Daily Papers

Current label-free RLVR approaches for large language models (LLMs), such as TTRL and Self-reward, have demonstrated effectiveness in improving the performance of LLMs on complex reasoning tasks. However, these methods rely heavily on accurate pseudo-label estimation and converge on spurious yet popular answers, thereby trapping in a dominant mode and limiting further improvements. Building on this, we propose Dual Consensus Reinforcement Learning (DCRL), a novel self-supervised training method which is capable of generating more reliable learning signals through a two-stage consensus mechanism. The model initially acts as an anchor, producing dominant responses; then it serves as an explorer, generating diverse auxiliary signals via a temporary unlearning process. The final training target is derived from the harmonic mean of these two signal sets. Notably, the process operates entirely without external models or supervision. Across eight benchmarks and diverse domains, DCRL consistently improves Pass@1 over majority vote while yielding more stable training dynamics. These results demonstrate that DCRL establishes a scalable path toward stronger reasoning without labels.

In this research, we use user defined labels from three internet text sources (Reddit, Stackexchange, Arxiv) to train 21 different machine learning models for the topic classification task of detecting cybersecurity discussions in natural text. We analyze the false positive and false negative rates of each of the 21 model's in a cross validation experiment. Then we present a Cybersecurity Topic Classification (CTC) tool, which takes the majority vote of the 21 trained machine learning models as the decision mechanism for detecting cybersecurity related text. We also show that the majority vote mechanism of the CTC tool provides lower false negative and false positive rates on average than any of the 21 individual models. We show that the CTC tool is scalable to the hundreds of thousands of documents with a wall clock time on the order of hours.

Understanding how structured internal structure emerges during neural network training is central to the study of deep learning. We investigate this phenomenon through the group composition task, where a two-layer neural network is trained to predict g_1 star g_2 for elements of a finite group G. By lifting the projected gradient flow to the Fourier domain, we demonstrate that the training dynamics are governed by a Riemannian gradient ascent on a representation-theoretic energy functional. We prove that, under random initialization, this flow drives each neuron to converge almost surely toward a single irreducible representation, while the cross-layer Fourier coefficients achieve a rotational rank-one alignment. This framework provides a representation-theoretic account of feature learning and characterizes a novel low-rank compression phenomenon for matrix-valued group representations. Moreover, for Abelian groups, we provide a complete population-level description: random initialization promotes uniform diversification across nontrivial representations and induces Haar-uniform phases, jointly approximating the indicator via a majority-vote mechanism. We further prove that both phase alignment and representation competition emerge with exponential convergence rates.

In democracies, major policy decisions typically require some form of majority or consensus, so elites must secure mass support to govern. Historically, elites could shape support only through limited instruments like schooling and mass media; advances in AI-driven persuasion sharply reduce the cost and increase the precision of shaping public opinion, making the distribution of preferences itself an object of deliberate design. We develop a dynamic model in which elites choose how much to reshape the distribution of policy preferences, subject to persuasion costs and a majority rule constraint. With a single elite, any optimal intervention tends to push society toward more polarized opinion profiles - a ``polarization pull'' - and improvements in persuasion technology accelerate this drift. When two opposed elites alternate in power, the same technology also creates incentives to park society in ``semi-lock'' regions where opinions are more cohesive and harder for a rival to overturn, so advances in persuasion can either heighten or dampen polarization depending on the environment. Taken together, cheaper persuasion technologies recast polarization as a strategic instrument of governance rather than a purely emergent social byproduct, with important implications for democratic stability as AI capabilities advance.

LLM inference often generates a batch of candidates for a prompt and selects one via strategies like majority voting or Best-of- N (BoN). For difficult tasks, this single-shot selection often underperforms. Consequently, evaluations commonly report Pass@k: the agent may submit up to k responses, and only the best of them is used when computing regret. Motivated by this, we study inference scaling in the more general Pass@k inference setting, and prove that neither majority voting nor BoN exhibits the desirable scaling with k and the sampling budget N. Combining the advantages of majority voting and BoN, we propose a new inference strategy called Best-of-Majority (BoM), with a pivotal step that restricts the candidates to the responses with high frequency in the N samples before selecting the top-k rewards. We prove that when the sampling budget is N=tildeOmega(C^*), the regret of BoM is O(epsilon_{opt}+epsilon_{mathrm{RM}^2C^*/k}), where C^* is the coverage coefficient, epsilon_{RM} is the estimation error of the reward model, and epsilon_{opt} is the estimation error of reward at the optimal response. We further establish a matching lower bound, certifying that our algorithm is minimax optimal. Beyond optimality, BoM has a key advantage: unlike majority voting and BoN, its performance does not degrade when increasing N. Experimental results of inference on math problems show BoM outperforming both majority voting and BoN.

Multi-Agent Debate~(MAD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the performance of large language models through collaborative reasoning. Despite recent advances, the key factors driving MAD's effectiveness remain unclear. In this work, we disentangle MAD into two key components--Majority Voting and inter-agent Debate--and assess their respective contributions. Through extensive experiments across seven NLP benchmarks, we find that Majority Voting alone accounts for most of the performance gains typically attributed to MAD. To explain this, we propose a theoretical framework that models debate as a stochastic process. We prove that it induces a martingale over agents' belief trajectories, implying that debate alone does not improve expected correctness. Guided by these insights, we demonstrate that targeted interventions, by biasing the belief update toward correction, can meaningfully enhance debate effectiveness. Overall, our findings suggest that while MAD has potential, simple ensembling methods remain strong and more reliable alternatives in many practical settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/debate-or-vote.

Modern large language models (LLMs) have exhibited cooperative synergy on complex task-solving, and collective decision-making (CDM) is a pivotal component in LLM-based multi-agent collaboration frameworks. Our survey on 52 recent such systems uncovers a severe lack of diversity, with a heavy reliance on dictatorial and plurality voting for CDM. Through the lens of social choice theory, we scrutinize widely-adopted CDM methods and identify their limitations. To enrich current landscape of LLM-based CDM, we present GEDI, an electoral CDM module that incorporates various ordinal preferential voting mechanisms. Our empirical case study across three benchmarks shows that the integration of certain CDM methods can markedly improve the reasoning capabilities and robustness of some leading LLMs, all without requiring intricate system designs. Additionally, we find that some CDM mechanisms generate positive synergies even with as few as three agents. The voting-based methods also demonstrate robustness against single points of failure, as well as diversity in terms of hit-rate@k and subject-wise impacts.

Reliably labelling data typically requires annotations from multiple human workers. However, humans are far from being perfect. Hence, it is a common practice to aggregate labels gathered from multiple annotators to make a more confident estimate of the true label. Among many aggregation methods, the simple and well known Majority Vote (MV) selects the class label polling the highest number of votes. However, despite its importance, the optimality of MV's label aggregation has not been extensively studied. We address this gap in our work by characterising the conditions under which MV achieves the theoretically optimal lower bound on label estimation error. Our results capture the tolerable limits on annotation noise under which MV can optimally recover labels for a given class distribution. This certificate of optimality provides a more principled approach to model selection for label aggregation as an alternative to otherwise inefficient practices that sometimes include higher experts, gold labels, etc., that are all marred by the same human uncertainty despite huge time and monetary costs. Experiments on both synthetic and real world data corroborate our theoretical findings.

User-generated contents (UGCs) on online platforms allow marketing researchers to understand consumer preferences for products and services. With the advance of large language models (LLMs), some studies utilized the models for annotation and sentiment analysis. However, the relationship between the accuracy and the hyper-parameters of LLMs is yet to be thoroughly examined. In addition, the issues of variability and reproducibility of results from each trial of LLMs have rarely been considered in existing literature. Since actual human annotation uses majority voting to resolve disagreements among annotators, this study introduces a majority voting mechanism to a sentiment analysis model using local LLMs. By a series of three analyses of online reviews on restaurant evaluations, we demonstrate that majority voting with multiple attempts using a medium-sized model produces more robust results than using a large model with a single attempt. Furthermore, we conducted further analysis to investigate the effect of each aspect on the overall evaluation.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

Majority voting over multiple LLM attempts improves mathematical reasoning, but correlated errors limit the effective sample size. A natural fix is to assign different reasoning strategies to different voters. The approach, Diverse Prompt Mixer, is tested on the AIMO 3 competition: 3 models, 23+ experiments, 50 IMO-level problems, one H100 80 GB, 5-hour limit. Every prompt-level intervention fails. High-temperature sampling already decorrelates errors; weaker strategies reduce accuracy more than they reduce correlation. Across an 8-point capability gap at equal N=8 and every optimization tested, model capability dominates. The gap between the best majority-vote score (42/50) and pass@20 (~45.5) is selection loss, not prompt loss. A verifier-based selector could close it. Prompt engineering cannot.

A standard technique for scaling inference-time reasoning is Self-Consistency, whereby multiple candidate answers are sampled from an LLM and the most common answer is selected. More recently, it has been shown that weighted majority voting (e.g. Confidence-Informed Self Consistency (CISC)), which assigns a confidence value to each candidate answer and chooses the answer with the largest accumulated score, tends to be more accurate on a wide range of popular benchmarks. In practice, weighted majority voting necessitates calling a critic LLM on each candidate's reasoning trace to produce the answer's confidence score. This secondary series of LLM calls greatly increases the overhead and cost of weighted majority voting, despite its potential performance benefits. To reduce this expense, we propose VecCISC, a lightweight, adaptive framework that uses a measure of semantic similarity to filter reasoning traces that are semantically equivalent to others, degenerate, or hallucinated, thus decreasing the number of candidate answers that must be evaluated by the critic. To ensure adequate experimental thoroughness, we evaluate VecCISC on five challenging, widely-adopted datasets spanning the domains of mathematics, chemistry, biology, commonsense reasoning, and the humanities. Our results demonstrate that VecCISC reduces the total token usage by 47%, while maintaining or exceeding the accuracy of CISC.

The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We introduce generative social choice, a design methodology for open-ended democratic processes that combines the rigor of social choice theory with the capability of large language models to generate text and extrapolate preferences. Our framework divides the design of AI-augmented democratic processes into two components: first, proving that the process satisfies representation guarantees when given access to oracle queries; second, empirically validating that these queries can be approximately implemented using a large language model. We apply this framework to the problem of summarizing free-form opinions into a proportionally representative slate of opinion statements; specifically, we develop a democratic process with representation guarantees and use this process to portray the opinions of participants in a survey about abortion policy. In a trial with 100 representative US residents, we find that 84 out of 100 participants feel "excellently" or "exceptionally" represented by the slate of five statements we extracted.

The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.

Generations from large language models (LLMs) can be improved by sampling and scoring multiple solutions to select a final answer. Current "sample and select" methods such as self-consistency (SC) rely on majority voting to score answers. However, when tasks have many distinct and valid answers, selection by voting requires a large number of samples. This makes SC prohibitively expensive for interactive tasks that involve generating multiple actions (answers) sequentially. After establishing that majority voting fails to provide consistent gains on such tasks, we demonstrate how to increase success rates by softening the scoring criterion. We introduce Soft Self-Consistency (SOFT-SC), which replaces SC's discontinuous scoring with a continuous score computed from model likelihoods, allowing for selection even when actions are sparsely distributed. SOFT-SC improves both performance and efficiency on long-horizon interactive tasks, requiring half as many samples as SC for comparable or better performance. For a fixed number of samples, SOFT-SC leads to a 1.3% increase over SC in absolute success rate on writing bash programs, a 6.6% increase on online shopping (WebShop), and a 4.7% increase for an interactive household game (ALFWorld). Finally, we show that SOFT-SC can be applied to both open-source and black-box models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities in mathematical and scientific tasks. To enhance complex reasoning, multi-agent systems have been proposed to harness the collective intelligence of LLM agents. However, existing collaboration structures are either predefined or rely on majority voting or round-table debates, which can suppress correct but less dominant agent contributions. Recent approaches model multi-agent systems as graph networks but optimize purely for agent performance, neglecting the quality of interactions. We hypothesize that effective agent communication is crucial for multi-agent reasoning and that debating quality plays a significant role. To address this, we propose ours, a multi-agent verbal reinforcement learning algorithm that dynamically constructs and refines multi-agent collaboration structures. Our method defines action spaces and a feedback mechanism that evaluates communication robustness and coherence throughout the debate. The final decision is achieved through a majority vote over all the agents. We assess ours on various reasoning tasks, including mathematical reasoning, creative writing, scientific reasoning, and numerical sorting. Results demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms single-agent prompting methods and state-of-the-art multi-agent frameworks on diverse tasks.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex mathematical reasoning tasks, but they inevitably generate errors throughout multi-step solutions. Process-level Reward Models (PRMs) have shown great promise by providing supervision and evaluation at each intermediate step, thereby effectively improving the models' reasoning abilities. However, training effective PRMs requires high-quality process reward data, yet existing methods for constructing such data are often labour-intensive or inefficient. In this paper, we propose an uncertainty-driven framework for automated process reward data construction, encompassing both data generation and annotation processes for PRMs. Additionally, we identify the limitations of both majority vote and PRMs, and introduce two generic uncertainty-aware output aggregation methods: Hybrid Majority Reward Vote and Weighted Reward Frequency Vote, which combine the strengths of majority vote with PRMs. Extensive experiments on ProcessBench, MATH, and GSMPlus show the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed PRM data construction framework, and demonstrate that the two output aggregation methods further improve the mathematical reasoning abilities across diverse PRMs. The code and data will be publicly available at https://github.com/Jiuzhouh/UnPRM.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has significantly enhanced the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but its reliance on expensive human-labeled data or complex reward models severely limits scalability. While existing self-feedback methods aim to address this problem, they are constrained by the capabilities of a single model, which can lead to overconfidence in incorrect answers, reward hacking, and even training collapse. To this end, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Coevolutionary Collective Feedback (RLCCF), a novel RL framework that enables multi-model collaborative evolution without external supervision. Specifically, RLCCF optimizes the ability of a model collective by maximizing its Collective Consistency (CC), which jointly trains a diverse ensemble of LLMs and provides reward signals by voting on collective outputs. Moreover, each model's vote is weighted by its Self-Consistency (SC) score, ensuring that more confident models contribute more to the collective decision. Benefiting from the diverse output distributions and complementary abilities of multiple LLMs, RLCCF enables the model collective to continuously enhance its reasoning ability through coevolution. Experiments on four mainstream open-source LLMs across four mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our framework yields significant performance gains, achieving an average relative improvement of 16.72\% in accuracy. Notably, RLCCF not only improves the performance of individual models but also enhances the group's majority-voting accuracy by 4.51\%, demonstrating its ability to extend the collective capability boundary of the model collective.

In democratic societies, electoral systems play a crucial role in translating public preferences into political representation. Among these, the D'Hondt method is widely used to ensure proportional representation, balancing fair representation with governmental stability. Recently, there has been a growing interest in applying similar principles of proportional representation to enhance interpretability in machine learning, specifically in Explainable AI (XAI). This study investigates the integration of D'Hondt-based voting principles in the DhondtXAI method, which leverages resource allocation concepts to interpret feature importance within AI models. Through a comparison of SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations) and DhondtXAI, we evaluate their effectiveness in feature attribution within CatBoost and XGBoost models for breast cancer and diabetes prediction, respectively. The DhondtXAI approach allows for alliance formation and thresholding to enhance interpretability, representing feature importance as seats in a parliamentary view. Statistical correlation analyses between SHAP values and DhondtXAI allocations support the consistency of interpretations, demonstrating DhondtXAI's potential as a complementary tool for understanding feature importance in AI models. The results highlight that integrating electoral principles, such as proportional representation and alliances, into AI explainability can improve user understanding, especially in high-stakes fields like healthcare.

This review examines how AI technologies are transforming democratic representation, focusing on citizen participation and algorithmic decision-making. The analysis reveals that AI technologies are reshaping democratic processes in fundamental ways: enabling mass-scale deliberation, changing how citizens access and engage with political information, and transforming how representatives make and implement decisions. While AI offers unprecedented opportunities for enhancing democratic participation and governance efficiency, it also presents significant challenges to democratic legitimacy and accountability. Social media platforms' AI-driven algorithms currently mediate much political discourse, creating concerns about information manipulation and privacy. Large Language Models introduce both epistemic challenges and potential tools for improving democratic dialogue. The emergence of Mass Online Deliberation platforms suggests possibilities for scaling up meaningful citizen participation, while Algorithmic Decision-Making systems promise more efficient policy implementation but face limitations in handling complex political trade-offs. As these systems become prevalent, representatives may assume the role of architects of automated decision frameworks, responsible for guiding the translation of politically contested concepts into technical parameters and metrics. Advanced deliberation platforms offering real-time insights into citizen preferences will challenge traditional representative independence and discretion to interpret public will. The institutional integration of these participation mechanisms requires frameworks that balance the benefits with democratic stability through hybrid systems weighting different forms of democratic expression.

Conventional community detection requires centralized network data, making it unsuitable for distributed or privacy-preserving systems. In this paper, we demonstrate that macroscopic graph partitioning can emerge purely from strictly local, privacy preserving interactions driven by social learning. By reframing clustering as a symmetry-breaking process within nonlinear opinion dynamics, we show that exchanging saturated state dependent signal (like public actions) forces a network to naturally fracture along its sparsest cuts. We mathematically establish the spectral conditions under which dense core communities lock into stable, polarized states, robustly resisting external influence. To apply this mechanism, we propose three decentralized algorithms, leading up to the Score-based Edge Reliability (SER) framework. By evaluating network ties across multiple independent discussion topics, SER statistically bypasses the errors of traditional greedy bisections and naturally isolates structurally ambiguous frontier nodes. Validations on the ABCD benchmark and the real-world Ngogo chimpanzee network confirm that our fully decentralized approach matches the accuracy of globally optimized heuristics (e.g., Louvain, Leiden) up to a theoretical limit of detectable graphs.

Citizens' assemblies are a form of democratic innovation in which a randomly selected panel of constituents deliberates on questions of public interest. We study a novel goal for the selection of panel members: maximizing the entropy of the distribution over possible panels. We design algorithms that sample from maximum-entropy distributions, potentially subject to constraints on the individual selection probabilities. We investigate the properties of these algorithms theoretically, including in terms of their resistance to manipulation and transparency. We benchmark our algorithms on a large set of real assembly lotteries in terms of their intersectional diversity and the probability of satisfying unseen representation constraints, and we obtain favorable results on both measures. We deploy one of our algorithms on a website for citizens' assembly practitioners.

The advent of test-time scaling in large language models (LLMs), exemplified by OpenAI's o1 series, has advanced reasoning capabilities by scaling computational resource allocation during inference. While successors like QwQ, Deepseek-R1 (R1) and LIMO replicate these advancements, whether these models truly possess test-time scaling capabilities remains underexplored. This study found that longer CoTs of these o1-like models do not consistently enhance accuracy; in fact, correct solutions are often shorter than incorrect ones for the same questions. Further investigation shows this phenomenon is closely related to models' self-revision capabilities - longer CoTs contain more self-revisions, which often lead to performance degradation. We then compare sequential and parallel scaling strategies on QwQ, R1 and LIMO, finding that parallel scaling achieves better coverage and scalability. Based on these insights, we propose Shortest Majority Vote, a method that combines parallel scaling strategies with CoT length characteristics, significantly improving models' test-time scalability compared to conventional majority voting approaches.

Federated learning allows collaborative workers to solve a machine learning problem while preserving data privacy. Recent studies have tackled various challenges in federated learning, but the joint optimization of communication overhead, learning reliability, and deployment efficiency is still an open problem. To this end, we propose a new scheme named federated learning via plurality vote (FedVote). In each communication round of FedVote, workers transmit binary or ternary weights to the server with low communication overhead. The model parameters are aggregated via weighted voting to enhance the resilience against Byzantine attacks. When deployed for inference, the model with binary or ternary weights is resource-friendly to edge devices. We show that our proposed method can reduce quantization error and converges faster compared with the methods directly quantizing the model updates.

Achieving political consensus is crucial yet challenging for the effective functioning of social governance. However, although frontier AI systems represented by large language models (LLMs) have developed rapidly in recent years, their capabilities in this scope are still understudied. In this paper, we introduce PoliCon, a novel benchmark constructed from 2,225 high-quality deliberation records of the European Parliament over 13 years, ranging from 2009 to 2022, to evaluate the ability of LLMs to draft consensus resolutions based on divergent party positions under varying collective decision-making contexts and political requirements. Specifically, PoliCon incorporates four factors to build each task environment for finding different political consensus: specific political issues, political goals, participating parties, and power structures based on seat distribution. We also developed an evaluation framework based on social choice theory for PoliCon, which simulates the real voting outcomes of different political parties to assess whether LLM-generated resolutions meet the requirements of the predetermined political consensus. Our experimental results demonstrate that even state-of-the-art models remain undersatisfied with complex tasks like passing resolutions by a two-thirds majority and addressing security issues, while uncovering their inherent partisan biases and revealing some behaviors LLMs show to achieve the consensus, such as prioritizing the stance of the dominant party instead of uniting smaller parties, which highlights PoliCon's promise as an effective platform for studying LLMs' ability to promote political consensus. The code and dataset are released at https://zowiezhang.github.io/projects/PoliCon.

Investigating NLP through a philosophical lens has recently caught researcher's eyes as it connects computational methods with classical schools of philosophy. This paper introduces a philosophical approach inspired by the Hegelian Dialectic for LLMs' self-reflection, utilizing a self-dialectical approach to emulate internal critiques and then synthesize new ideas by resolving the contradicting points. Moreover, this paper investigates the effect of LLMs' temperature for generation by establishing a dynamic annealing approach, which promotes the creativity in the early stages and gradually refines it by focusing on the nuances, as well as a fixed temperature strategy for generation. Our proposed approach is examined to determine its ability to generate novel ideas from an initial proposition. Additionally, a Multi Agent Majority Voting (MAMV) strategy is leveraged to assess the validity and novelty of the generated ideas, which proves beneficial in the absence of domain experts. Our experiments show promise in generating new ideas and provide a stepping stone for future research.

There is intense interest in investigating how inference time compute (ITC) (e.g. repeated sampling, refinements, etc) can improve large language model (LLM) capabilities. At the same time, recent breakthroughs in reasoning models, such as Deepseek-R1, unlock the opportunity for reinforcement learning to improve LLM reasoning skills. An in-depth understanding of how ITC interacts with reasoning across different models could provide important guidance on how to further advance the LLM frontier. This work conducts a comprehensive analysis of inference-time scaling methods for both reasoning and non-reasoning models on challenging reasoning tasks. Specifically, we focus our research on verifier-free inference time-scaling methods due to its generalizability without needing a reward model. We construct the Pareto frontier of quality and efficiency. We find that non-reasoning models, even with an extremely high inference budget, still fall substantially behind reasoning models. For reasoning models, majority voting proves to be a robust inference strategy, generally competitive or outperforming other more sophisticated ITC methods like best-of-N and sequential revisions, while the additional inference compute offers minimal improvements. We further perform in-depth analyses of the association of key response features (length and linguistic markers) with response quality, with which we can improve the existing ITC methods. We find that correct responses from reasoning models are typically shorter and have fewer hedging and thinking markers (but more discourse markers) than the incorrect responses.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

A key component of understanding hand-object interactions is the ability to identify the active object -- the object that is being manipulated by the human hand. In order to accurately localize the active object, any method must reason using information encoded by each image pixel, such as whether it belongs to the hand, the object, or the background. To leverage each pixel as evidence to determine the bounding box of the active object, we propose a pixel-wise voting function. Our pixel-wise voting function takes an initial bounding box as input and produces an improved bounding box of the active object as output. The voting function is designed so that each pixel inside of the input bounding box votes for an improved bounding box, and the box with the majority vote is selected as the output. We call the collection of bounding boxes generated inside of the voting function, the Relational Box Field, as it characterizes a field of bounding boxes defined in relationship to the current bounding box. While our voting function is able to improve the bounding box of the active object, one round of voting is typically not enough to accurately localize the active object. Therefore, we repeatedly apply the voting function to sequentially improve the location of the bounding box. However, since it is known that repeatedly applying a one-step predictor (i.e., auto-regressive processing with our voting function) can cause a data distribution shift, we mitigate this issue using reinforcement learning (RL). We adopt standard RL to learn the voting function parameters and show that it provides a meaningful improvement over a standard supervised learning approach. We perform experiments on two large-scale datasets: 100DOH and MECCANO, improving AP50 performance by 8% and 30%, respectively, over the state of the art.

Federated learning (FL) faces a critical dilemma: existing protection mechanisms like differential privacy (DP) and homomorphic encryption (HE) enforce a rigid trade-off, forcing a choice between model utility and computational efficiency. This lack of flexibility hinders the practical implementation. To address this, we introduce ParaAegis, a parallel protection framework designed to give practitioners flexible control over the privacy-utility-efficiency balance. Our core innovation is a strategic model partitioning scheme. By applying lightweight DP to the less critical, low norm portion of the model while protecting the remainder with HE, we create a tunable system. A distributed voting mechanism ensures consensus on this partitioning. Theoretical analysis confirms the adjustments between efficiency and utility with the same privacy. Crucially, the experimental results demonstrate that by adjusting the hyperparameters, our method enables flexible prioritization between model accuracy and training time.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

Self-consistency (SC) is a widely used test-time inference technique for improving performance in chain-of-thought reasoning. It involves generating multiple responses, or samples from a large language model (LLM) and selecting the most frequent answer. This procedure can naturally be viewed as a majority vote or empirical mode estimation. Despite its effectiveness, SC is prohibitively expensive at scale when naively applied to datasets, and it lacks a unified theoretical treatment of sample efficiency and scaling behavior. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of SC's scaling behavior and its variants, drawing on mode estimation and voting theory. We derive and empirically validate power law scaling for self-consistency across datasets, and analyze the sample efficiency for fixed-allocation and dynamic-allocation sampling schemes. From these insights, we introduce Blend-ASC, a novel variant of self-consistency that dynamically allocates samples to questions during inference, achieving state-of-the-art sample efficiency. Our approach uses 6.8x fewer samples than vanilla SC on average, outperforming both fixed- and dynamic-allocation SC baselines, thereby demonstrating the superiority of our approach in terms of efficiency. In contrast to existing variants, Blend-ASC is hyperparameter-free and can fit an arbitrary sample budget, ensuring it can be easily applied to any self-consistency application.

Disagreement in annotation is a common phenomenon in the development of NLP datasets and serves as a valuable source of insight. While majority voting remains the dominant strategy for aggregating labels, recent work has explored modeling individual annotators to preserve their perspectives. However, modeling each annotator is resource-intensive and remains underexplored across various NLP tasks. We propose an agreement-based clustering technique to model the disagreement between the annotators. We conduct comprehensive experiments in 40 datasets in 18 typologically diverse languages, covering three subjective NLP tasks: sentiment analysis, emotion classification, and hate speech detection. We evaluate four aggregation approaches: majority vote, ensemble, multi-label, and multitask. The results demonstrate that agreement-based clustering can leverage the full spectrum of annotator perspectives and significantly enhance classification performance in subjective NLP tasks compared to majority voting and individual annotator modeling. Regarding the aggregation approach, the multi-label and multitask approaches are better for modeling clustered annotators than an ensemble and model majority vote.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

The massive population election simulation aims to model the preferences of specific groups in particular election scenarios. It has garnered significant attention for its potential to forecast real-world social trends. Traditional agent-based modeling (ABM) methods are constrained by their ability to incorporate complex individual background information and provide interactive prediction results. In this paper, we introduce ElectionSim, an innovative election simulation framework based on large language models, designed to support accurate voter simulations and customized distributions, together with an interactive platform to dialogue with simulated voters. We present a million-level voter pool sampled from social media platforms to support accurate individual simulation. We also introduce PPE, a poll-based presidential election benchmark to assess the performance of our framework under the U.S. presidential election scenario. Through extensive experiments and analyses, we demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our framework in U.S. presidential election simulations.

Multi-agent LLM committees replicate the same model under different role prompts and aggregate outputs by majority vote, implicitly assuming that agents contribute complementary evidence. We embed each agent's chain-of-thought rationale and measure pairwise similarity: across 100 GSM8K questions with three Qwen2.5-14B agents, mean cosine similarity is 0.888 and effective rank is 2.17 out of 3.0, a failure mode we term representational collapse. DALC, a training-free consensus protocol that computes diversity weights from embedding geometry, reaches 87% on GSM8K versus 84% for self-consistency at 26% lower token cost. Ablation experiments reveal 1-3 point per-protocol run-to-run variance, confirm that hint sharing contributes more than diversity weighting alone, and show that encoder choice strongly modulates collapse severity (cosine 0.908 with mxbai versus 0.888 with nomic) and downstream accuracy. The more robust finding is that collapse is measurable, worsens on harder tasks, and that the choice of embedding proxy is a first-order design decision for any latent communication protocol.

Test-time scaling can improve model performance by aggregating stochastic reasoning trajectories. However, achieving sample-efficient test-time self-consistency under a limited budget remains an open challenge. We introduce PETS (Principled and Efficient Test-TimeSelf-Consistency), which initiates a principled study of trajectory allocation through an optimization framework. Central to our approach is the self-consistency rate, a new measure defined as agreement with the infinite-budget majority vote. This formulation makes sample-efficient test-time allocation theoretically grounded and amenable to rigorous analysis. We study both offline and online settings. In the offline regime, where all questions are known in advance, we connect trajectory allocation to crowdsourcing, a classic and well-developed area, by modeling reasoning traces as workers. This perspective allows us to leverage rich existing theory, yielding theoretical guarantees and an efficient majority-voting-based allocation algorithm. In the online streaming regime, where questions arrive sequentially and allocations must be made on the fly, we propose a novel method inspired by the offline framework. Our approach adapts budgets to question difficulty while preserving strong theoretical guarantees and computational efficiency. Experiments show that PETS consistently outperforms uniform allocation. On GPQA, PETS achieves perfect self-consistency in both settings while reducing the sampling budget by up to 75% (offline) and 55% (online) relative to uniform allocation. Code is available at https://github.com/ZDCSlab/PETS.

Recent years have witnessed the rapid development of Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), which excel at collaborative decision-making and complex problem-solving. Recently, researchers have further investigated Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) frameworks, which enhance the reasoning and collaboration capabilities of MAS through information exchange and debate among multiple agents. However, existing approaches often rely on unguided initialization, causing agents to adopt identical reasoning paths that lead to the same errors. As a result, effective debate among agents is hindered, and the final outcome frequently degenerates into simple majority voting. To solve the above problem, in this paper, we introduce Dynamic Multi-Agent Debate (DynaDebate), which enhances the effectiveness of multi-agent debate through three key mechanisms: (1) Dynamic Path Generation and Allocation, which employs a dedicated Path Generation Agent to generate diverse and logical solution paths with adaptive redundancy; (2) Process-Centric Debate, which shifts the focus from surface-level outcome voting to rigorous step-by-step logic critique to ensure process correctness; (3) A Trigger-Based Verification Agent, which is activated upon disagreement and uses external tools to objectively resolve deadlocks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DynaDebate achieves superior performance across various benchmarks, surpassing existing state-of-the-art MAD methods.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

In data poisoning attacks, an adversary tries to change a model's prediction by adding, modifying, or removing samples in the training data. Recently, ensemble-based approaches for obtaining provable defenses against data poisoning have been proposed where predictions are done by taking a majority vote across multiple base models. In this work, we show that merely considering the majority vote in ensemble defenses is wasteful as it does not effectively utilize available information in the logits layers of the base models. Instead, we propose Run-Off Election (ROE), a novel aggregation method based on a two-round election across the base models: In the first round, models vote for their preferred class and then a second, Run-Off election is held between the top two classes in the first round. Based on this approach, we propose DPA+ROE and FA+ROE defense methods based on Deep Partition Aggregation (DPA) and Finite Aggregation (FA) approaches from prior work. We evaluate our methods on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB and obtain improvements in certified accuracy by up to 3%-4%. Also, by applying ROE on a boosted version of DPA, we gain improvements around 12%-27% comparing to the current state-of-the-art, establishing a new state-of-the-art in (pointwise) certified robustness against data poisoning. In many cases, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art, even when using 32 times less computational power.

Test-time reinforcement learning (TTRL) enables large language models (LLMs) to self-improve on unlabeled inputs, but its effectiveness critically depends on how reward signals are estimated without ground-truth supervision. Most existing TTRL methods rely on majority voting (MV) over rollouts to produce deterministic rewards, implicitly assuming that the majority rollout provides a reliable learning signal. We show that this assumption is fragile: MV reduces the rollout distribution into a single outcome, discarding information about non-majority but correct actions candidates, and yields systematically biased reward estimates. To address this, we propose Distribution-AwareReward Estimation (DARE), which shifts reward estimation from a single majority outcome to the full empirical rollout distribution. DARE further augments this distribution-based reward with an exploration bonus and a distribution pruning mechanism for non-majority rollout exploration and reward denoise, yielding a more informative and robust reward estimation. Extensive experiments on challenging reasoning benchmarks show that DARE improves optimization stability and final performance over recent baselines, achieving relative improvements of 25.3% on challenging AIME 2024 and 5.3% on AMC.

Multi-agent debate (MAD) has recently emerged as a promising framework for improving the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs). Yet, whether LLM agents can genuinely engage in deliberative reasoning, beyond simple ensembling or majority voting, remains unclear. We address this question through a controlled study using the Knight--Knave--Spy logic puzzle, which enables precise, step-wise evaluation of debate outcomes and processes under verifiable ground truth. We systematically set up six structural and cognitive factors, including agent team size, composition, confidence visibility, debate order, debate depth, and task difficulty, to disentangle their respective effects on collective reasoning. Our results show that intrinsic reasoning strength and group diversity are the dominant drivers of debate success, while structural parameters such as order or confidence visibility offer limited gains. Beyond outcomes, process-level analyses identify key behavioral patterns: majority pressure suppresses independent correction, effective teams overturn incorrect consensus, and rational, validity-aligned reasoning most strongly predicts improvement. These findings provide valuable insights into how and why LLM debates succeed or fail, offering guidance for designing interpretable and truth-seeking multi-agent reasoning systems.

Parallel thinking has emerged as a promising paradigm for reasoning, yet it imposes significant computational burdens. Existing efficiency methods primarily rely on local, per-trajectory signals and lack principled mechanisms to exploit global dynamics across parallel branches. We introduce 2D probing, an interface that exposes the width-depth dynamics of parallel thinking by periodically eliciting intermediate answers from all branches. Our analysis reveals three key insights: non-monotonic scaling across width-depth allocations, heterogeneous reasoning branch lengths, and early stabilization of global consensus. Guided by these insights, we introduce Parallel-Probe, a training-free controller designed to optimize online parallel thinking. Parallel-Probe employs consensus-based early stopping to regulate reasoning depth and deviation-based branch pruning to dynamically adjust width. Extensive experiments across three benchmarks and multiple models demonstrate that Parallel-Probe establishes a superior Pareto frontier for test-time scaling. Compared to standard majority voting, it reduces sequential tokens by up to 35.8% and total token cost by over 25.8% while maintaining competitive accuracy.