Daily Papers

Transformer models have achieved remarkable results in a wide range of applications. However, their scalability is hampered by the quadratic time and memory complexity of the self-attention mechanism concerning the sequence length. This limitation poses a substantial obstacle when dealing with long documents or high-resolution images. In this work, we study the self-attention mechanism by analyzing the distribution of the attention matrix and its concentration ability. Furthermore, we propose instruments to measure these quantities and introduce a novel self-attention mechanism, Linear Log-Normal Attention, designed to emulate the distribution and concentration behavior of the original self-attention. Our experimental results on popular natural language benchmarks reveal that our proposed Linear Log-Normal Attention outperforms other linearized attention alternatives, offering a promising avenue for enhancing the scalability of transformer models. Our code is available in supplementary materials.

We show via a combination of mathematical arguments and empirical evidence that data distributions sampled from diffusion models satisfy a Concentration of Measure Property saying that any Lipschitz 1-dimensional projection of a random vector is not too far from its mean with high probability. This implies that such models are quite restrictive and gives an explanation for a fact previously observed in the literature that conventional diffusion models cannot capture "heavy-tailed" data (i.e. data x for which the norm |x|_2 does not possess a sub-Gaussian tail) well. We then proceed to train a generalized linear model using stochastic gradient descent (SGD) on the diffusion-generated data for a multiclass classification task and observe empirically that a Gaussian universality result holds for the test error. In other words, the test error depends only on the first and second order statistics of the diffusion-generated data in the linear setting. Results of such forms are desirable because they allow one to assume the data itself is Gaussian for analyzing performance of the trained classifier. Finally, we note that current approaches to proving universality do not apply to this case as the covariance matrices of the data tend to have vanishing minimum singular values for the diffusion-generated data, while the current proofs assume that this is not the case (see Subsection 3.4 for more details). This leaves extending previous mathematical universality results as an intriguing open question.

Recently, self-supervised learning has attracted great attention, since it only requires unlabeled data for model training. Contrastive learning is one popular method for self-supervised learning and has achieved promising empirical performance. However, the theoretical understanding of its generalization ability is still limited. To this end, we define a kind of (sigma,delta)-measure to mathematically quantify the data augmentation, and then provide an upper bound of the downstream classification error rate based on the measure. It reveals that the generalization ability of contrastive self-supervised learning is related to three key factors: alignment of positive samples, divergence of class centers, and concentration of augmented data. The first two factors are properties of learned representations, while the third one is determined by pre-defined data augmentation. We further investigate two canonical contrastive losses, InfoNCE and cross-correlation, to show how they provably achieve the first two factors. Moreover, we conduct experiments to study the third factor, and observe a strong correlation between downstream performance and the concentration of augmented data.

Cells that collide with each other repolarize away from contact, in a process called contact inhibition of locomotion (CIL), which is necessary for correct development of the embryo. CIL can occur even when cells make a micron-scale contact with a neighbor - much smaller than their size. How precisely can a cell sense cell-cell contact and repolarize in the correct direction? What factors control whether a cell recognizes it has contacted a neighbor? We propose a theoretical model for the limits of CIL where cells recognize the presence of another cell by binding the protein ephrin with the Eph receptor. This recognition is made difficult by the presence of interfering ligands that bind nonspecifically. Both theoretical predictions and simulation results show that it becomes more difficult to sense cell-cell contact when it is difficult to distinguish ephrin from the interfering ligands, or when there are more interfering ligands, or when the contact width decreases. However, the error of estimating contact position remains almost constant when the contact width changes. This happens because the cell gains spatial information largely from the boundaries of cell-cell contact. We study using statistical decision theory the likelihood of a false positive CIL event in the absence of cell-cell contact, and the likelihood of a false negative where CIL does not occur when another cell is present. Our results suggest that the cell is more likely to make incorrect decisions when the contact width is very small or so large that it nears the cell's perimeter. However, in general, we find that cells have the ability to make reasonably reliable CIL decisions even for very narrow (micron-scale) contacts, even if the concentration of interfering ligands is ten times that of the correct ligands.

This study explores the neural and behavioral consequences of LLM-assisted essay writing. Participants were divided into three groups: LLM, Search Engine, and Brain-only (no tools). Each completed three sessions under the same condition. In a fourth session, LLM users were reassigned to Brain-only group (LLM-to-Brain), and Brain-only users were reassigned to LLM condition (Brain-to-LLM). A total of 54 participants took part in Sessions 1-3, with 18 completing session 4. We used electroencephalography (EEG) to assess cognitive load during essay writing, and analyzed essays using NLP, as well as scoring essays with the help from human teachers and an AI judge. Across groups, NERs, n-gram patterns, and topic ontology showed within-group homogeneity. EEG revealed significant differences in brain connectivity: Brain-only participants exhibited the strongest, most distributed networks; Search Engine users showed moderate engagement; and LLM users displayed the weakest connectivity. Cognitive activity scaled down in relation to external tool use. In session 4, LLM-to-Brain participants showed reduced alpha and beta connectivity, indicating under-engagement. Brain-to-LLM users exhibited higher memory recall and activation of occipito-parietal and prefrontal areas, similar to Search Engine users. Self-reported ownership of essays was the lowest in the LLM group and the highest in the Brain-only group. LLM users also struggled to accurately quote their own work. While LLMs offer immediate convenience, our findings highlight potential cognitive costs. Over four months, LLM users consistently underperformed at neural, linguistic, and behavioral levels. These results raise concerns about the long-term educational implications of LLM reliance and underscore the need for deeper inquiry into AI's role in learning.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Recent work has shown that LLMs can sometimes detect when steering vectors are injected into their residual stream and identify the injected concept -- a phenomenon termed "introspective awareness." We investigate the mechanisms underlying this capability in open-weights models. First, we find that it is behaviorally robust: models detect injected steering vectors at moderate rates with 0% false positives across diverse prompts and dialogue formats. Notably, this capability emerges specifically from post-training; we show that preference optimization algorithms like DPO can elicit it, but standard supervised finetuning does not. We provide evidence that detection cannot be explained by simple linear association between certain steering vectors and directions promoting affirmative responses. We trace the detection mechanism to a two-stage circuit in which "evidence carrier" features in early post-injection layers detect perturbations monotonically along diverse directions, suppressing downstream "gate" features that implement a default negative response. This circuit is absent in base models and robust to refusal ablation. Identification of injected concepts relies on largely distinct later-layer mechanisms that only weakly overlap with those involved in detection. Finally, we show that introspective capability is substantially underelicited: ablating refusal directions improves detection by +53%, and a trained bias vector improves it by +75% on held-out concepts, both without meaningfully increasing false positives. Our results suggest that this introspective awareness of injected concepts is robust and mechanistically nontrivial, and could be substantially amplified in future models. Code: https://github.com/safety-research/introspection-mechanisms.

Esports are a mostly sedentary activity. There is a growing need for investigation into how biomechanical and physical abilities can be optimized for esports through training. One such research avenue concerns the ability of esports players to perform balance tasks due to the prolonged sedentary states that are required to reach the top echelon of performance. Our aim for this work is to describe and compare physical abilities (balance, grip strength, and self-reported training habits) of top Polish StarCraft~2 tournament players. Esports players differed significantly from the reference group in their ability to balance on one leg. Additionally, in a grip strength test, the esports group fared worse than the reference group in all consecutive attempts. Despite self-reported physical activity in the esports group, player fitness requires further research. Training optimization could offset the issues arising from sedentary activity, and intensifying esports training so it could take less time overall.

The concept of a 'Ballmer Peak' was first proposed in 2007, postulating that there exists a very specific blood alcohol content which confers superhuman programming ability. More generally, there is a commonly held belief among software engineers that coding is easier and more productive after a few drinks. Using the industry standard for assessment of coding ability, we conducted a search for such a peak and more generally investigated the effect of different amounts of alcohol on performance. We conclusively refute the existence of a specific peak with large magnitude, but with p < 0.001 find that there was a significant positive effect to a low amount of alcohol - slightly less than two drinks - on programming ability.

Multilingual transfer ability, which reflects how well the models fine-tuned on one source language can be applied to other languages, has been well studied in multilingual pre-trained models (e.g., BLOOM). However, such ability has not been investigated for English-centric models (e.g., LLaMA). To fill this gap, we study the following research questions. First, does multilingual transfer ability exist in English-centric models and how does it compare with multilingual pretrained models? Second, does it only appears when English is the source language for the English-centric model? Third, how does it vary in different tasks? We take multilingual reasoning ability as our focus and conduct extensive experiments across four types of reasoning tasks. We find that the multilingual pretrained model does not always outperform an English-centric model. Furthermore, English appears to be a less suitable source language, and the choice of source language becomes less important when the English-centric model scales up. In addition, different types of tasks exhibit different multilingual transfer abilities. These findings demonstrate that English-centric models not only possess multilingual transfer ability but may even surpass the transferability of multilingual pretrained models if well-trained. By showing the strength and weaknesses, the experiments also provide valuable insights into enhancing multilingual reasoning abilities for the English-centric models.

People often optimize for long-term goals in collaboration: A mentor or companion doesn't just answer questions, but also scaffolds learning, tracks progress, and prioritizes the other person's growth over immediate results. In contrast, current AI systems are fundamentally short-sighted collaborators - optimized for providing instant and complete responses, without ever saying no (unless for safety reasons). What are the consequences of this dynamic? Here, through a series of randomized controlled trials on human-AI interactions (N = 1,222), we provide causal evidence for two key consequences of AI assistance: reduced persistence and impairment of unassisted performance. Across a variety of tasks, including mathematical reasoning and reading comprehension, we find that although AI assistance improves performance in the short-term, people perform significantly worse without AI and are more likely to give up. Notably, these effects emerge after only brief interactions with AI (approximately 10 minutes). These findings are particularly concerning because persistence is foundational to skill acquisition and is one of the strongest predictors of long-term learning. We posit that persistence is reduced because AI conditions people to expect immediate answers, thereby denying them the experience of working through challenges on their own. These results suggest the need for AI model development to prioritize scaffolding long-term competence alongside immediate task completion.

There is a strong association between the quality of the writing in a resume for new labor market entrants and whether those entrants are ultimately hired. We show that this relationship is, at least partially, causal: a field experiment in an online labor market was conducted with nearly half a million jobseekers in which a treated group received algorithmic writing assistance. Treated jobseekers experienced an 8% increase in the probability of getting hired. Contrary to concerns that the assistance is taking away a valuable signal, we find no evidence that employers were less satisfied. We present a model in which better writing is not a signal of ability but helps employers ascertain ability, which rationalizes our findings.

Majority voting over multiple LLM attempts improves mathematical reasoning, but correlated errors limit the effective sample size. A natural fix is to assign different reasoning strategies to different voters. The approach, Diverse Prompt Mixer, is tested on the AIMO 3 competition: 3 models, 23+ experiments, 50 IMO-level problems, one H100 80 GB, 5-hour limit. Every prompt-level intervention fails. High-temperature sampling already decorrelates errors; weaker strategies reduce accuracy more than they reduce correlation. Across an 8-point capability gap at equal N=8 and every optimization tested, model capability dominates. The gap between the best majority-vote score (42/50) and pass@20 (~45.5) is selection loss, not prompt loss. A verifier-based selector could close it. Prompt engineering cannot.

Current large language models have dangerous capabilities, which are likely to become more problematic in the future. Activation steering techniques can be used to reduce risks from these capabilities. In this paper, we investigate the efficacy of activation steering for broad skills and multiple behaviours. First, by comparing the effects of reducing performance on general coding ability and Python-specific ability, we find that steering broader skills is competitive to steering narrower skills. Second, we steer models to become more or less myopic and wealth-seeking, among other behaviours. In our experiments, combining steering vectors for multiple different behaviours into one steering vector is largely unsuccessful. On the other hand, injecting individual steering vectors at different places in a model simultaneously is promising.

This paper documents and theorises a self-reinforcing dynamic between two measurable trends: the exponential expansion of large language model (LLM) context windows and the secular contraction of human sustained-attention capacity. We term the resulting asymmetry the Cognitive Divergence. AI context windows have grown from 512 tokens in 2017 to 2,000,000 tokens by 2026 (factor ~3,906; fitted lambda = 0.59/yr; doubling time ~14 months). Over the same period, human Effective Context Span (ECS) -- a token-equivalent measure derived from validated reading-rate meta-analysis (Brysbaert, 2019) and an empirically motivated Comprehension Scaling Factor -- has declined from approximately 16,000 tokens (2004 baseline) to an estimated 1,800 tokens (2026, extrapolated from longitudinal behavioural data ending 2020 (Mark, 2023); see Section 9 for uncertainty discussion). The AI-to-human ratio grew from near parity at the ChatGPT launch (November 2022) to 556--1,111x raw and 56--111x quality-adjusted, after accounting for retrieval degradation (Liu et al., 2024; Chroma, 2025). Beyond documenting this divergence, the paper introduces the Delegation Feedback Loop hypothesis: as AI capability grows, the cognitive threshold at which humans delegate to AI falls, extending to tasks of negligible demand; the resulting reduction in cognitive practice may further attenuate the capacities already documented as declining (Gerlich, 2025; Kim et al., 2026; Kosmyna et al., 2025). Neither trend reverses spontaneously. The paper characterises the divergence statistically, reviews neurobiological mechanisms across eight peer-reviewed neuroimaging studies, presents empirical evidence bearing on the delegation threshold, and proposes a research agenda centred on a validated ECS psychometric instrument and longitudinal study of AI-mediated cognitive change.

Recent work has proposed artificial intelligence (AI) models that can learn to decide whether to make a prediction for an instance of a task or to delegate it to a human by considering both parties' capabilities. In simulations with synthetically generated or context-independent human predictions, delegation can help improve the performance of human-AI teams -- compared to humans or the AI model completing the task alone. However, so far, it remains unclear how humans perform and how they perceive the task when they are aware that an AI model delegated task instances to them. In an experimental study with 196 participants, we show that task performance and task satisfaction improve through AI delegation, regardless of whether humans are aware of the delegation. Additionally, we identify humans' increased levels of self-efficacy as the underlying mechanism for these improvements in performance and satisfaction. Our findings provide initial evidence that allowing AI models to take over more management responsibilities can be an effective form of human-AI collaboration in workplaces.

A central puzzle for the behavioural sciences and for human-facing artificial intelligence is the persistence of within-person variability. The same individual, presented with the same observable input, produces different outcomes on different occasions, and different individuals produce divergent outcomes that no observable covariate fully predicts. We argue that this variability belongs in the dynamic latent state of the person, and that human outcomes are controllable in a precise and operational sense through interventions that target the state and its weighting at the moment a decision is being formed. We define a state as the time-indexed weighting vector over the dimensions that govern how an individual's biology, physiology, and neuropsychology process the next event into a decision and an outcome. The relationship between state, decision, and outcome is causal rather than correlational. The weighting vector is dynamic at sub-daily timescales. The conscious channel through which outcomes are reportable is a narrow attentional bottleneck whose contents are themselves state-dependent. Taken together, these claims imply that the outcome of a given event is controllable, conditionally, on the state-trajectory at the time of intervention. We motivate the framework with six strands of established evidence (causal inference, predictive processing, allostasis, attentional bottleneck, chronobiology, computational psychiatry) and a 24-month observational base from a deployed behavioural platform spanning more than 200,000 consented users across four occupational personas (research period 2023 to 2026). We derive seven testable predictions, list six operational requirements for state-aware systems, and discuss implications for digital health, education, AI personalisation, and personal agency.

Knowledge distillation (KD) is a key technique for compressing large language models into smaller ones while preserving performance. Despite the recent traction of KD research, its effectiveness for smaller language models (LMs) and the mechanisms driving knowledge transfer remain underexplored. In this work, we present the first large-scale empirical and statistical analysis of KD across models ranging from 0.5B to 7B parameters on 14 complex reasoning tasks in a zero-shot setting. Our findings reveal that KD can improve the average performance of smaller models by up to 10%, with a peak task specific gain of 22%, while providing only marginal benefits (sim 1.3%) for larger models. Surprisingly, teacher performance has a minimal impact on student outcomes, while teacher task expertise impacts KD effectiveness. A correlation study indicates that smaller LMs benefit more from KD, whereas larger LMs show diminished gains. Additionally, we uncover a misalignment between improvements in student performance and reasoning fidelity, suggesting that while KD enhances accuracy, it does not always maintain the structured decision-making processes of the teacher. Our ablation study further highlights the importance of teacher signals and logit smoothing in influencing students' performance after distillation. Overall, our study offers a comprehensive empirical and statistical assessment of KD, highlighting both its benefits and trade-offs when distilling knowledge from larger to smaller LMs.

With LLMs shifting their role from statistical modeling of language to serving as general-purpose AI agents, how should LLM evaluations change? Arguably, a key ability of an AI agent is to flexibly combine, as needed, the basic skills it has learned. The capability to combine skills plays an important role in (human) pedagogy and also in a paper on emergence phenomena (Arora & Goyal, 2023). This work introduces Skill-Mix, a new evaluation to measure ability to combine skills. Using a list of N skills the evaluator repeatedly picks random subsets of k skills and asks the LLM to produce text combining that subset of skills. Since the number of subsets grows like N^k, for even modest k this evaluation will, with high probability, require the LLM to produce text significantly different from any text in the training set. The paper develops a methodology for (a) designing and administering such an evaluation, and (b) automatic grading (plus spot-checking by humans) of the results using GPT-4 as well as the open LLaMA-2 70B model. Administering a version of to popular chatbots gave results that, while generally in line with prior expectations, contained surprises. Sizeable differences exist among model capabilities that are not captured by their ranking on popular LLM leaderboards ("cramming for the leaderboard"). Furthermore, simple probability calculations indicate that GPT-4's reasonable performance on k=5 is suggestive of going beyond "stochastic parrot" behavior (Bender et al., 2021), i.e., it combines skills in ways that it had not seen during training. We sketch how the methodology can lead to a Skill-Mix based eco-system of open evaluations for AI capabilities of future models.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrate impressive abilities over high level perception and reasoning, their robustness in the wild still lags behind humans and exhibits diminished efficacy on simple tasks that are intuitive for humans. We examine the hypothesis that these deficiencies stem from the absence of core knowledge, rudimentary cognitive abilities innate to humans from early childhood. To probe core knowledge representation in MLLMs, we draw from developmental cognitive sciences and develop a large-scale benchmark, CoreCognition dataset, encompassing 12 core cognitive concepts. We evaluate 219 models with 10 different prompts, leading to a total of 2409 data points for analysis. Our findings reveal core knowledge deficits in early developed core abilities while models demonstrate human comparable performance in high level cognition. Moreover, we find that low level abilities show little to no scaling, in stark contrast to high level abilities. Finally, we introduce an evaluation technique, Concept Hacking, through which we demonstrate that MLLMs do not genuinely advance toward core knowledge but instead rely on illusory understanding and shortcut learning as they scale. Website with this https://growing-ai-like-a-child.github.io/{link}.