimized implementations, democratizing access to cognition engineering and enabling every practitioner to participate in AI's second act. We provide a regularly updated collection of papers on test-time scaling in the GitHub Repository: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/cognition-engineering

The field of psychology has long recognized a basic level of categorization that humans use when labeling visual stimuli, a term coined by Rosch in 1976. This level of categorization has been found to be used most frequently, to have higher information density, and to aid in visual language tasks with priming in humans. Here, we investigate basic level categorization in two recently released, open-source vision-language models (VLMs). This paper demonstrates that Llama 3.2 Vision Instruct (11B) and Molmo 7B-D both prefer basic level categorization consistent with human behavior. Moreover, the models' preferences are consistent with nuanced human behaviors like the biological versus non-biological basic level effects and the well established expert basic level shift, further suggesting that VLMs acquire cognitive categorization behaviors from the human data on which they are trained.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable success in interpreting natural scenes, their ability to process discrete symbols -- the fundamental building blocks of human cognition -- remains a critical open question. Unlike continuous visual data, symbols such as mathematical formulas, chemical structures, and linguistic characters require precise, deeper interpretation. This paper introduces a comprehensive benchmark to evaluate how top-tier MLLMs navigate these "discrete semantic spaces" across five domains: language, culture, mathematics, physics, and chemistry. Our investigation uncovers a counterintuitive phenomenon: models often fail at basic symbol recognition yet succeed in complex reasoning tasks, suggesting they rely on linguistic probability rather than true visual perception. By exposing this "cognitive mismatch", we highlight a significant gap in current AI capabilities: the struggle to truly perceive and understand the symbolic languages that underpin scientific discovery and abstract thought. This work offers a roadmap for developing more rigorous, human-aligned intelligent systems.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

Drawing on contemporary pragmatist philosophy and linguistic theories on cognition, meaning, and communication, this paper presents a dynamic, metasemantic-metapragmatic taxonomy for grounding and conceptualizing human-like multimodal communicative alignment. The framework is rooted in contemporary developments of the three basic communicative capacities initially identified by American logician and pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce: iconic (sensory and perceptual qualities), indexical (contextual and sociocultural associations), and rule-like (symbolic and intuitive reasoning). Expanding on these developments, I introduce the concept of indexical contextualization and propose the principle of "contextualization directionality" for characterizing the crucial metapragmatic capacity for maintaining, navigating, or transitioning between semantic and pragmatic modes of multimodal communication. I contend that current cognitive-social computational and engineering methodologies disproportionately emphasize the semantic/metasemantic domain, overlooking the pivotal role of metapragmatic indexicality in traversing the semantic-pragmatic spectrum of communication. The framework's broader implications for intentionality, identity, affect, and ethics in within-modal and cross-modal human-machine alignment are also discussed.

Reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence that plays a crucial role in activities such as problem solving, decision making, and critical thinking. In recent years, large language models (LLMs) have made significant progress in natural language processing, and there is observation that these models may exhibit reasoning abilities when they are sufficiently large. However, it is not yet clear to what extent LLMs are capable of reasoning. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of knowledge on reasoning in LLMs, including techniques for improving and eliciting reasoning in these models, methods and benchmarks for evaluating reasoning abilities, findings and implications of previous research in this field, and suggestions on future directions. Our aim is to provide a detailed and up-to-date review of this topic and stimulate meaningful discussion and future work.

Autonomous web navigation remains challenging for LLM agents, and the strongest generalist systems rely on proprietary reasoning models whose inference cost is prohibitive for the repetitive tasks where such agents would be most useful. We argue this gap stems not from insufficient model capability but from agent architectures that fail to replicate three human cognitive advantages: selective attention to relevant page regions, persistent memory of website structure, and procedural fluency with common interaction patterns. We introduce WebChallenger, a web agent framework that addresses each gap through architecture design rather than model scale, built around PageMem: a structured page representation deterministically constructed from the DOM that exposes each page as a hierarchy of semantic sections with short summaries. On this shared substrate we build three mechanisms that mirror the three cognitive advantages: a divide-and-conquer observation pipeline that lets the agent skim section summaries and extract details only from task-relevant regions; a lightweight exploration and memory system that traverses each website once to build a reusable map of pages and element behaviors; and compound action workflows that collapse common multi-step interactions into single agent actions, handling partial state changes automatically. Because all three operate over PageMem, the framework generalizes across websites without site-specific adapters. Using off-the-shelf open-weight models without fine-tuning, our system achieves 56.3% on WebArena, 48.7% on VisualWebArena, 51.0% on Online-Mind2Web, and 70.9% on WorkArena, approaching frontier proprietary systems at a fraction of the cost. Our code is released at https://github.com/jayoohwang1/webchallenger

The lack of a concrete definition for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) obscures the gap between today's specialized AI and human-level cognition. This paper introduces a quantifiable framework to address this, defining AGI as matching the cognitive versatility and proficiency of a well-educated adult. To operationalize this, we ground our methodology in Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory, the most empirically validated model of human cognition. The framework dissects general intelligence into ten core cognitive domains-including reasoning, memory, and perception-and adapts established human psychometric batteries to evaluate AI systems. Application of this framework reveals a highly "jagged" cognitive profile in contemporary models. While proficient in knowledge-intensive domains, current AI systems have critical deficits in foundational cognitive machinery, particularly long-term memory storage. The resulting AGI scores (e.g., GPT-4 at 27%, GPT-5 at 58%) concretely quantify both rapid progress and the substantial gap remaining before AGI.

This study explores the neural and behavioral consequences of LLM-assisted essay writing. Participants were divided into three groups: LLM, Search Engine, and Brain-only (no tools). Each completed three sessions under the same condition. In a fourth session, LLM users were reassigned to Brain-only group (LLM-to-Brain), and Brain-only users were reassigned to LLM condition (Brain-to-LLM). A total of 54 participants took part in Sessions 1-3, with 18 completing session 4. We used electroencephalography (EEG) to assess cognitive load during essay writing, and analyzed essays using NLP, as well as scoring essays with the help from human teachers and an AI judge. Across groups, NERs, n-gram patterns, and topic ontology showed within-group homogeneity. EEG revealed significant differences in brain connectivity: Brain-only participants exhibited the strongest, most distributed networks; Search Engine users showed moderate engagement; and LLM users displayed the weakest connectivity. Cognitive activity scaled down in relation to external tool use. In session 4, LLM-to-Brain participants showed reduced alpha and beta connectivity, indicating under-engagement. Brain-to-LLM users exhibited higher memory recall and activation of occipito-parietal and prefrontal areas, similar to Search Engine users. Self-reported ownership of essays was the lowest in the LLM group and the highest in the Brain-only group. LLM users also struggled to accurately quote their own work. While LLMs offer immediate convenience, our findings highlight potential cognitive costs. Over four months, LLM users consistently underperformed at neural, linguistic, and behavioral levels. These results raise concerns about the long-term educational implications of LLM reliance and underscore the need for deeper inquiry into AI's role in learning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various tasks, raising expectations for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). This position paper argues that integrating explicit memory is the cornerstone for advancing LLMs toward AGI. The key reason is that the underlying learning mechanism of LLMs is highly analogous to human implicit memory. However, higher-order cognitive functions necessary for AGI, such as long-term strategic planning, metacognition, and symbolic reasoning, heavily rely on hippocampal explicit memory and cannot arise solely from implicit statistical learning. Drawing on findings from neuroscience, I advance this perspective and complement it with computational requirements for artificial explicit memory systems, hoping to foster further research and lay the groundwork for explicit memory integration.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have shown remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks (e.g., image captioning, visual question answering). While broad, their knowledge remains generic (e.g., recognizing a dog), and they are unable to handle personalized subjects (e.g., recognizing a user's pet dog). Human reasoning, in contrast, typically operates within the context of specific subjects in our surroundings. For example, one might ask, "What should I buy for my dog's birthday?"; as opposed to a generic inquiry about "What should I buy for a dog's birthday?". Similarly, when looking at a friend's image, the interest lies in seeing their activities (e.g., "my friend is holding a cat"), rather than merely observing generic human actions (e.g., "a man is holding a cat"). In this paper, we introduce the novel task of personalizing LMMs, so that they can have conversations about a specific subject. We propose Yo'LLaVA, which learns to embed a personalized subject into a set of latent tokens given a handful of example images of the subject. Our qualitative and quantitative analyses reveal that Yo'LLaVA can learn the concept more efficiently using fewer tokens and more effectively encode the visual attributes compared to strong prompting baselines (e.g., LLaVA).

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence, specifically regarding the awareness of one's own knowledge. While humans rely on shared internal memory for both answering questions and reporting their knowledge state, this dependency in LLMs remains underexplored. This study proposes a framework to measure metacognitive ability d_{type2}' using a dual-prompt method, followed by the introduction of Evolution Strategy for Metacognitive Alignment (ESMA) to bind a model's internal knowledge to its explicit behaviors. ESMA demonstrates robust generalization across diverse untrained settings, indicating a enhancement in the model's ability to reference its own knowledge. Furthermore, parameter analysis attributes these improvements to a sparse set of significant modifications.

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.

The web is full of guidance on a wide variety of tasks, from changing the oil in your car to baking an apple pie. However, as content is created independently, a single task could have thousands of corresponding procedural texts. This makes it difficult for users to view the bigger picture and understand the multiple ways the task could be accomplished. In this work we propose an unsupervised learning approach for summarizing multiple procedural texts into an intuitive graph representation, allowing users to easily explore commonalities and differences. We demonstrate our approach on recipes, a prominent example of procedural texts. User studies show that our representation is intuitive and coherent and that it has the potential to help users with several sensemaking tasks, including adapting recipes for a novice cook and finding creative ways to spice up a dish.

A moderately detailed consideration of interactive LLMs as cognitive systems is given, focusing on LLMs circa mid-2023 such as ChatGPT, GPT-4, Bard, Llama, etc.. Cognitive strengths of these systems are reviewed, and then careful attention is paid to the substantial differences between the sort of cognitive system these LLMs are, and the sort of cognitive systems human beings are. It is found that many of the practical weaknesses of these AI systems can be tied specifically to lacks in the basic cognitive architectures according to which these systems are built. It is argued that incremental improvement of such LLMs is not a viable approach to working toward human-level AGI, in practical terms given realizable amounts of compute resources. This does not imply there is nothing to learn about human-level AGI from studying and experimenting with LLMs, nor that LLMs cannot form significant parts of human-level AGI architectures that also incorporate other ideas. Social and ethical matters regarding LLMs are very briefly touched from this perspective, which implies that while care should be taken regarding misinformation and other issues, and economic upheavals will need their own social remedies based on their unpredictable course as with any powerfully impactful technology, overall the sort of policy needed as regards modern LLMs is quite different than would be the case if a more credible approximation to human-level AGI were at hand.

Benefiting from the powerful capabilities of large language models (LLMs), agents based on LLMs have shown the potential to address domain-specific tasks and emulate human behaviors. However, the content generated by these agents remains somewhat superficial, owing to their limited domain expertise and the absence of an effective cognitive architecture. To address this, we present the Configurable General Multi-Agent Interaction (CGMI) framework, designed to replicate human interactions in real-world scenarios. Specifically, we propose a tree-structured methodology for the assignment, detection, and maintenance of agent personality. Additionally, we designed a cognitive architecture equipped with a skill library based on the ACT* model, which contains memory, reflection, and planning modules. We have also integrated general agents to augment the virtual environment's realism. Using the CGMI framework, we simulated numerous classroom interactions between teacher and students. The experiments indicate that aspects such as the teaching methodology, curriculum, and student performance closely mirror real classroom settings. We will open source our work.

People can categorize the same entity at multiple taxonomic levels, such as basic (bear), superordinate (animal), and subordinate (grizzly bear). While prior research has focused on basic-level categories, this study is the first attempt to examine the organization of categories by analyzing exemplars produced at the subordinate level. We present a new Italian psycholinguistic dataset of human-generated exemplars for 187 concrete words. We then use these data to evaluate whether textual and vision LLMs produce meaningful exemplars that align with human category organization across three key tasks: exemplar generation, category induction, and typicality judgment. Our findings show a low alignment between humans and LLMs, consistent with previous studies. However, their performance varies notably across different semantic domains. Ultimately, this study highlights both the promises and the constraints of using AI-generated exemplars to support psychological and linguistic research.

We introduce KiloGram, a resource for studying abstract visual reasoning in humans and machines. Drawing on the history of tangram puzzles as stimuli in cognitive science, we build a richly annotated dataset that, with >1k distinct stimuli, is orders of magnitude larger and more diverse than prior resources. It is both visually and linguistically richer, moving beyond whole shape descriptions to include segmentation maps and part labels. We use this resource to evaluate the abstract visual reasoning capacities of recent multi-modal models. We observe that pre-trained weights demonstrate limited abstract reasoning, which dramatically improves with fine-tuning. We also observe that explicitly describing parts aids abstract reasoning for both humans and models, especially when jointly encoding the linguistic and visual inputs. KiloGram is available at https://lil.nlp.cornell.edu/kilogram .

Large Language Model can reasonably understand and generate human expressions but may lack of thorough thinking and reasoning mechanisms. Recently there have been several studies which enhance the thinking ability of language models but most of them are not data-driven or training-based. In this paper, we are motivated by the cognitive mechanism in the natural world, and design a novel model architecture called TaS which allows it to first consider the thoughts and then express the response based upon the query. We design several pipelines to annotate or generate the thought contents from prompt-response samples, then add language heads in a middle layer which behaves as the thinking layer. We train the language model by the thoughts-augmented data and successfully let the thinking layer automatically generate reasonable thoughts and finally output more reasonable responses. Both qualitative examples and quantitative results validate the effectiveness and performance of TaS. Our code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/TadE.

There is a concerted effort to build domain-general artificial intelligence in the form of universal neural network models with sufficient computational flexibility to solve a wide variety of cognitive tasks but without requiring fine-tuning on individual problem spaces and domains. To do this, models need appropriate priors and inductive biases, such that trained models can generalise to out-of-distribution examples and new problem sets. Here we provide an overview of the hallmarks endowing biological neural networks with the functionality needed for flexible cognition, in order to establish which features might also be important to achieve similar functionality in artificial systems. We specifically discuss the role of system-level distribution of network communication and recurrence, in addition to the role of short-term topological changes for efficient local computation. As machine learning models become more complex, these principles may provide valuable directions in an otherwise vast space of possible architectures. In addition, testing these inductive biases within artificial systems may help us to understand the biological principles underlying domain-general cognition.

In this paper we argue that key, often sensational and misleading, claims regarding linguistic capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are based on at least two unfounded assumptions; the assumption of language completeness and the assumption of data completeness. Language completeness assumes that a distinct and complete thing such as `a natural language' exists, the essential characteristics of which can be effectively and comprehensively modelled by an LLM. The assumption of data completeness relies on the belief that a language can be quantified and wholly captured by data. Work within the enactive approach to cognitive science makes clear that, rather than a distinct and complete thing, language is a means or way of acting. Languaging is not the kind of thing that can admit of a complete or comprehensive modelling. From an enactive perspective we identify three key characteristics of enacted language; embodiment, participation, and precariousness, that are absent in LLMs, and likely incompatible in principle with current architectures. We argue that these absences imply that LLMs are not now and cannot in their present form be linguistic agents the way humans are. We illustrate the point in particular through the phenomenon of `algospeak', a recently described pattern of high stakes human language activity in heavily controlled online environments. On the basis of these points, we conclude that sensational and misleading claims about LLM agency and capabilities emerge from a deep misconception of both what human language is and what LLMs are.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrate impressive abilities over high level perception and reasoning, their robustness in the wild still lags behind humans and exhibits diminished efficacy on simple tasks that are intuitive for humans. We examine the hypothesis that these deficiencies stem from the absence of core knowledge, rudimentary cognitive abilities innate to humans from early childhood. To probe core knowledge representation in MLLMs, we draw from developmental cognitive sciences and develop a large-scale benchmark, CoreCognition dataset, encompassing 12 core cognitive concepts. We evaluate 219 models with 10 different prompts, leading to a total of 2409 data points for analysis. Our findings reveal core knowledge deficits in early developed core abilities while models demonstrate human comparable performance in high level cognition. Moreover, we find that low level abilities show little to no scaling, in stark contrast to high level abilities. Finally, we introduce an evaluation technique, Concept Hacking, through which we demonstrate that MLLMs do not genuinely advance toward core knowledge but instead rely on illusory understanding and shortcut learning as they scale. Website with this https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{link}.

We introduce "Method Actors" as a mental model for guiding LLM prompt engineering and prompt architecture. Under this mental model, LLMs should be thought of as actors; prompts as scripts and cues; and LLM responses as performances. We apply this mental model to the task of improving LLM performance at playing Connections, a New York Times word puzzle game that prior research identified as a challenging benchmark for evaluating LLM reasoning. Our experiments with GPT-4o show that a "Method Actors" approach can significantly improve LLM performance over both a vanilla and "Chain of Thoughts" approach. A vanilla approach solves 27% of Connections puzzles in our dataset and a "Chain of Thoughts" approach solves 41% of puzzles, whereas our strongest "Method Actor" approach solves 86% of puzzles. We also test OpenAI's newest model designed specifically for complex reasoning tasks, o1-preview. When asked to solve a puzzle all at once, o1-preview solves 79% of Connections puzzles in our dataset, and when allowed to build puzzle solutions one guess at a time over multiple API calls, o1-preview solves 100% of the puzzles. Incorporating a "Method Actor" prompt architecture increases the percentage of puzzles that o1-preview solves perfectly from 76% to 87%.

Large language models' reasoning abilities benefit from methods that organize their thought processes, such as chain-of-thought prompting, which employs a sequential structure to guide the reasoning process step-by-step. However, existing approaches focus primarily on organizing the sequence of thoughts, leaving structure in individual thought steps underexplored. To address this gap, we propose Table as Thought, a framework inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories on human thought. Table as Thought organizes reasoning within a tabular schema, where rows represent sequential thought steps and columns capture critical constraints and contextual information to enhance reasoning. The reasoning process iteratively populates the table until self-verification ensures completeness and correctness. Our experiments show that Table as Thought excels in planning tasks and demonstrates a strong potential for enhancing LLM performance in mathematical reasoning compared to unstructured thought baselines. This work provides a novel exploration of refining thought representation within LLMs, paving the way for advancements in reasoning and AI cognition.

Identifying which brain regions represent a visual concept in the human brain is a central challenge in neuroscience. Existing approaches have localized coarse functional regions (e.g., faces, places) through activation maximization, identifying regions that activate strongly for a target concept relative to other concepts. Yet strong activation alone does not establish that a region represents the concept itself, as responses may instead be driven by correlated visual or semantic cues. We introduce BrainCause, an automated framework that combines generative and brain models to synthesize controlled stimuli and validate neural representations through targeted causal testing. Given a query specifying a concept of interest, our framework constructs targeted stimulus sets comprising concept images, counterfactual edits that remove the target concept while preserving other image content, and images with candidate correlated distractors. It then uses an image-to-fMRI encoding model to predict brain responses and searches for representations that respond specifically to the target concept over correlated alternatives. BrainCause returns validated candidate representations and proposes follow-up fMRI experiments to further test or extend its discoveries. Our approach successfully recovers known functional localizations and identifies new candidate representations across dozens of concepts, validated on both predicted and measured fMRI data. Critically, we show that without causal validation, a large fraction of localizations would be false positives, confirming that activation alone is insufficient evidence of representation.

Large language models map semantically related prompts to similar internal representations -- a phenomenon interpretable as attractor-like dynamics. We ask whether the identity document of a persistent cognitive agent (its cognitive_core) exhibits analogous attractor-like behavior. We present a controlled experiment on Llama 3.1 8B Instruct, comparing hidden states of an original cognitive_core (Condition A), seven paraphrases (Condition B), and seven structurally matched controls (Condition C). Mean-pooled states at layers 8, 16, and 24 show that paraphrases converge to a tighter cluster than controls (Cohen's d > 1.88, p < 10^{-27}, Bonferroni-corrected). Replication on Gemma 2 9B confirms cross-architecture generalizability. Ablations suggest the effect is primarily semantic rather than structural, and that structural completeness appears necessary to reach the attractor region. An exploratory experiment shows that reading a scientific description of the agent shifts internal state toward the attractor -- closer than a sham preprint -- distinguishing knowing about an identity from operating as that identity. These results provide representational evidence that agent identity documents induce attractor-like geometry in LLM activation space.

The quest for human imitative AI has been an enduring topic in AI research since its inception. The technical evolution and emerging capabilities of the latest cohort of large language models (LLMs) have reinvigorated the subject beyond academia to the cultural zeitgeist. While recent NLP evaluation benchmark tasks test some aspects of human-imitative behaviour (e.g., BIG-bench's 'human-like behavior' tasks), few, if not none, examine creative problem solving abilities. Creative problem solving in humans is a well-studied topic in cognitive neuroscience with standardized tests that predominantly use the ability to associate (heterogeneous) connections among clue words as a metric for creativity. Exposure to misleading stimuli - distractors dubbed red herrings - impede human performance in such tasks via the fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm. In cognitive neuroscience studies, such fixations are experimentally induced by pre-exposing participants to orthographically similar incorrect words to subsequent word-fragments or clues. The popular British quiz show Only Connect's Connecting Wall segment essentially mimics Mednick's Remote Associates Test (RAT) formulation with built-in, deliberate red herrings, which makes it an ideal proxy dataset to explore and study fixation effect and Einstellung paradigm from cognitive neuroscience in LLMs. In addition to presenting the novel Only Connect Wall (OCW) dataset, we also report results from our evaluation of selected pre-trained language models and LLMs (including OpenAI's GPT series) on creative problem solving tasks like grouping clue words by heterogeneous connections, and identifying correct open knowledge domain connections in respective groups. The code and link to the dataset are available at https://github.com/TaatiTeam/OCW.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), which autonomously produce a reasoning Chain of Thought (CoT) before producing final responses, offer a promising approach to interpreting and monitoring model behaviors. Inspired by the observation that certain CoT patterns -- e.g., ``Wait, did I miss anything?'' -- consistently emerge across tasks, we explore whether LRMs exhibit human-like cognitive habits. Building on Habits of Mind, a well-established framework of cognitive habits associated with successful human problem-solving, we introduce CogTest, a principled benchmark designed to evaluate LRMs' cognitive habits. CogTest includes 16 cognitive habits, each instantiated with 25 diverse tasks, and employs an evidence-first extraction method to ensure reliable habit identification. With CogTest, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 16 widely used LLMs (13 LRMs and 3 non-reasoning ones). Our findings reveal that LRMs, unlike conventional LLMs, not only exhibit human-like habits but also adaptively deploy them according to different tasks. Finer-grained analyses further uncover patterns of similarity and difference in LRMs' cognitive habit profiles, particularly certain inter-family similarity (e.g., Qwen-3 models and DeepSeek-R1). Extending the study to safety-related tasks, we observe that certain habits, such as Taking Responsible Risks, are strongly associated with the generation of harmful responses. These findings suggest that studying persistent behavioral patterns in LRMs' CoTs is a valuable step toward deeper understanding of LLM misbehavior. The code is available at: https://github.com/jianshuod/CogTest.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) excel at many multimodal tasks, yet their cognitive processes remain opaque on complex lateral thinking challenges like rebus puzzles. While recent work has demonstrated these models struggle significantly with rebus puzzle solving, the underlying reasoning processes and failure patterns remain largely unexplored. We address this gap through a comprehensive explainability analysis that moves beyond performance metrics to understand how VLMs approach these complex lateral thinking challenges. Our study contributes a systematically annotated dataset of 221 rebus puzzles across six cognitive categories, paired with an evaluation framework that separates reasoning quality from answer correctness. We investigate three prompting strategies designed to elicit different types of explanatory processes and reveal critical insights into VLM cognitive processes. Our findings demonstrate that reasoning quality varies dramatically across puzzle categories, with models showing systematic strengths in visual composition while exhibiting fundamental limitations in absence interpretation and cultural symbolism. We also discover that prompting strategy substantially influences both cognitive approach and problem-solving effectiveness, establishing explainability as an integral component of model performance rather than a post-hoc consideration.

Attention mechanisms are a central property of cognitive systems allowing them to selectively deploy cognitive resources in a flexible manner. Attention has been long studied in the neurosciences and there are numerous phenomenological models that try to capture its core properties. Recently attentional mechanisms have become a dominating architectural choice of machine learning and are the central innovation of Transformers. The dominant intuition and formalism underlying their development has drawn on ideas of keys and queries in database management systems. In this work, we propose an alternative Bayesian foundation for attentional mechanisms and show how this unifies different attentional architectures in machine learning. This formulation allows to to identify commonality across different attention ML architectures as well as suggest a bridge to those developed in neuroscience. We hope this work will guide more sophisticated intuitions into the key properties of attention architectures and suggest new ones.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

Imagine a world where AI can handle your work while you sleep - organizing your research materials, drafting a report, or creating a presentation you need for tomorrow. However, while current digital agents can perform simple tasks, they are far from capable of handling the complex real-world work that humans routinely perform. We present PC Agent, an AI system that demonstrates a crucial step toward this vision through human cognition transfer. Our key insight is that the path from executing simple "tasks" to handling complex "work" lies in efficiently capturing and learning from human cognitive processes during computer use. To validate this hypothesis, we introduce three key innovations: (1) PC Tracker, a lightweight infrastructure that efficiently collects high-quality human-computer interaction trajectories with complete cognitive context; (2) a two-stage cognition completion pipeline that transforms raw interaction data into rich cognitive trajectories by completing action semantics and thought processes; and (3) a multi-agent system combining a planning agent for decision-making with a grounding agent for robust visual grounding. Our preliminary experiments in PowerPoint presentation creation reveal that complex digital work capabilities can be achieved with a small amount of high-quality cognitive data - PC Agent, trained on just 133 cognitive trajectories, can handle sophisticated work scenarios involving up to 50 steps across multiple applications. This demonstrates the data efficiency of our approach, highlighting that the key to training capable digital agents lies in collecting human cognitive data. By open-sourcing our complete framework, including the data collection infrastructure and cognition completion methods, we aim to lower the barriers for the research community to develop truly capable digital agents.

Conceptual knowledge is fundamental to human cognition and knowledge bases. However, existing knowledge probing works only focus on evaluating factual knowledge of pre-trained language models (PLMs) and ignore conceptual knowledge. Since conceptual knowledge often appears as implicit commonsense behind texts, designing probes for conceptual knowledge is hard. Inspired by knowledge representation schemata, we comprehensively evaluate conceptual knowledge of PLMs by designing three tasks to probe whether PLMs organize entities by conceptual similarities, learn conceptual properties, and conceptualize entities in contexts, respectively. For the tasks, we collect and annotate 24k data instances covering 393 concepts, which is COPEN, a COnceptual knowledge Probing bENchmark. Extensive experiments on different sizes and types of PLMs show that existing PLMs systematically lack conceptual knowledge and suffer from various spurious correlations. We believe this is a critical bottleneck for realizing human-like cognition in PLMs. COPEN and our codes are publicly released at https://github.com/THU-KEG/COPEN.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning and learning from human feedback improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can make models generate high-quality text, we conjecture that more implicit cognitive biases may arise in these fine-tuned models. Our work provides evidence that these fine-tuned models exhibit biases that were absent or less pronounced in their pretrained predecessors. We examine the extent of this phenomenon in three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models, especially those that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, GPT3.5, and GPT4. This research constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.

Control systems are ubiquitous in modern technology, comprising an engineered plant to be kept within specific, often fine-tuned, limits, and a separate controller that ensures this is the case. While modern controllers often employ digital computers, other examples are purely mechanical, or even biological. It is an open question whether computation is happening within all controllers by virtue of them being part of a control system. Abstraction/ Representation theory (ART) has been developed to tackle just this question of whether a physical system is computing. Here, we demonstrate how to use ART to model control systems, and analyse them for computational properties. We determine that the plant of a control system is (a proxy for) the representational entity necessary in ART for the existence of any computation: the plant is the user of the controller. We consider specific systems: a digital thermostat, an electro-mechanical thermostat, the purely mechanical centrifugal governor, and an open-loop human-controlled heating system. We show that all these systems, and control systems in general, are performing some degree of computation. As an initial use of these results, we apply them to computationalism within cognitive theory: we show the governor is computing, so it cannot play its role of counter-example in the question of whether the brain is too.

Mechanical reasoning is a hallmark of human intelligence, defined by its ubiquitous yet irreplaceable role in human activities ranging from routine tasks to civil engineering. Embedding machines with mechanical reasoning is therefore an important step towards building human-level artificial intelligence. Here, we leveraged 155 cognitive experiments to test the understanding of system stability, gears and pulley systems, leverage principle, inertia and motion, and fluid mechanics in 26 Vision Language Models (VLMs). Results indicate that VLMs consistently perform worse than humans on all domains, while demonstrate significant difficulty in reasoning about gear systems and fluid mechanics. Notably, their performance on these tasks do not improve as number of parameters increase, suggesting that current attention-based architecture may fail to grasp certain underlying mechanisms required for mechanical reasoning, particularly those pertaining to mental simulations.

Prompting Large Language Models (LLMs), or providing context on the expected model of operation, is an effective way to steer the outputs of such models to satisfy human desiderata after they have been trained. But in rapidly evolving domains, there is often need to fine-tune LLMs to improve either the kind of knowledge in their memory or their abilities to perform open ended reasoning in new domains. When human's learn new concepts, we often do so by linking the new material that we are studying to concepts we have already learned before. To that end, we ask, "can prompting help us teach LLMs how to learn". In this work, we study a novel generalization of instruction tuning, called contextual fine-tuning, to fine-tune LLMs. Our method leverages instructional prompts designed to mimic human cognitive strategies in learning and problem-solving to guide the learning process during training, aiming to improve the model's interpretation and understanding of domain-specific knowledge. We empirically demonstrate that this simple yet effective modification improves the ability of LLMs to be fine-tuned rapidly on new datasets both within the medical and financial domains.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

As LLMs become increasingly prevalent, it is interesting to consider how ``creative'' these models can be. From cognitive science, creativity consists of at least two key characteristics: convergent thinking (purposefulness to achieve a given goal) and divergent thinking (adaptability to new environments or constraints) runco2003critical. In this work, we introduce a framework for quantifying LLM creativity that incorporates the two characteristics. This is achieved by (1) Denial Prompting pushes LLMs to come up with more creative solutions to a given problem by incrementally imposing new constraints on the previous solution, compelling LLMs to adopt new strategies, and (2) defining and computing the NeoGauge metric which examines both convergent and divergent thinking in the generated creative responses by LLMs. We apply the proposed framework on Codeforces problems, a natural data source for collecting human coding solutions. We quantify NeoGauge for various proprietary and open-source models and find that even the most creative model, GPT-4, still falls short of demonstrating human-like creativity. We also experiment with advanced reasoning strategies (MCTS, self-correction, etc.) and observe no significant improvement in creativity. As a by-product of our analysis, we release NeoCoder dataset for reproducing our results on future models.

Deep learning models struggle with systematic compositional generalization, a hallmark of human cognition. We propose Mirage, a neuro-inspired dual-process model that offers a processing account for this ability. It combines a fast, intuitive ``System~1'' (a meta-trained Transformer) with a deliberate, rule-based ``System~2'' (a Schema Engine), mirroring the brain's neocortical and hippocampal--prefrontal circuits. Trained to perform general, single-step decomposition on a stream of random grammars, Mirage achieves >99\% accuracy on all splits of the SCAN benchmark in a task-agnostic setting. Ablations confirm that the model's systematic behavior emerges from the architectural interplay of its two systems, particularly its use of explicit, prioritized schemas and iterative refinement. In line with recent progress on recursive/recurrent Transformer approaches, Mirage preserves an iterative neural update while externalizing declarative control into an interpretable schema module. Our work provides a concrete computational model for interpreting how compositional reasoning can arise from a modular cognitive architecture.

Large language models (LLMs) have advanced the field of artificial intelligence (AI) and are a powerful enabler for interactive systems. However, they still face challenges in long-term interactions that require adaptation towards the user as well as contextual knowledge and understanding of the ever-changing environment. To overcome these challenges, holistic memory modeling is required to efficiently retrieve and store relevant information across interaction sessions for suitable responses. Cognitive AI, which aims to simulate the human thought process in a computerized model, highlights interesting aspects, such as thoughts, memory mechanisms, and decision-making, that can contribute towards improved memory modeling for LLMs. Inspired by these cognitive AI principles, we propose our memory framework CAIM. CAIM consists of three modules: 1.) The Memory Controller as the central decision unit; 2.) the Memory Retrieval, which filters relevant data for interaction upon request; and 3.) the Post-Thinking, which maintains the memory storage. We compare CAIM against existing approaches, focusing on metrics such as retrieval accuracy, response correctness, contextual coherence, and memory storage. The results demonstrate that CAIM outperforms baseline frameworks across different metrics, highlighting its context-awareness and potential to improve long-term human-AI interactions.

Memory plays a foundational role in augmenting the reasoning, adaptability, and contextual fidelity of modern Large Language Models and Multi-Modal LLMs. As these models transition from static predictors to interactive systems capable of continual learning and personalized inference, the incorporation of memory mechanisms has emerged as a central theme in their architectural and functional evolution. This survey presents a comprehensive and structured synthesis of memory in LLMs and MLLMs, organizing the literature into a cohesive taxonomy comprising implicit, explicit, and agentic memory paradigms. Specifically, the survey delineates three primary memory frameworks. Implicit memory refers to the knowledge embedded within the internal parameters of pre-trained transformers, encompassing their capacity for memorization, associative retrieval, and contextual reasoning. Recent work has explored methods to interpret, manipulate, and reconfigure this latent memory. Explicit memory involves external storage and retrieval components designed to augment model outputs with dynamic, queryable knowledge representations, such as textual corpora, dense vectors, and graph-based structures, thereby enabling scalable and updatable interaction with information sources. Agentic memory introduces persistent, temporally extended memory structures within autonomous agents, facilitating long-term planning, self-consistency, and collaborative behavior in multi-agent systems, with relevance to embodied and interactive AI. Extending beyond text, the survey examines the integration of memory within multi-modal settings, where coherence across vision, language, audio, and action modalities is essential. Key architectural advances, benchmark tasks, and open challenges are discussed, including issues related to memory capacity, alignment, factual consistency, and cross-system interoperability.

Do machines and humans process language in similar ways? A recent line of research has hinted in the affirmative, demonstrating that human brain signals can be effectively predicted using the internal representations of language models (LMs). This is thought to reflect shared computational principles between LMs and human language processing. However, there are also clear differences in how LMs and humans acquire and use language, even if the final task they are performing is the same. Despite this, there is little work exploring systematic differences between human and machine language processing using brain data. To address this question, we examine the differences between LM representations and the human brain's responses to language, specifically by examining a dataset of Magnetoencephalography (MEG) responses to a written narrative. In doing so we identify three phenomena that, in prior work, LMs have been found to not capture well: emotional understanding, figurative language processing, and physical commonsense. By fine-tuning LMs on datasets related to these phenomena, we observe that fine-tuned LMs show improved alignment with human brain responses across these tasks. Our study implies that the observed divergences between LMs and human brains may stem from LMs' inadequate representation of these specific types of knowledge.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.