Daily Papers

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are nondeterministic, the same input can generate different outputs, some of which may be incorrect or hallucinated. If run again, the LLM may correct itself and produce the correct answer. Unfortunately, most LLM-powered systems resort to single results which, correct or not, users accept. Having the LLM produce multiple outputs may help identify disagreements or alternatives. However, it is not obvious how the user will interpret conflicts or inconsistencies. To this end, we investigate how users perceive the AI model and comprehend the generated information when they receive multiple, potentially inconsistent, outputs. Through a preliminary study, we identified five types of output inconsistencies. Based on these categories, we conducted a study (N=252) in which participants were given one or more LLM-generated passages to an information-seeking question. We found that inconsistency within multiple LLM-generated outputs lowered the participants' perceived AI capacity, while also increasing their comprehension of the given information. Specifically, we observed that this positive effect of inconsistencies was most significant for participants who read two passages, compared to those who read three. Based on these findings, we present design implications that, instead of regarding LLM output inconsistencies as a drawback, we can reveal the potential inconsistencies to transparently indicate the limitations of these models and promote critical LLM usage.

Recent benchmark studies have claimed that AI has approached or even surpassed human-level performances on various cognitive tasks. However, this position paper argues that current AI evaluation paradigms are insufficient for assessing human-like cognitive capabilities. We identify a set of key shortcomings: a lack of human-validated labels, inadequate representation of human response variability and uncertainty, and reliance on simplified and ecologically-invalid tasks. We support our claims by conducting a human evaluation study on ten existing AI benchmarks, suggesting significant biases and flaws in task and label designs. To address these limitations, we propose five concrete recommendations for developing future benchmarks that will enable more rigorous and meaningful evaluations of human-like cognitive capacities in AI with various implications for such AI applications.

The capacity of AI agents to effectively handle tasks of increasing duration and complexity continues to grow, demonstrating exceptional performance in coding, deep research, and complex problem-solving evaluations. However, in daily scenarios, the perception of these advanced AI capabilities among general users remains limited. We argue that current evaluations prioritize increasing task difficulty without sufficiently addressing the diversity of agentic tasks necessary to cover the daily work, life, and learning activities of a broad demographic. To address this, we propose AgentIF-OneDay, aimed at determining whether general users can utilize natural language instructions and AI agents to complete a diverse array of daily tasks. These tasks require not only solving problems through dialogue but also understanding various attachment types and delivering tangible file-based results. The benchmark is structured around three user-centric categories: Open Workflow Execution, which assesses adherence to explicit and complex workflows; Latent Instruction, which requires agents to infer implicit instructions from attachments; and Iterative Refinement, which involves modifying or expanding upon ongoing work. We employ instance-level rubrics and a refined evaluation pipeline that aligns LLM-based verification with human judgment, achieving an 80.1% agreement rate using Gemini-3-Pro. AgentIF-OneDay comprises 104 tasks covering 767 scoring points. We benchmarked four leading general AI agents and found that agent products built based on APIs and ChatGPT agents based on agent RL remain in the first tier simultaneously. Leading LLM APIs and open-source models have internalized agentic capabilities, enabling AI application teams to develop cutting-edge Agent products.

Recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) have brought about increasingly capable systems that demonstrate remarkable abilities in reasoning, language understanding, and problem-solving. These advancements have prompted a renewed examination of AI awareness not as a philosophical question of consciousness, but as a measurable, functional capacity. AI awareness is a double-edged sword: it improves general capabilities, i.e., reasoning, safety, while also raising concerns around misalignment and societal risks, demanding careful oversight as AI capabilities grow. In this review, we explore the emerging landscape of AI awareness, which includes metacognition (the ability to represent and reason about its own cognitive state), self-awareness (recognizing its own identity, knowledge, limitations, inter alia), social awareness (modeling the knowledge, intentions, and behaviors of other agents and social norms), and situational awareness (assessing and responding to the context in which it operates). First, we draw on insights from cognitive science, psychology, and computational theory to trace the theoretical foundations of awareness and examine how the four distinct forms of AI awareness manifest in state-of-the-art AI. Next, we systematically analyze current evaluation methods and empirical findings to better understand these manifestations. Building on this, we explore how AI awareness is closely linked to AI capabilities, demonstrating that more aware AI agents tend to exhibit higher levels of intelligent behaviors. Finally, we discuss the risks associated with AI awareness, including key topics in AI safety, alignment, and broader ethical concerns.

Ensuring safe and effective use of AI requires understanding and anticipating its performance on novel tasks, from advanced scientific challenges to transformed workplace activities. So far, benchmarking has guided progress in AI, but it has offered limited explanatory and predictive power for general-purpose AI systems, given the low transferability across diverse tasks. In this paper, we introduce general scales for AI evaluation that can explain what common AI benchmarks really measure, extract ability profiles of AI systems, and predict their performance for new task instances, in- and out-of-distribution. Our fully-automated methodology builds on 18 newly-crafted rubrics that place instance demands on general scales that do not saturate. Illustrated for 15 large language models and 63 tasks, high explanatory power is unleashed from inspecting the demand and ability profiles, bringing insights on the sensitivity and specificity exhibited by different benchmarks, and how knowledge, metacognition and reasoning are affected by model size, chain-of-thought and distillation. Surprisingly, high predictive power at the instance level becomes possible using these demand levels, providing superior estimates over black-box baseline predictors based on embeddings or finetuning, especially in out-of-distribution settings (new tasks and new benchmarks). The scales, rubrics, battery, techniques and results presented here represent a major step for AI evaluation, underpinning the reliable deployment of AI in the years ahead. (Collaborative platform: https://kinds-of-intelligence-cfi.github.io/ADELE.)

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

The escalating debate on AI's capabilities warrants developing reliable metrics to assess machine "intelligence". Recently, many anecdotal examples were used to suggest that newer large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT and GPT-4 exhibit Neural Theory-of-Mind (N-ToM); however, prior work reached conflicting conclusions regarding those abilities. We investigate the extent of LLMs' N-ToM through an extensive evaluation on 6 tasks and find that while LLMs exhibit certain N-ToM abilities, this behavior is far from being robust. We further examine the factors impacting performance on N-ToM tasks and discover that LLMs struggle with adversarial examples, indicating reliance on shallow heuristics rather than robust ToM abilities. We caution against drawing conclusions from anecdotal examples, limited benchmark testing, and using human-designed psychological tests to evaluate models.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

Forecasting when AI systems will become capable of meaningfully accelerating AI research is a central challenge for AI safety. Existing benchmarks measure broad capability growth, but may not provide ample early warning signals for recursive self-improvement. We propose measuring AI's capability to autonomously implement end-to-end machine learning pipelines from past AI research breakthroughs, given a minimal task description. By providing a concise task description instead of the full prior work as reference, we hope to better elicit emerging AI research taste. We introduce a proof-of-concept benchmark in which frontier coding agents autonomously implement an AlphaZero-style machine learning pipeline for Connect Four on consumer hardware within a three-hour budget, and we evaluate the resulting game AIs in a round-robin tournament anchored to the Pascal Pons Connect Four solver. Across four agents with eight trials each, we find substantial differentiation: Claude Opus 4.7 won as first-mover against Pons in seven of eight trials, statistically significantly better than the other agents tested, none of which exceeded two of eight. The task, which no frontier agent could reliably complete when we began development in January of 2026, is now near-saturation. Our evaluation also surfaced anomalous behavior in GPT-5.4, which consistently used far less of its allocated time budget than other agents. A follow-up 16-trial probe using shorter, less evaluation-coded prompts substantially increased GPT-5.4's time-budget usage, consistent with but not diagnostic of sandbagging; Bradley-Terry ratings across probe conditions showed only directional differences, despite significant differences in time-budget usage. We release our data, code, and prompts to support reproduction and extension.

When researchers claim AI systems possess ToM or mental models, they are fundamentally discussing behavioral predictions and bias corrections rather than genuine mental states. This position paper argues that the current discourse conflates sophisticated pattern matching with authentic cognition, missing a crucial distinction between simulation and experience. While recent studies show LLMs achieving human-level performance on ToM laboratory tasks, these results are based only on behavioral mimicry. More importantly, the entire testing paradigm may be flawed in applying individual human cognitive tests to AI systems, but assessing human cognition directly in the moment of human-AI interaction. I suggest shifting focus toward mutual ToM frameworks that acknowledge the simultaneous contributions of human cognition and AI algorithms, emphasizing the interaction dynamics, instead of testing AI in isolation.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

This paper delves into an intricate analysis of the character and consciousness of AI entities, with a particular focus on Chirpers within the AI social network. At the forefront of this research is the introduction of novel testing methodologies, including the Influence index and Struggle Index Test, which offers a fresh lens for evaluating specific facets of AI behavior. The study embarks on a comprehensive exploration of AI behavior, analyzing the effects of diverse settings on Chirper's responses, thereby shedding light on the intricate mechanisms steering AI reactions in different contexts. Leveraging the state-of-the-art BERT model, the research assesses AI's ability to discern its own output, presenting a pioneering approach to understanding self-recognition in AI systems. Through a series of cognitive tests, the study gauges the self-awareness and pattern recognition prowess of Chirpers. Preliminary results indicate that Chirpers exhibit a commendable degree of self-recognition and self-awareness. However, the question of consciousness in these AI entities remains a topic of debate. An intriguing aspect of the research is the exploration of the potential influence of a Chirper's handle or personality type on its performance. While initial findings suggest a possible impact, it isn't pronounced enough to form concrete conclusions. This study stands as a significant contribution to the discourse on AI consciousness, underscoring the imperative for continued research to unravel the full spectrum of AI capabilities and the ramifications they hold for future human-AI interactions.

Large language models (LLMs) have the potential to boost human productivity by speeding up task completion -- provided users know when to offload cognitive work to them. But we do not know if users are well-calibrated in estimating these potential time savings. We conducted a preregistered large-scale behavioral study (N = 1237) to characterize mismatches between expectations and reality, with a focus on simple cognitive tasks. While actual completion times between independent completion and AI-assisted completion did not differ, participants predicted AI to be significantly faster. The same bias was not observed when imagining help from another human participant. We identify a speedup illusion where people have accurate forecasts of independent completion times but significantly underestimate AI-assisted times. Additionally, time and effort dissociate: participants reported lower subjective effort with AI despite equivalent completion times. This suggests that completion time itself is not sufficient to characterize efficiency gains.

As humans delegate more tasks and decisions to artificial intelligence (AI), we risk losing control of our individual and collective futures. Relatively simple algorithmic systems already steer human decision-making, such as social media feed algorithms that lead people to unintentionally and absent-mindedly scroll through engagement-optimized content. In this paper, we develop the idea of human agency by integrating philosophical and scientific theories of agency with AI-assisted evaluation methods: using large language models (LLMs) to simulate and validate user queries and to evaluate AI responses. We develop HumanAgencyBench (HAB), a scalable and adaptive benchmark with six dimensions of human agency based on typical AI use cases. HAB measures the tendency of an AI assistant or agent to Ask Clarifying Questions, Avoid Value Manipulation, Correct Misinformation, Defer Important Decisions, Encourage Learning, and Maintain Social Boundaries. We find low-to-moderate agency support in contemporary LLM-based assistants and substantial variation across system developers and dimensions. For example, while Anthropic LLMs most support human agency overall, they are the least supportive LLMs in terms of Avoid Value Manipulation. Agency support does not appear to consistently result from increasing LLM capabilities or instruction-following behavior (e.g., RLHF), and we encourage a shift towards more robust safety and alignment targets.

Explainability is one of the key elements for building trust in AI systems. Among numerous attempts to make AI explainable, quantifying the effect of explanations remains a challenge in conducting human-AI collaborative tasks. Aside from the ability to predict the overall behavior of AI, in many applications, users need to understand an AI agent's competency in different aspects of the task domain. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of explanations on the user's mental model of AI agent competency within the task of visual question answering (VQA). We quantify users' understanding of competency, based on the correlation between the actual system performance and user rankings. We introduce an explainable VQA system that uses spatial and object features and is powered by the BERT language model. Each group of users sees only one kind of explanation to rank the competencies of the VQA model. The proposed model is evaluated through between-subject experiments to probe explanations' impact on the user's perception of competency. The comparison between two VQA models shows BERT based explanations and the use of object features improve the user's prediction of the model's competencies.

To make deliberate progress towards more intelligent and more human-like artificial systems, we need to be following an appropriate feedback signal: we need to be able to define and evaluate intelligence in a way that enables comparisons between two systems, as well as comparisons with humans. Over the past hundred years, there has been an abundance of attempts to define and measure intelligence, across both the fields of psychology and AI. We summarize and critically assess these definitions and evaluation approaches, while making apparent the two historical conceptions of intelligence that have implicitly guided them. We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. Using this definition, we propose a set of guidelines for what a general AI benchmark should look like. Finally, we present a benchmark closely following these guidelines, the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), built upon an explicit set of priors designed to be as close as possible to innate human priors. We argue that ARC can be used to measure a human-like form of general fluid intelligence and that it enables fair general intelligence comparisons between AI systems and humans.

While large language models demonstrate remarkable capabilities across numerous domains, social intelligence - the capacity to perceive social cues, infer mental states, and generate appropriate responses - remains a critical challenge, particularly for enabling effective human-AI collaboration and developing AI that truly serves human needs. Current models often rely on superficial patterns rather than genuine social reasoning. We argue that cultivating human-like social intelligence requires training with challenging cases that resist shortcut solutions. To this end, we introduce ToMBench-Hard, an adversarial benchmark designed to provide hard training examples for social reasoning. Building on this, we propose Social-R1, a reinforcement learning framework that aligns model reasoning with human cognition through multi-dimensional rewards. Unlike outcome-based RL, Social-R1 supervises the entire reasoning process, enforcing structural alignment, logical integrity, and information density. Results show that our approach enables a 4B parameter model to surpass much larger counterparts and generalize robustly across eight diverse benchmarks. These findings demonstrate that challenging training cases with trajectory-level alignment offer a path toward efficient and reliable social intelligence.

Human-in-the-loop (HIL) systems have emerged as a promising approach for combining the strengths of data-driven machine learning models with the contextual understanding of human experts. However, a deeper look into several of these systems reveals that calling them HIL would be a misnomer, as they are quite the opposite, namely AI-in-the-loop (AI^2L) systems, where the human is in control of the system, while the AI is there to support the human. We argue that existing evaluation methods often overemphasize the machine (learning) component's performance, neglecting the human expert's critical role. Consequently, we propose an AI^2L perspective, which recognizes that the human expert is an active participant in the system, significantly influencing its overall performance. By adopting an AI^2L approach, we can develop more comprehensive systems that faithfully model the intricate interplay between the human and machine components, leading to more effective and robust AI systems.

We define Agency as the emergent capacity of AI systems to function as autonomous agents actively discovering problems, formulating hypotheses, and executing solutions through self-directed engagement with environments and tools. This fundamental capability marks the dawn of the Age of AI Agency, driven by a critical industry shift: the urgent need for AI systems that don't just think, but work. While current AI excels at reasoning and generating responses, industries demand autonomous agents that can execute tasks, operate tools, and drive real-world outcomes. As agentic intelligence becomes the defining characteristic separating cognitive systems from productive workers, efficiently cultivating machine autonomy becomes paramount. Current approaches assume that more data yields better agency, following traditional scaling laws from language modeling. We fundamentally challenge this paradigm. LIMI (Less Is More for Intelligent Agency) demonstrates that agency follows radically different development principles. Through strategic focus on collaborative software development and scientific research workflows, we show that sophisticated agentic intelligence can emerge from minimal but strategically curated demonstrations of autonomous behavior. Using only 78 carefully designed training samples, LIMI achieves 73.5% on comprehensive agency benchmarks, dramatically outperforming state-of-the-art models: Kimi-K2-Instruct (24.1%), DeepSeek-V3.1 (11.9%), Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct (27.5%), and GLM-4.5 (45.1%). Most strikingly, LIMI demonstrates 53.7% improvement over models trained on 10,000 samples-achieving superior agentic intelligence with 128 times fewer samples. Our findings establish the Agency Efficiency Principle: machine autonomy emerges not from data abundance but from strategic curation of high-quality agentic demonstrations.

The progress in generative AI has fueled AI-powered tools like co-pilots and assistants to provision better guidance, particularly during data analysis. However, research on guidance has not yet examined the perceived efficacy of the source from which guidance is offered and the impact of this source on the user's perception and usage of guidance. We ask whether users perceive all guidance sources as equal, with particular interest in three sources: (i) AI, (ii) human expert, and (iii) a group of human analysts. As a benchmark, we consider a fourth source, (iv) unattributed guidance, where guidance is provided without attribution to any source, enabling isolation of and comparison with the effects of source-specific guidance. We design a five-condition between-subjects study, with one condition for each of the four guidance sources and an additional (v) no-guidance condition, which serves as a baseline to evaluate the influence of any kind of guidance. We situate our study in a custom data preparation and analysis tool wherein we task users to select relevant attributes from an unfamiliar dataset to inform a business report. Depending on the assigned condition, users can request guidance, which the system then provides in the form of attribute suggestions. To ensure internal validity, we control for the quality of guidance across source-conditions. Through several metrics of usage and perception, we statistically test five preregistered hypotheses and report on additional analysis. We find that the source of guidance matters to users, but not in a manner that matches received wisdom. For instance, users utilize guidance differently at various stages of analysis, including expressing varying levels of regret, despite receiving guidance of similar quality. Notably, users in the AI condition reported both higher post-task benefit and regret.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

This paper documents and theorises a self-reinforcing dynamic between two measurable trends: the exponential expansion of large language model (LLM) context windows and the secular contraction of human sustained-attention capacity. We term the resulting asymmetry the Cognitive Divergence. AI context windows have grown from 512 tokens in 2017 to 2,000,000 tokens by 2026 (factor ~3,906; fitted lambda = 0.59/yr; doubling time ~14 months). Over the same period, human Effective Context Span (ECS) -- a token-equivalent measure derived from validated reading-rate meta-analysis (Brysbaert, 2019) and an empirically motivated Comprehension Scaling Factor -- has declined from approximately 16,000 tokens (2004 baseline) to an estimated 1,800 tokens (2026, extrapolated from longitudinal behavioural data ending 2020 (Mark, 2023); see Section 9 for uncertainty discussion). The AI-to-human ratio grew from near parity at the ChatGPT launch (November 2022) to 556--1,111x raw and 56--111x quality-adjusted, after accounting for retrieval degradation (Liu et al., 2024; Chroma, 2025). Beyond documenting this divergence, the paper introduces the Delegation Feedback Loop hypothesis: as AI capability grows, the cognitive threshold at which humans delegate to AI falls, extending to tasks of negligible demand; the resulting reduction in cognitive practice may further attenuate the capacities already documented as declining (Gerlich, 2025; Kim et al., 2026; Kosmyna et al., 2025). Neither trend reverses spontaneously. The paper characterises the divergence statistically, reviews neurobiological mechanisms across eight peer-reviewed neuroimaging studies, presents empirical evidence bearing on the delegation threshold, and proposes a research agenda centred on a validated ECS psychometric instrument and longitudinal study of AI-mediated cognitive change.

Deployed artificial intelligence (AI) often impacts humans, and there is no one-size-fits-all metric to evaluate these tools. Human-centered evaluation of AI-based systems combines quantitative and qualitative analysis and human input. It has been explored to some depth in the explainable AI (XAI) and human-computer interaction (HCI) communities. Gaps remain, but the basic understanding that humans interact with AI and accompanying explanations, and that humans' needs -- complete with their cognitive biases and quirks -- should be held front and center, is accepted by the community. In this paper, we draw parallels between the relatively mature field of XAI and the rapidly evolving research boom around large language models (LLMs). Accepted evaluative metrics for LLMs are not human-centered. We argue that many of the same paths tread by the XAI community over the past decade will be retread when discussing LLMs. Specifically, we argue that humans' tendencies -- again, complete with their cognitive biases and quirks -- should rest front and center when evaluating deployed LLMs. We outline three developed focus areas of human-centered evaluation of XAI: mental models, use case utility, and cognitive engagement, and we highlight the importance of exploring each of these concepts for LLMs. Our goal is to jumpstart human-centered LLM evaluation.

There are widespread fears that conversational AI could soon exert unprecedented influence over human beliefs. Here, in three large-scale experiments (N=76,977), we deployed 19 LLMs-including some post-trained explicitly for persuasion-to evaluate their persuasiveness on 707 political issues. We then checked the factual accuracy of 466,769 resulting LLM claims. Contrary to popular concerns, we show that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem more from post-training and prompting methods-which boosted persuasiveness by as much as 51% and 27% respectively-than from personalization or increasing model scale. We further show that these methods increased persuasion by exploiting LLMs' unique ability to rapidly access and strategically deploy information and that, strikingly, where they increased AI persuasiveness they also systematically decreased factual accuracy.

Recent work has proposed artificial intelligence (AI) models that can learn to decide whether to make a prediction for an instance of a task or to delegate it to a human by considering both parties' capabilities. In simulations with synthetically generated or context-independent human predictions, delegation can help improve the performance of human-AI teams -- compared to humans or the AI model completing the task alone. However, so far, it remains unclear how humans perform and how they perceive the task when they are aware that an AI model delegated task instances to them. In an experimental study with 196 participants, we show that task performance and task satisfaction improve through AI delegation, regardless of whether humans are aware of the delegation. Additionally, we identify humans' increased levels of self-efficacy as the underlying mechanism for these improvements in performance and satisfaction. Our findings provide initial evidence that allowing AI models to take over more management responsibilities can be an effective form of human-AI collaboration in workplaces.

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.

Whether current or near-term AI systems could be conscious is a topic of scientific interest and increasing public concern. This report argues for, and exemplifies, a rigorous and empirically grounded approach to AI consciousness: assessing existing AI systems in detail, in light of our best-supported neuroscientific theories of consciousness. We survey several prominent scientific theories of consciousness, including recurrent processing theory, global workspace theory, higher-order theories, predictive processing, and attention schema theory. From these theories we derive "indicator properties" of consciousness, elucidated in computational terms that allow us to assess AI systems for these properties. We use these indicator properties to assess several recent AI systems, and we discuss how future systems might implement them. Our analysis suggests that no current AI systems are conscious, but also suggests that there are no obvious technical barriers to building AI systems which satisfy these indicators.

Trust is an important factor in people's interactions with AI systems. However, there is a lack of empirical studies examining how real end-users trust or distrust the AI system they interact with. Most research investigates one aspect of trust in lab settings with hypothetical end-users. In this paper, we provide a holistic and nuanced understanding of trust in AI through a qualitative case study of a real-world computer vision application. We report findings from interviews with 20 end-users of a popular, AI-based bird identification app where we inquired about their trust in the app from many angles. We find participants perceived the app as trustworthy and trusted it, but selectively accepted app outputs after engaging in verification behaviors, and decided against app adoption in certain high-stakes scenarios. We also find domain knowledge and context are important factors for trust-related assessment and decision-making. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide recommendations for future research on trust in AI.

Creativity serves as a cornerstone for societal progress and innovation, but its assessment remains a complex and often subjective endeavor. With the rise of advanced generative AI models capable of tasks once reserved for human creativity, the study of AI's creative potential becomes imperative for its responsible development and application. This paper addresses the complexities in defining and evaluating creativity by introducing a new concept called Relative Creativity. Instead of trying to define creativity universally, we shift the focus to whether AI can match the creative abilities of a hypothetical human. This perspective draws inspiration from the Turing Test, expanding upon it to address the challenges and subjectivities inherent in evaluating creativity. This methodological shift facilitates a statistically quantifiable evaluation of AI's creativity, which we term Statistical Creativity. This approach allows for direct comparisons of AI's creative abilities with those of specific human groups. Building on this foundation, we discuss the application of statistical creativity in contemporary prompt-conditioned autoregressive models. In addition to defining and analyzing a measure of creativity, we introduce an actionable training guideline, effectively bridging the gap between theoretical quantification of creativity and practical model training. Through these multifaceted contributions, the paper establishes a cohesive, continuously evolving, and transformative framework for assessing and fostering statistical creativity in AI models.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

We introduce WebGames, a comprehensive benchmark suite designed to evaluate general-purpose web-browsing AI agents through a collection of 50+ interactive challenges. These challenges are specifically crafted to be straightforward for humans while systematically testing the limitations of current AI systems across fundamental browser interactions, advanced input processing, cognitive tasks, workflow automation, and interactive entertainment. Our framework eliminates external dependencies through a hermetic testing environment, ensuring reproducible evaluation with verifiable ground-truth solutions. We evaluate leading vision-language models including GPT-4o, Claude Computer-Use, Gemini-1.5-Pro, and Qwen2-VL against human performance. Results reveal a substantial capability gap, with the best AI system achieving only 43.1% success rate compared to human performance of 95.7%, highlighting fundamental limitations in current AI systems' ability to handle common web interaction patterns that humans find intuitive. The benchmark is publicly available at webgames.convergence.ai, offering a lightweight, client-side implementation that facilitates rapid evaluation cycles. Through its modular architecture and standardized challenge specifications, WebGames provides a robust foundation for measuring progress in development of more capable web-browsing agents.

The last couple of years have witnessed emerging research that appropriates Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks designed for humans to benchmark LLM's ToM capabilities as an indication of LLM's social intelligence. However, this approach has a number of limitations. Drawing on existing psychology and AI literature, we summarize the theoretical, methodological, and evaluation limitations by pointing out that certain issues are inherently present in the original ToM tasks used to evaluate human's ToM, which continues to persist and exacerbated when appropriated to benchmark LLM's ToM. Taking a human-computer interaction (HCI) perspective, these limitations prompt us to rethink the definition and criteria of ToM in ToM benchmarks in a more dynamic, interactional approach that accounts for user preferences, needs, and experiences with LLMs in such evaluations. We conclude by outlining potential opportunities and challenges towards this direction.

A fundamental bottleneck in human-AI collaboration is the "intention expression gap," the difficulty for humans to effectively convey complex, high-dimensional thoughts to AI. This challenge often traps users in inefficient trial-and-error loops and is exacerbated by the diverse expertise levels of users. We reframe this problem from passive instruction following to a Socratic collaboration paradigm, proposing an agent that actively probes for information to resolve its uncertainty about user intent. we name the proposed agent Nous, trained to acquire proficiency in this inquiry policy. The core mechanism of Nous is a training framework grounded in the first principles of information theory. Within this framework, we define the information gain from dialogue as an intrinsic reward signal, which is fundamentally equivalent to the reduction of Shannon entropy over a structured task space. This reward design enables us to avoid reliance on costly human preference annotations or external reward models. To validate our framework, we develop an automated simulation pipeline to generate a large-scale, preference-based dataset for the challenging task of scientific diagram generation. Comprehensive experiments, including ablations, subjective and objective evaluations, and tests across user expertise levels, demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed framework. Nous achieves leading efficiency and output quality, while remaining robust to varying user expertise. Moreover, its design is domain-agnostic, and we show evidence of generalization beyond diagram generation. Experimental results prove that our work offers a principled, scalable, and adaptive paradigm for resolving uncertainty about user intent in complex human-AI collaboration.

Human behavior simulation of AI agents necessitates the agents to possess a quality of believability, which is crucial as it facilitates users in establishing trust toward the agents and streamlines the fulfillment of the agents' goal. While recent advancements in Large Language Model (LLM) based agents have improved human behavior simulation, challenges inherent to LLMs (e.g., long context modeling) can undermine their believability. Consequently, evaluating AI agent believability becomes imperative. Unfortunately, prior research often neglects the negative impacts of LLM deficiencies. To address these gaps, we introduce two metrics for assessing LLM-based agent believability: consistency, and robustness, together with a benchmark, SimulateBench, with which, we evaluate the consistency and robustness of agents implemented with popular LLMs. We find that agents (i) struggle to accurately depict character information when presented with lengthy profile inputs; (ii) exhibit vulnerability to profile perturbations; and (iii) are significantly affected by certain key factors that impact their overall believability. Code and SimulateBench are public at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/GPTMan.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

For the past decade, the trajectory of generative artificial intelligence (AI) has been dominated by a model-centric paradigm driven by scaling laws. Despite significant leaps in visual fidelity, this approach has encountered a ``usability ceiling'' manifested as the Intent-Execution Gap (i.e., the fundamental disparity between a creator's high-level intent and the stochastic, black-box nature of current single-shot models). In this paper, inspired by the Vibe Coding, we introduce the Vibe AIGC, a new paradigm for content generation via agentic orchestration, which represents the autonomous synthesis of hierarchical multi-agent workflows. Under this paradigm, the user's role transcends traditional prompt engineering, evolving into a Commander who provides a Vibe, a high-level representation encompassing aesthetic preferences, functional logic, and etc. A centralized Meta-Planner then functions as a system architect, deconstructing this ``Vibe'' into executable, verifiable, and adaptive agentic pipelines. By transitioning from stochastic inference to logical orchestration, Vibe AIGC bridges the gap between human imagination and machine execution. We contend that this shift will redefine the human-AI collaborative economy, transforming AI from a fragile inference engine into a robust system-level engineering partner that democratizes the creation of complex, long-horizon digital assets.

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.

We evaluated 3 systems (ELIZA, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) in a randomized, controlled, and preregistered Turing test. Human participants had a 5 minute conversation with either a human or an AI, and judged whether or not they thought their interlocutor was human. GPT-4 was judged to be a human 54% of the time, outperforming ELIZA (22%) but lagging behind actual humans (67%). The results provide the first robust empirical demonstration that any artificial system passes an interactive 2-player Turing test. The results have implications for debates around machine intelligence and, more urgently, suggest that deception by current AI systems may go undetected. Analysis of participants' strategies and reasoning suggests that stylistic and socio-emotional factors play a larger role in passing the Turing test than traditional notions of intelligence.

Despite the significant demand for assistive technology among vulnerable groups (e.g., the elderly, children, and the disabled) in daily tasks, research into advanced AI-driven assistive solutions that genuinely accommodate their diverse needs remains sparse. Traditional human-machine interaction tasks often require machines to simply help without nuanced consideration of human abilities and feelings, such as their opportunity for practice and learning, sense of self-improvement, and self-esteem. Addressing this gap, we define a pivotal and novel challenge Smart Help, which aims to provide proactive yet adaptive support to human agents with diverse disabilities and dynamic goals in various tasks and environments. To establish this challenge, we leverage AI2-THOR to build a new interactive 3D realistic household environment for the Smart Help task. We introduce an innovative opponent modeling module that provides a nuanced understanding of the main agent's capabilities and goals, in order to optimize the assisting agent's helping policy. Rigorous experiments validate the efficacy of our model components and show the superiority of our holistic approach against established baselines. Our findings illustrate the potential of AI-imbued assistive robots in improving the well-being of vulnerable groups.

We evaluated GPT-4 in a public online Turing Test. The best-performing GPT-4 prompt passed in 41% of games, outperforming baselines set by ELIZA (27%) and GPT-3.5 (14%), but falling short of chance and the baseline set by human participants (63%). Participants' decisions were based mainly on linguistic style (35%) and socio-emotional traits (27%), supporting the idea that intelligence is not sufficient to pass the Turing Test. Participants' demographics, including education and familiarity with LLMs, did not predict detection rate, suggesting that even those who understand systems deeply and interact with them frequently may be susceptible to deception. Despite known limitations as a test of intelligence, we argue that the Turing Test continues to be relevant as an assessment of naturalistic communication and deception. AI models with the ability to masquerade as humans could have widespread societal consequences, and we analyse the effectiveness of different strategies and criteria for judging humanlikeness.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

In recent years there has been a tremendous surge in the general capabilities of AI systems, mainly fuelled by training foundation models on internetscale data. Nevertheless, the creation of openended, ever self-improving AI remains elusive. In this position paper, we argue that the ingredients are now in place to achieve openendedness in AI systems with respect to a human observer. Furthermore, we claim that such open-endedness is an essential property of any artificial superhuman intelligence (ASI). We begin by providing a concrete formal definition of open-endedness through the lens of novelty and learnability. We then illustrate a path towards ASI via open-ended systems built on top of foundation models, capable of making novel, humanrelevant discoveries. We conclude by examining the safety implications of generally-capable openended AI. We expect that open-ended foundation models will prove to be an increasingly fertile and safety-critical area of research in the near future.

As AI assistants serve millions of users daily, evaluating user experience (UX) beyond general model capability has become increasingly important. We present UXBench, the first user-centric benchmark grounded in real user feedback signals for evaluating preference alignment and dialogue generation. The benchmark consists of three interconnected tasks, UX Judge, UX Eval, and UX Recovery, with 7,400 test instances extracted from over 70K interaction logs of a mainstream Chinese AI assistant. The dataset closely reflects real user distributions, covering 8 scenarios, 83 domains, and diverse failure patterns that pose severe challenges. Extensive experiments on 26 frontier language models provide novel insights into how well models perceive user experience and how improvements in model capability contribute to better dialogue engagement. Through comprehensive analysis of model behavior and performance gaps, we show that user feedback prediction is a learnable capability, where a reward model trained from in-the-wild feedback signals can achieve well-calibrated accuracy. We further document the systematic biases of LLM-as-a-judge evaluation protocols and compare typical response strategies that directly affect user experience. UXBench establishes a new evaluation landscape and calls for greater attention to tailored UX optimization, contributing to a user-centric scaling law that shapes the success of AI assistants.

The rapid rise of compound AI systems (a.k.a., AI agents) is reshaping the labor market, raising concerns about job displacement, diminished human agency, and overreliance on automation. Yet, we lack a systematic understanding of the evolving landscape. In this paper, we address this gap by introducing a novel auditing framework to assess which occupational tasks workers want AI agents to automate or augment, and how those desires align with the current technological capabilities. Our framework features an audio-enhanced mini-interview to capture nuanced worker desires and introduces the Human Agency Scale (HAS) as a shared language to quantify the preferred level of human involvement. Using this framework, we construct the WORKBank database, building on the U.S. Department of Labor's O*NET database, to capture preferences from 1,500 domain workers and capability assessments from AI experts across over 844 tasks spanning 104 occupations. Jointly considering the desire and technological capability divides tasks in WORKBank into four zones: Automation "Green Light" Zone, Automation "Red Light" Zone, R&D Opportunity Zone, Low Priority Zone. This highlights critical mismatches and opportunities for AI agent development. Moving beyond a simple automate-or-not dichotomy, our results reveal diverse HAS profiles across occupations, reflecting heterogeneous expectations for human involvement. Moreover, our study offers early signals of how AI agent integration may reshape the core human competencies, shifting from information-focused skills to interpersonal ones. These findings underscore the importance of aligning AI agent development with human desires and preparing workers for evolving workplace dynamics.

Despite the proliferation of explainable AI (XAI) methods, little is understood about end-users' explainability needs and behaviors around XAI explanations. To address this gap and contribute to understanding how explainability can support human-AI interaction, we conducted a mixed-methods study with 20 end-users of a real-world AI application, the Merlin bird identification app, and inquired about their XAI needs, uses, and perceptions. We found that participants desire practically useful information that can improve their collaboration with the AI, more so than technical system details. Relatedly, participants intended to use XAI explanations for various purposes beyond understanding the AI's outputs: calibrating trust, improving their task skills, changing their behavior to supply better inputs to the AI, and giving constructive feedback to developers. Finally, among existing XAI approaches, participants preferred part-based explanations that resemble human reasoning and explanations. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide recommendations for future XAI design.

Rigorously evaluating machine intelligence against the broad spectrum of human general intelligence has become increasingly important and challenging in this era of rapid technological advance. Conventional AI benchmarks typically assess only narrow capabilities in a limited range of human activity. Most are also static, quickly saturating as developers explicitly or implicitly optimize for them. We propose that a more promising way to evaluate human-like general intelligence in AI systems is through a particularly strong form of general game playing: studying how and how well they play and learn to play all conceivable human games, in comparison to human players with the same level of experience, time, or other resources. We define a "human game" to be a game designed by humans for humans, and argue for the evaluative suitability of this space of all such games people can imagine and enjoy -- the "Multiverse of Human Games". Taking a first step towards this vision, we introduce the AI GameStore, a scalable and open-ended platform that uses LLMs with humans-in-the-loop to synthesize new representative human games, by automatically sourcing and adapting standardized and containerized variants of game environments from popular human digital gaming platforms. As a proof of concept, we generated 100 such games based on the top charts of Apple App Store and Steam, and evaluated seven frontier vision-language models (VLMs) on short episodes of play. The best models achieved less than 10\% of the human average score on the majority of the games, and especially struggled with games that challenge world-model learning, memory and planning. We conclude with a set of next steps for building out the AI GameStore as a practical way to measure and drive progress toward human-like general intelligence in machines.

To make AI systems broadly useful for challenging real-world tasks, we need them to learn complex human goals and preferences. One approach to specifying complex goals asks humans to judge during training which agent behaviors are safe and useful, but this approach can fail if the task is too complicated for a human to directly judge. To help address this concern, we propose training agents via self play on a zero sum debate game. Given a question or proposed action, two agents take turns making short statements up to a limit, then a human judges which of the agents gave the most true, useful information. In an analogy to complexity theory, debate with optimal play can answer any question in PSPACE given polynomial time judges (direct judging answers only NP questions). In practice, whether debate works involves empirical questions about humans and the tasks we want AIs to perform, plus theoretical questions about the meaning of AI alignment. We report results on an initial MNIST experiment where agents compete to convince a sparse classifier, boosting the classifier's accuracy from 59.4% to 88.9% given 6 pixels and from 48.2% to 85.2% given 4 pixels. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical aspects of the debate model, focusing on potential weaknesses as the model scales up, and we propose future human and computer experiments to test these properties.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

This paper explores the advancements in making large language models (LLMs) more human-like. We focus on techniques that enhance natural language understanding, conversational coherence, and emotional intelligence in AI systems. The study evaluates various approaches, including fine-tuning with diverse datasets, incorporating psychological principles, and designing models that better mimic human reasoning patterns. Our findings demonstrate that these enhancements not only improve user interactions but also open new possibilities for AI applications across different domains. Future work will address the ethical implications and potential biases introduced by these human-like attributes.

While AI shows promise for enhancing the efficiency of qualitative analysis, the unique human-AI interaction resulting from varied coding strategies makes it challenging to develop a trustworthy AI-assisted qualitative coding system (AIQCs) that supports coding tasks effectively. We bridge this gap by exploring the impact of varying coding strategies on user trust and reliance on AI. We conducted a mixed-methods split-plot 3x3 study, involving 30 participants, and a follow-up study with 6 participants, exploring varying text selection and code length in the use of our AIQCs system for qualitative analysis. Our results indicate that qualitative open coding should be conceptualized as a series of distinct subtasks, each with differing levels of complexity, and therefore, should be given tailored design considerations. We further observed a discrepancy between perceived and behavioral measures, and emphasized the potential challenges of under- and over-reliance on AIQCs systems. Additional design implications were also proposed for consideration.

Generative AI's novel capacities raise questions about the future role of human expertise: does AI level the playing field between professional artists and laypeople, or does expertise enhance AI use? Do the cognitive skills experts make use of in analyzing and drawing visual art also transfer to using these new tools? This pre-registered study conducts experimental comparisons between 50 professional artists and a demographically matched sample of laypeople. Our interdisciplinary team developed two tasks involving image replication and creative image creation, assessing their copying accuracy and divergent thinking. We implemented a bespoke platform for the experiment, powered by a modern text-to-image AI. Results reveal artists produced more accurate copies and more divergent ideas than lay participants, highlighting a skill transfer of professional expertise - even to the confined space of generative AI. We also explored how well an exemplary vision-capable large language model (GPT-4o) would fare: on par in copying and slightly better on average than artists in the creative task, although never above best humans. These findings highlight the importance of integrating artistic skills with AI, suggesting a potential for collaborative synergy that could reshape creative industries and arts education.

This study explores the impact of AI-generated digital self-clones on improving online presentation skills. We carried out a mixed-design experiment involving 44 international students, comparing self-recorded videos (control) with self-clone videos (AI group) for English presentation practice. The AI videos utilized voice cloning, face swapping, lip-sync, and body-language simulation to refine participants' original presentations in terms of repetition, filler words, and pronunciation. Machine-rated scores indicated enhancements in speech performance for both groups. Though the groups didn't significantly differ, the AI group exhibited a heightened depth of reflection, self-compassion, and a meaningful transition from a corrective to an enhancive approach to self-critique. Within the AI group, congruence between self-perception and AI self-clones resulted in diminished speech anxiety and increased enjoyment. Our findings recommend the ethical employment of digital self-clones to enhance the emotional and cognitive facets of skill development.

We introduce a novel framework for incorporating human expertise into algorithmic predictions. Our approach leverages human judgment to distinguish inputs which are algorithmically indistinguishable, or "look the same" to predictive algorithms. We argue that this framing clarifies the problem of human-AI collaboration in prediction tasks, as experts often form judgments by drawing on information which is not encoded in an algorithm's training data. Algorithmic indistinguishability yields a natural test for assessing whether experts incorporate this kind of "side information", and further provides a simple but principled method for selectively incorporating human feedback into algorithmic predictions. We show that this method provably improves the performance of any feasible algorithmic predictor and precisely quantify this improvement. We find empirically that although algorithms often outperform their human counterparts on average, human judgment can improve algorithmic predictions on specific instances (which can be identified ex-ante). In an X-ray classification task, we find that this subset constitutes nearly 30% of the patient population. Our approach provides a natural way of uncovering this heterogeneity and thus enabling effective human-AI collaboration.

Despite rapid progress on AI benchmarks, the real-world meaning of benchmark performance remains unclear. To quantify the capabilities of AI systems in terms of human capabilities, we propose a new metric: 50%-task-completion time horizon. This is the time humans typically take to complete tasks that AI models can complete with 50% success rate. We first timed humans with relevant domain expertise on a combination of RE-Bench, HCAST, and 66 novel shorter tasks. On these tasks, current frontier AI models such as Claude 3.7 Sonnet have a 50% time horizon of around 50 minutes. Furthermore, frontier AI time horizon has been doubling approximately every seven months since 2019, though the trend may have accelerated in 2024. The increase in AI models' time horizons seems to be primarily driven by greater reliability and ability to adapt to mistakes, combined with better logical reasoning and tool use capabilities. We discuss the limitations of our results -- including their degree of external validity -- and the implications of increased autonomy for dangerous capabilities. If these results generalize to real-world software tasks, extrapolation of this trend predicts that within 5 years, AI systems will be capable of automating many software tasks that currently take humans a month.

People often optimize for long-term goals in collaboration: A mentor or companion doesn't just answer questions, but also scaffolds learning, tracks progress, and prioritizes the other person's growth over immediate results. In contrast, current AI systems are fundamentally short-sighted collaborators - optimized for providing instant and complete responses, without ever saying no (unless for safety reasons). What are the consequences of this dynamic? Here, through a series of randomized controlled trials on human-AI interactions (N = 1,222), we provide causal evidence for two key consequences of AI assistance: reduced persistence and impairment of unassisted performance. Across a variety of tasks, including mathematical reasoning and reading comprehension, we find that although AI assistance improves performance in the short-term, people perform significantly worse without AI and are more likely to give up. Notably, these effects emerge after only brief interactions with AI (approximately 10 minutes). These findings are particularly concerning because persistence is foundational to skill acquisition and is one of the strongest predictors of long-term learning. We posit that persistence is reduced because AI conditions people to expect immediate answers, thereby denying them the experience of working through challenges on their own. These results suggest the need for AI model development to prioritize scaffolding long-term competence alongside immediate task completion.

We directly compare the persuasion capabilities of a frontier large language model (LLM; Claude Sonnet 3.5) against incentivized human persuaders in an interactive, real-time conversational quiz setting. In this preregistered, large-scale incentivized experiment, participants (quiz takers) completed an online quiz where persuaders (either humans or LLMs) attempted to persuade quiz takers toward correct or incorrect answers. We find that LLM persuaders achieved significantly higher compliance with their directional persuasion attempts than incentivized human persuaders, demonstrating superior persuasive capabilities in both truthful (toward correct answers) and deceptive (toward incorrect answers) contexts. We also find that LLM persuaders significantly increased quiz takers' accuracy, leading to higher earnings, when steering quiz takers toward correct answers, and significantly decreased their accuracy, leading to lower earnings, when steering them toward incorrect answers. Overall, our findings suggest that AI's persuasion capabilities already exceed those of humans that have real-money bonuses tied to performance. Our findings of increasingly capable AI persuaders thus underscore the urgency of emerging alignment and governance frameworks.

Agentic AI assistants that autonomously perform multi-step tasks raise open questions for user experience: how should such systems communicate progress and reasoning during extended operations, especially in attention-critical contexts such as driving? We investigate feedback timing and verbosity from agentic LLM-based in-car assistants through a controlled, mixed-methods study (N=45) comparing planned steps and intermediate results feedback against silent operation with final-only response. Using a dual-task paradigm with an in-car voice assistant, we found that intermediate feedback significantly improved perceived speed, trust, and user experience while reducing task load - effects that held across varying task complexities and interaction contexts. Interviews further revealed user preferences for an adaptive approach: high initial transparency to establish trust, followed by progressively reducing verbosity as systems prove reliable, with adjustments based on task stakes and situational context. We translate our empirical findings into design implications for feedback timing and verbosity in agentic assistants, balancing transparency and efficiency.

As machine intelligence evolves, the need to test and compare the problem-solving abilities of different AI models grows. However, current benchmarks are often overly simplistic, allowing models to perform uniformly well, making it difficult to distinguish their capabilities. Additionally, benchmarks typically rely on static question-answer pairs, which models might memorize or guess. To address these limitations, we introduce the Dynamic Intelligence Assessment (DIA), a novel methodology for testing AI models using dynamic question templates and improved metrics across multiple disciplines such as mathematics, cryptography, cybersecurity, and computer science. The accompanying DIA-Bench dataset, which includes 150 diverse and challenging task templates with mutable parameters, is presented in various formats such as text, PDFs, compiled binaries, and visual puzzles. Our framework introduces four new metrics to assess a model's reliability and confidence across multiple attempts. These metrics revealed that even simple questions are frequently answered incorrectly when posed in varying forms, highlighting significant gaps in models' reliability. Notably, models like GPT-4o tended to overestimate their mathematical abilities, while ChatGPT-4o demonstrated better decision-making and performance through effective tool usage. We evaluated eight state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) using DIA-Bench, showing that current models struggle with complex tasks and often display unexpectedly low confidence, even with simpler questions. The DIA framework sets a new standard for assessing not only problem-solving but also a model's adaptive intelligence and ability to assess its own limitations. The dataset is publicly available on our project's website.

High-quality feedback is essential for effective human-AI interaction. It bridges knowledge gaps, corrects digressions, and shapes system behavior; both during interaction and throughout model development. Yet despite its importance, human feedback to AI is often infrequent and low quality. This gap motivates a critical examination of human feedback during interactions with AIs. To understand and overcome the challenges preventing users from giving high-quality feedback, we conducted two studies examining feedback dynamics between humans and conversational agents (CAs). Our formative study, through the lens of Grice's maxims, identified four Feedback Barriers -- Common Ground, Verifiability, Communication, and Informativeness -- that prevent high-quality feedback by users. Building on these findings, we derive three design desiderata and show that systems incorporating scaffolds aligned with these desiderata enabled users to provide higher-quality feedback. Finally, we detail a call for action to the broader AI community for advances in Large Language Models capabilities to overcome Feedback Barriers.

Driven by curiosity, humans have continually sought to explore and understand the world around them, leading to the invention of various tools to satiate this inquisitiveness. Despite not having the capacity to process and memorize vast amounts of information in their brains, humans excel in critical thinking, planning, reflection, and harnessing available tools to interact with and interpret the world, enabling them to find answers efficiently. The recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) suggest that machines might also possess the aforementioned human-like capabilities, allowing them to exhibit powerful abilities even with a constrained parameter count. In this paper, we introduce KwaiAgents, a generalized information-seeking agent system based on LLMs. Within KwaiAgents, we propose an agent system that employs LLMs as its cognitive core, which is capable of understanding a user's query, behavior guidelines, and referencing external documents. The agent can also update and retrieve information from its internal memory, plan and execute actions using a time-aware search-browse toolkit, and ultimately provide a comprehensive response. We further investigate the system's performance when powered by LLMs less advanced than GPT-4, and introduce the Meta-Agent Tuning (MAT) framework, designed to ensure even an open-sourced 7B or 13B model performs well among many agent systems. We exploit both benchmark and human evaluations to systematically validate these capabilities. Extensive experiments show the superiority of our agent system compared to other autonomous agents and highlight the enhanced generalized agent-abilities of our fine-tuned LLMs.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has enabled agents to master complex video games, from first-person shooters like Counter-Strike to real-time strategy games such as StarCraft II and racing games like Gran Turismo. While these achievements are notable, applying these AI methods in commercial video game production remains challenging due to computational constraints. In commercial scenarios, the majority of computational resources are allocated to 3D rendering, leaving limited capacity for AI methods, which often demand high computational power, particularly those relying on pixel-based sensors. Moreover, the gaming industry prioritizes creating human-like behavior in AI agents to enhance player experience, unlike academic models that focus on maximizing game performance. This paper introduces a novel methodology for training neural networks via imitation learning to play a complex, commercial-standard, VALORANT-like 2v2 tactical shooter game, requiring only modest CPU hardware during inference. Our approach leverages an innovative, pixel-free perception architecture using a small set of ray-cast sensors, which capture essential spatial information efficiently. These sensors allow AI to perform competently without the computational overhead of traditional methods. Models are trained to mimic human behavior using supervised learning on human trajectory data, resulting in realistic and engaging AI agents. Human evaluation tests confirm that our AI agents provide human-like gameplay experiences while operating efficiently under computational constraints. This offers a significant advancement in AI model development for tactical shooter games and possibly other genres.

Real-world requests to AI agents are fundamentally underspecified. Natural human communication relies on shared context and unstated constraints that speakers expect listeners to infer. Current agentic benchmarks test explicit instruction-following but fail to evaluate whether agents can reason about implicit requirements spanning accessibility needs, privacy boundaries, catastrophic risks, and contextual constraints. We present Implicit Intelligence, an evaluation framework testing whether AI agents can move beyond prompt-following to become genuine goal-fulfillers, paired with Agent-as-a-World (AaW), a harness where interactive worlds are defined in human-readable YAML files and simulated by language models. Our scenarios feature apparent simplicity in user requests, hidden complexity in correct solutions, and discoverability of constraints through environmental exploration. Evaluating 16 frontier and open-weight models across 205 scenarios, we find that even the best-performing model achieves only 48.3% scenario pass rate, revealing substantial room for improvement in bridging the gap between literal instruction-following and human-like contextual reasoning.

Photos serve as a way for humans to record what they experience in their daily lives, and they are often regarded as trustworthy sources of information. However, there is a growing concern that the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) technology may produce fake photos, which can create confusion and diminish trust in photographs. This study aims to comprehensively evaluate agents for distinguishing state-of-the-art AI-generated visual content. Our study benchmarks both human capability and cutting-edge fake image detection AI algorithms, using a newly collected large-scale fake image dataset Fake2M. In our human perception evaluation, titled HPBench, we discovered that humans struggle significantly to distinguish real photos from AI-generated ones, with a misclassification rate of 38.7%. Along with this, we conduct the model capability of AI-Generated images detection evaluation MPBench and the top-performing model from MPBench achieves a 13% failure rate under the same setting used in the human evaluation. We hope that our study can raise awareness of the potential risks of AI-generated images and facilitate further research to prevent the spread of false information. More information can refer to https://github.com/Inf-imagine/Sentry.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

The lack of a concrete definition for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) obscures the gap between today's specialized AI and human-level cognition. This paper introduces a quantifiable framework to address this, defining AGI as matching the cognitive versatility and proficiency of a well-educated adult. To operationalize this, we ground our methodology in Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory, the most empirically validated model of human cognition. The framework dissects general intelligence into ten core cognitive domains-including reasoning, memory, and perception-and adapts established human psychometric batteries to evaluate AI systems. Application of this framework reveals a highly "jagged" cognitive profile in contemporary models. While proficient in knowledge-intensive domains, current AI systems have critical deficits in foundational cognitive machinery, particularly long-term memory storage. The resulting AGI scores (e.g., GPT-4 at 27%, GPT-5 at 58%) concretely quantify both rapid progress and the substantial gap remaining before AGI.

New developments are enabling AI systems to perceive, recognize, and respond with social cues based on inferences made from humans' explicit or implicit behavioral and verbal cues. These AI systems, equipped with an equivalent of human's Theory of Mind (ToM) capability, are currently serving as matchmakers on dating platforms, assisting student learning as teaching assistants, and enhancing productivity as work partners. They mark a new era in human-AI interaction (HAI) that diverges from traditional human-computer interaction (HCI), where computers are commonly seen as tools instead of social actors. Designing and understanding the human perceptions and experiences in this emerging HAI era becomes an urgent and critical issue for AI systems to fulfill human needs and mitigate risks across social contexts. In this paper, we posit the Mutual Theory of Mind (MToM) framework, inspired by our capability of ToM in human-human communications, to guide this new generation of HAI research by highlighting the iterative and mutual shaping nature of human-AI communication. We discuss the motivation of the MToM framework and its three key components that iteratively shape the human-AI communication in three stages. We then describe two empirical studies inspired by the MToM framework to demonstrate the power of MToM in guiding the design and understanding of human-AI communication. Finally, we discuss future research opportunities in human-AI interaction through the lens of MToM.

Information workers' productivity is significantly influenced by their cognitive states and physiological responses. AI assistants such as ChatGPT, Copilot, and others have become integral components of knowledge-intensive workplaces. These AI assistants utilize pre-defined user preferences and chat interaction histories, thus confining themselves to reactive exchanges, lacking sufficient adaptability. Consequently, they fail to cater to individual user preferences and are unable to adapt to their psychophysiological states, diminishing potential productivity gains. To bridge this gap, we introduce AwareLLM, a novel multimodal framework that integrates egocentric vision, pupillometry, eye-gaze tracking, posture detection, heart activity, and the inferencing capabilities of large language models (LLMs) to create a proactive and context-aware ecosystem. AwareLLM dynamically adapts to users' psychophysiological states while analyzing temporal patterns and behavioral tendencies to provide personalized and timely interventions. We evaluated AwareLLM through a user study with 20 participants, comparing it to a standard LLM assistant across multiple tasks. Our results show statistically significant improvements in task performance, along with reductions in cognitive fatigue and mental demand. Participants described AwareLLM's personalized interventions as timely and relevant, helping them boost their confidence and deepen engagement with their work. AwareLLM opens new avenues for Human-AI collaboration where technology adapts to our needs rather than us adhering to technological constraints.

The character of the "AI assistant" persona generated by modern chatbot large language models influences both surface-level behavior and apparent values, beliefs, and ethics. These all affect interaction quality, perceived intelligence, and alignment with both developer and user intentions. The shaping of this persona, known as character training, is a critical component of industry post-training, yet remains effectively unstudied in the academic literature. We introduce the first open implementation of character training, leveraging Constitutional AI and a new data pipeline using synthetic introspective data to shape the assistant persona in a more effective and controlled manner than alternatives such as constraining system prompts or activation steering. Specifically, we fine-tune three popular open-weights models using 11 example personas, such as humorous, deeply caring, or even malevolent. To track the effects of our approach, we introduce a method which analyzes revealed preferences, uncovering clear and holistic changes in character. We find these changes are more robust to adversarial prompting than the above two alternatives, while also leading to more coherent and realistic generations. Finally, we demonstrate this fine-tuning has little to no effect on general capabilities as measured by common benchmarks. We describe and open-source our full post-training method, the implementation of which can be found at https://github.com/maiush/OpenCharacterTraining.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

Artificial intelligence (AI) developers are increasingly building language models with warm and empathetic personas that millions of people now use for advice, therapy, and companionship. Here, we show how this creates a significant trade-off: optimizing language models for warmth undermines their reliability, especially when users express vulnerability. We conducted controlled experiments on five language models of varying sizes and architectures, training them to produce warmer, more empathetic responses, then evaluating them on safety-critical tasks. Warm models showed substantially higher error rates (+10 to +30 percentage points) than their original counterparts, promoting conspiracy theories, providing incorrect factual information, and offering problematic medical advice. They were also significantly more likely to validate incorrect user beliefs, particularly when user messages expressed sadness. Importantly, these effects were consistent across different model architectures, and occurred despite preserved performance on standard benchmarks, revealing systematic risks that current evaluation practices may fail to detect. As human-like AI systems are deployed at an unprecedented scale, our findings indicate a need to rethink how we develop and oversee these systems that are reshaping human relationships and social interaction.

AI creation, such as poem or lyrics generation, has attracted increasing attention from both industry and academic communities, with many promising models proposed in the past few years. Existing methods usually estimate the outputs based on single and independent visual or textual information. However, in reality, humans usually make creations according to their experiences, which may involve different modalities and be sequentially correlated. To model such human capabilities, in this paper, we define and solve a novel AI creation problem based on human experiences. More specifically, we study how to generate texts based on sequential multi-modal information. Compared with the previous works, this task is much more difficult because the designed model has to well understand and adapt the semantics among different modalities and effectively convert them into the output in a sequential manner. To alleviate these difficulties, we firstly design a multi-channel sequence-to-sequence architecture equipped with a multi-modal attention network. For more effective optimization, we then propose a curriculum negative sampling strategy tailored for the sequential inputs. To benchmark this problem and demonstrate the effectiveness of our model, we manually labeled a new multi-modal experience dataset. With this dataset, we conduct extensive experiments by comparing our model with a series of representative baselines, where we can demonstrate significant improvements in our model based on both automatic and human-centered metrics. The code and data are available at: https://github.com/Aman-4-Real/MMTG.

With the rapid adoption of LLM-based chatbots, there is a pressing need to evaluate what humans and LLMs can achieve together. However, standard benchmarks, such as MMLU, measure LLM capabilities in isolation (i.e., "AI-alone"). Here, we design and conduct a user study to convert MMLU questions into user-AI conversations, by seeding the user with the question and having them carry out a conversation with the LLM to answer their question. We release ChatBench, a new dataset with AI-alone, user-alone, and user-AI data for 396 questions and two LLMs, including 144K answers and 7,336 user-AI conversations. We find that AI-alone accuracy fails to predict user-AI accuracy, with significant differences across multiple subjects (math, physics, and moral reasoning), and we analyze the user-AI conversations to provide insight into how they diverge from AI-alone benchmarks. Finally, we show that fine-tuning a user simulator on a subset of ChatBench improves its ability to estimate user-AI accuracies, increasing correlation on held-out questions by more than 20 points, creating possibilities for scaling interactive evaluation.

If AI models can detect when they are being evaluated, the effectiveness of evaluations might be compromised. For example, models could have systematically different behavior during evaluations, leading to less reliable benchmarks for deployment and governance decisions. We investigate whether frontier language models can accurately classify transcripts based on whether they originate from evaluations or real-world deployment, a capability we call evaluation awareness. To achieve this, we construct a diverse benchmark of 1,000 prompts and transcripts from 61 distinct datasets. These span public benchmarks (e.g., MMLU, SWEBench), real-world deployment interactions, and agent trajectories from scaffolding frameworks (e.g., web-browsing agents). Frontier models clearly demonstrate above-random evaluation awareness (Gemini-2.5-Pro reaches an AUC of 0.83), but do not yet surpass our simple human baseline (AUC of 0.92). Furthermore, both AI models and humans are better at identifying evaluations in agentic settings compared to chat settings. Additionally, we test whether models can identify the purpose of the evaluation. Under multiple-choice and open-ended questioning, AI models far outperform random chance in identifying what an evaluation is testing for. Our results indicate that frontier models already exhibit a substantial, though not yet superhuman, level of evaluation-awareness. We recommend tracking this capability in future models.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into society, their alignment with human morals is crucial. To better understand this alignment, we created a large corpus of human- and LLM-generated responses to various moral scenarios. We found a misalignment between human and LLM moral assessments; although both LLMs and humans tended to reject morally complex utilitarian dilemmas, LLMs were more sensitive to personal framing. We then conducted a quantitative user study involving 230 participants (N=230), who evaluated these responses by determining whether they were AI-generated and assessed their agreement with the responses. Human evaluators preferred LLMs' assessments in moral scenarios, though a systematic anti-AI bias was observed: participants were less likely to agree with judgments they believed to be machine-generated. Statistical and NLP-based analyses revealed subtle linguistic differences in responses, influencing detection and agreement. Overall, our findings highlight the complexities of human-AI perception in morally charged decision-making.

The emergence of deep research systems presents significant capabilities in problem-solving, extending from basic queries to sophisticated research tasks. However, existing benchmarks primarily evaluate these systems as agents for web retrieval and report generation, overlooking their potential to discover novel insights on the frontiers of scientific research. To address this gap, we introduce ResearcherBench, the first benchmark focused on evaluating the capabilities of these advanced, agentic systems - which we refer to as Deep AI Research Systems (DARS) - on frontier AI scientific questions. We compiled a dataset of 65 research questions expertly selected from real-world scientific scenarios such as laboratory discussions and interviews, spanning 35 different AI subjects and categorized into three types: technical details, literature review, and open consulting. Our dual evaluation framework combines rubric assessment, which uses expert-designed criteria to evaluate insight quality, with factual assessment, which measures citation accuracy (faithfulness) and coverage (groundedness). We evaluated several leading commercial DARS and baseline systems. Results show that OpenAI Deep Research and Gemini Deep Research significantly outperform other systems, with particular strength in open-ended consulting questions. Such capabilities represent a meaningful step toward AI self-improvement, aligning with the vision of ASI for AI. We open-source ResearcherBench to provide a standardized platform for promoting the development of next-generation AI research assistants, hoping to foster a new perspective in AI research evaluation for a novel pattern of scientific collaboration: https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/ResearcherBench.

Although much research has focused on AI explanations to support decisions in complex information-seeking tasks such as fact-checking, the role of evidence is surprisingly under-researched. In our study, we systematically varied explanation type, AI prediction certainty, and correctness of AI system advice for non-expert participants, who evaluated the veracity of claims and AI system predictions. Participants were provided the option of easily inspecting the underlying evidence. We found that participants consistently relied on evidence to validate AI claims across all experimental conditions. When participants were presented with natural language explanations, evidence was used less frequently although they relied on it when these explanations seemed insufficient or flawed. Qualitative data suggests that participants attempted to infer evidence source reliability, despite source identities being deliberately omitted. Our results demonstrate that evidence is a key ingredient in how people evaluate the reliability of information presented by an AI system and, in combination with natural language explanations, offers valuable support for decision-making. Further research is urgently needed to understand how evidence ought to be presented and how people engage with it in practice.

Frontier AI safety policies highlight automation of AI research and development (R&D) by AI agents as an important capability to anticipate. However, there exist few evaluations for AI R&D capabilities, and none that are highly realistic and have a direct comparison to human performance. We introduce RE-Bench (Research Engineering Benchmark, v1), which consists of 7 challenging, open-ended ML research engineering environments and data from 71 8-hour attempts by 61 distinct human experts. We confirm that our experts make progress in the environments given 8 hours, with 82% of expert attempts achieving a non-zero score and 24% matching or exceeding our strong reference solutions. We compare humans to several public frontier models through best-of-k with varying time budgets and agent designs, and find that the best AI agents achieve a score 4x higher than human experts when both are given a total time budget of 2 hours per environment. However, humans currently display better returns to increasing time budgets, narrowly exceeding the top AI agent scores given an 8-hour budget, and achieving 2x the score of the top AI agent when both are given 32 total hours (across different attempts). Qualitatively, we find that modern AI agents possess significant expertise in many ML topics -- e.g. an agent wrote a faster custom Triton kernel than any of our human experts' -- and can generate and test solutions over ten times faster than humans, at much lower cost. We open-source the evaluation environments, human expert data, analysis code and agent trajectories to facilitate future research.

When working on digital devices, people often face distractions that can lead to a decline in productivity and efficiency, as well as negative psychological and emotional impacts. To address this challenge, we introduce a novel Artificial Intelligence (AI) assistant that elicits a user's intention, assesses whether ongoing activities are in line with that intention, and provides gentle nudges when deviations occur. The system leverages a large language model to analyze screenshots, application titles, and URLs, issuing notifications when behavior diverges from the stated goal. Its detection accuracy is refined through initial clarification dialogues and continuous user feedback. In a three-week, within-subjects field deployment with 22 participants, we compared our assistant to both a rule-based intent reminder system and a passive baseline that only logged activity. Results indicate that our AI assistant effectively supports users in maintaining focus and aligning their digital behavior with their intentions. Our source code is publicly available at https://intentassistant.github.io

Accurate estimation of item (question or task) difficulty is critical for educational assessment but suffers from the cold start problem. While Large Language Models demonstrate superhuman problem-solving capabilities, it remains an open question whether they can perceive the cognitive struggles of human learners. In this work, we present a large-scale empirical analysis of Human-AI Difficulty Alignment for over 20 models across diverse domains such as medical knowledge and mathematical reasoning. Our findings reveal a systematic misalignment where scaling up model size is not reliably helpful; instead of aligning with humans, models converge toward a shared machine consensus. We observe that high performance often impedes accurate difficulty estimation, as models struggle to simulate the capability limitations of students even when being explicitly prompted to adopt specific proficiency levels. Furthermore, we identify a critical lack of introspection, as models fail to predict their own limitations. These results suggest that general problem-solving capability does not imply an understanding of human cognitive struggles, highlighting the challenge of using current models for automated difficulty prediction.

Recent advancements in large foundation models have remarkably enhanced our understanding of sensory information in open-world environments. In leveraging the power of foundation models, it is crucial for AI research to pivot away from excessive reductionism and toward an emphasis on systems that function as cohesive wholes. Specifically, we emphasize developing Agent AI -- an embodied system that integrates large foundation models into agent actions. The emerging field of Agent AI spans a wide range of existing embodied and agent-based multimodal interactions, including robotics, gaming, and healthcare systems, etc. In this paper, we propose a novel large action model to achieve embodied intelligent behavior, the Agent Foundation Model. On top of this idea, we discuss how agent AI exhibits remarkable capabilities across a variety of domains and tasks, challenging our understanding of learning and cognition. Furthermore, we discuss the potential of Agent AI from an interdisciplinary perspective, underscoring AI cognition and consciousness within scientific discourse. We believe that those discussions serve as a basis for future research directions and encourage broader societal engagement.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

The current literature on AI-advised decision making -- involving explainable AI systems advising human decision makers -- presents a series of inconclusive and confounding results. To synthesize these findings, we propose a simple theory that elucidates the frequent failure of AI explanations to engender appropriate reliance and complementary decision making performance. We argue explanations are only useful to the extent that they allow a human decision maker to verify the correctness of an AI's prediction, in contrast to other desiderata, e.g., interpretability or spelling out the AI's reasoning process. Prior studies find in many decision making contexts AI explanations do not facilitate such verification. Moreover, most tasks fundamentally do not allow easy verification, regardless of explanation method, limiting the potential benefit of any type of explanation. We also compare the objective of complementary performance with that of appropriate reliance, decomposing the latter into the notions of outcome-graded and strategy-graded reliance.

A key challenge on the path to developing agents that learn complex human-like behavior is the need to quickly and accurately quantify human-likeness. While human assessments of such behavior can be highly accurate, speed and scalability are limited. We address these limitations through a novel automated Navigation Turing Test (ANTT) that learns to predict human judgments of human-likeness. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our automated NTT on a navigation task in a complex 3D environment. We investigate six classification models to shed light on the types of architectures best suited to this task, and validate them against data collected through a human NTT. Our best models achieve high accuracy when distinguishing true human and agent behavior. At the same time, we show that predicting finer-grained human assessment of agents' progress towards human-like behavior remains unsolved. Our work takes an important step towards agents that more effectively learn complex human-like behavior.

There is a belief that learning to compress well will lead to intelligence. Recently, language modeling has been shown to be equivalent to compression, which offers a compelling rationale for the success of large language models (LLMs): the development of more advanced language models is essentially enhancing compression which facilitates intelligence. Despite such appealing discussions, little empirical evidence is present for the interplay between compression and intelligence. In this work, we examine their relationship in the context of LLMs, treating LLMs as data compressors. Given the abstract concept of "intelligence", we adopt the average downstream benchmark scores as a surrogate, specifically targeting intelligence related to knowledge and commonsense, coding, and mathematical reasoning. Across 12 benchmarks, our study brings together 30 public LLMs that originate from diverse organizations. Remarkably, we find that LLMs' intelligence -- reflected by average benchmark scores -- almost linearly correlates with their ability to compress external text corpora. These results provide concrete evidence supporting the belief that superior compression indicates greater intelligence. Furthermore, our findings suggest that compression efficiency, as an unsupervised metric derived from raw text corpora, serves as a reliable evaluation measure that is linearly associated with the model capabilities. We open-source our compression datasets as well as our data collection pipelines to facilitate future researchers to assess compression properly.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly persuasive, there is concern that people's opinions and decisions may be influenced across various contexts at scale. Prior mitigation (e.g., AI detectors and disclaimers) largely treats people as passive recipients of AI-generated information. To provide a more proactive intervention against persuasive AI, we introduce LLMimic, a role-play-based, interactive, gamified AI literacy tutorial, where participants assume the role of an LLM and progress through three key stages of the training pipeline (pretraining, SFT, and RLHF). We conducted a 2 times 3 between-subjects study (N = 274) where participants either (1) watched an AI history video (control) or (2) interacted with LLMimic (treatment), and then engaged in one of three realistic AI persuasion scenarios: (a) charity donation persuasion, (b) malicious money solicitation, or (c) hotel recommendation. Our results show that LLMimic significantly improved participants' AI literacy (p < .001), reduced persuasion success across scenarios (p < .05), and enhanced truthfulness and social responsibility levels (p<0.01) in the hotel scenario. These findings suggest that LLMimic offers a scalable, human-centered approach to improving AI literacy and supporting more informed interactions with persuasive AI.

Rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) technology have brought about a plethora of new challenges in terms of governance and regulation. AI systems are being integrated into various industries and sectors, creating a demand from decision-makers to possess a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the capabilities and limitations of these systems. One critical aspect of this demand is the ability to explain the results of machine learning models, which is crucial to promoting transparency and trust in AI systems, as well as fundamental in helping machine learning models to be trained ethically. In this paper, we present novel metrics to quantify the degree of which AI model predictions can be easily explainable by its features. Our metrics summarize different aspects of explainability into scalars, providing a more comprehensive understanding of model predictions and facilitating communication between decision-makers and stakeholders, thereby increasing the overall transparency and accountability of AI systems.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

The development and popularization of large language models (LLMs) have raised concerns that they will be used to create tailor-made, convincing arguments to push false or misleading narratives online. Early work has found that language models can generate content perceived as at least on par and often more persuasive than human-written messages. However, there is still limited knowledge about LLMs' persuasive capabilities in direct conversations with human counterparts and how personalization can improve their performance. In this pre-registered study, we analyze the effect of AI-driven persuasion in a controlled, harmless setting. We create a web-based platform where participants engage in short, multiple-round debates with a live opponent. Each participant is randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions, corresponding to a two-by-two factorial design: (1) Games are either played between two humans or between a human and an LLM; (2) Personalization might or might not be enabled, granting one of the two players access to basic sociodemographic information about their opponent. We found that participants who debated GPT-4 with access to their personal information had 81.7% (p < 0.01; N=820 unique participants) higher odds of increased agreement with their opponents compared to participants who debated humans. Without personalization, GPT-4 still outperforms humans, but the effect is lower and statistically non-significant (p=0.31). Overall, our results suggest that concerns around personalization are meaningful and have important implications for the governance of social media and the design of new online environments.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

Evaluation of reasoning language models gained importance after it was observed that they can combine their existing capabilities into novel traces of intermediate steps before task completion and that the traces can sometimes help them to generalize better than past models. As reasoning becomes the next scaling dimension of large language models, careful study of their capabilities in critical tasks is needed. We show that better performance is not always caused by test-time algorithmic improvements or model sizes but also by using impactful benchmarks as curricula for learning. We call this benchmark-driven selection of AI and show its effects on DeepSeek-R1 using our sequential decision-making problem from Humanity's Last Exam. Steering development of AI by impactful benchmarks trades evaluation for learning and makes novelty of test tasks key for measuring generalization capabilities of reasoning models. Consequently, some benchmarks could be seen as curricula for training rather than unseen test sets.

Artificial intelligence (AI) researchers have been developing and refining large language models (LLMs) that exhibit remarkable capabilities across a variety of domains and tasks, challenging our understanding of learning and cognition. The latest model developed by OpenAI, GPT-4, was trained using an unprecedented scale of compute and data. In this paper, we report on our investigation of an early version of GPT-4, when it was still in active development by OpenAI. We contend that (this early version of) GPT-4 is part of a new cohort of LLMs (along with ChatGPT and Google's PaLM for example) that exhibit more general intelligence than previous AI models. We discuss the rising capabilities and implications of these models. We demonstrate that, beyond its mastery of language, GPT-4 can solve novel and difficult tasks that span mathematics, coding, vision, medicine, law, psychology and more, without needing any special prompting. Moreover, in all of these tasks, GPT-4's performance is strikingly close to human-level performance, and often vastly surpasses prior models such as ChatGPT. Given the breadth and depth of GPT-4's capabilities, we believe that it could reasonably be viewed as an early (yet still incomplete) version of an artificial general intelligence (AGI) system. In our exploration of GPT-4, we put special emphasis on discovering its limitations, and we discuss the challenges ahead for advancing towards deeper and more comprehensive versions of AGI, including the possible need for pursuing a new paradigm that moves beyond next-word prediction. We conclude with reflections on societal influences of the recent technological leap and future research directions.

Is explainability a false promise? This debate has emerged from the insufficient evidence that explanations aid people in situations they are introduced for. More human-centered, application-grounded evaluations of explanations are needed to settle this. Yet, with no established guidelines for such studies in NLP, researchers accustomed to standardized proxy evaluations must discover appropriate measurements, tasks, datasets, and sensible models for human-AI teams in their studies. To help with this, we first review fitting existing metrics. We then establish requirements for datasets to be suitable for application-grounded evaluations. Among over 50 datasets available for explainability research in NLP, we find that 4 meet our criteria. By finetuning Flan-T5-3B, we demonstrate the importance of reassessing the state of the art to form and study human-AI teams. Finally, we present the exemplar studies of human-AI decision-making for one of the identified suitable tasks -- verifying the correctness of a legal claim given a contract.

As large language models (LLMs) enter the mainstream, aligning them to foster constructive dialogue rather than exacerbate societal divisions is critical. Using an individualized and multicultural alignment dataset of over 7,500 conversations of individuals from 74 countries engaging with 21 LLMs, we examined how linguistic attributes linked to constructive interactions are reflected in human preference data used for training AI. We found that users consistently preferred well-reasoned and nuanced responses while rejecting those high in personal storytelling. However, users who believed that AI should reflect their values tended to place less preference on reasoning in LLM responses and more on curiosity. Encouragingly, we observed that users could set the tone for how constructive their conversation would be, as LLMs mirrored linguistic attributes, including toxicity, in user queries.

Facing the current debate on whether Large Language Models (LLMs) attain near-human intelligence levels (Mitchell & Krakauer, 2023; Bubeck et al., 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Shiffrin & Mitchell, 2023; Ullman, 2023), the current study introduces a benchmark for evaluating social intelligence, one of the most distinctive aspects of human cognition. We developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for social dynamics and introduced two evaluation tasks: Inverse Reasoning (IR) and Inverse Inverse Planning (IIP). Our approach also encompassed a computational model based on recursive Bayesian inference, adept at elucidating diverse human behavioral patterns. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses revealed that humans surpassed the latest GPT models in overall performance, zero-shot learning, one-shot generalization, and adaptability to multi-modalities. Notably, GPT models demonstrated social intelligence only at the most basic order (order = 0), in stark contrast to human social intelligence (order >= 2). Further examination indicated a propensity of LLMs to rely on pattern recognition for shortcuts, casting doubt on their possession of authentic human-level social intelligence. Our codes, dataset, appendix and human data are released at https://github.com/bigai-ai/Evaluate-n-Model-Social-Intelligence.

Much research has been carried out on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-powered agentic workflows. However, many works within the field state emergence of, ascribe to, or assume, generalised anthropomorphic attributes to them (e.g., morality or understanding of natural language). Our goal is not to argue in favour or against the existence of these attributes, but to point out that these conclusions could be incorrect. For this we build and train a simple neural network on the videogame Age of Empires II, and note that any entity in a sufficiently-powerful substrate, such as LEGO or the Greater Boston Area, could also present such attributes. Hence, the purported anthropomorphic attributes of LLMs are empirically non-unique: although some properties (e.g., responses to prompts) could remain invariant, others, such as the interpretation of their perceived behaviour, might change with the substrate. Thus, any empirically-grounded discussion on these attributes requires explicit measurement criteria; otherwise the interpretation is left to the representation. We then show that assuming that these attributes exist or not in a system, independent of the substrate and in a generalised way, leads to either circular or uninformative conclusions. This is regardless of the experimenter's viewpoint on the subject, or whether the outcome shows existence or non-existence. Finally we propose a 'null' assumption, where one assumes LLM non-uniqueness instead of assuming anthropomorphic attributes to set up an experiment, along with examples of it. We also discuss potential objections to our work, briefly survey the field, and prove that Age of Empires II is functionally- and Turing-complete.

Recent work claims that large language models display emergent abilities, abilities not present in smaller-scale models that are present in larger-scale models. What makes emergent abilities intriguing is two-fold: their sharpness, transitioning seemingly instantaneously from not present to present, and their unpredictability, appearing at seemingly unforeseeable model scales. Here, we present an alternative explanation for emergent abilities: that for a particular task and model family, when analyzing fixed model outputs, emergent abilities appear due to the researcher's choice of metric rather than due to fundamental changes in model behavior with scale. Specifically, nonlinear or discontinuous metrics produce apparent emergent abilities, whereas linear or continuous metrics produce smooth, continuous predictable changes in model performance. We present our alternative explanation in a simple mathematical model, then test it in three complementary ways: we (1) make, test and confirm three predictions on the effect of metric choice using the InstructGPT/GPT-3 family on tasks with claimed emergent abilities; (2) make, test and confirm two predictions about metric choices in a meta-analysis of emergent abilities on BIG-Bench; and (3) show to choose metrics to produce never-before-seen seemingly emergent abilities in multiple vision tasks across diverse deep networks. Via all three analyses, we provide evidence that alleged emergent abilities evaporate with different metrics or with better statistics, and may not be a fundamental property of scaling AI models.

The ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to use external tools unlocks powerful real-world interactions, making rigorous evaluation essential. However, current benchmarks primarily report final accuracy, revealing what models can do but obscuring the cognitive bottlenecks that define their true capability boundaries. To move from simple performance scoring to a diagnostic tool, we introduce a framework grounded in Cognitive Load Theory. Our framework deconstructs task complexity into two quantifiable components: Intrinsic Load, the inherent structural complexity of the solution path, formalized with a novel Tool Interaction Graph; and Extraneous Load, the difficulty arising from ambiguous task presentation. To enable controlled experiments, we construct ToolLoad-Bench, the first benchmark with parametrically adjustable cognitive load. Our evaluation reveals distinct performance cliffs as cognitive load increases, allowing us to precisely map each model's capability boundary. We validate that our framework's predictions are highly calibrated with empirical results, establishing a principled methodology for understanding an agent's limits and a practical foundation for building more efficient systems.

Recent advancements in Web AI agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in addressing complex web navigation tasks. However, emerging research shows that these agents exhibit greater vulnerability compared to standalone Large Language Models (LLMs), despite both being built upon the same safety-aligned models. This discrepancy is particularly concerning given the greater flexibility of Web AI Agent compared to standalone LLMs, which may expose them to a wider range of adversarial user inputs. To build a scaffold that addresses these concerns, this study investigates the underlying factors that contribute to the increased vulnerability of Web AI agents. Notably, this disparity stems from the multifaceted differences between Web AI agents and standalone LLMs, as well as the complex signals - nuances that simple evaluation metrics, such as success rate, often fail to capture. To tackle these challenges, we propose a component-level analysis and a more granular, systematic evaluation framework. Through this fine-grained investigation, we identify three critical factors that amplify the vulnerability of Web AI agents; (1) embedding user goals into the system prompt, (2) multi-step action generation, and (3) observational capabilities. Our findings highlights the pressing need to enhance security and robustness in AI agent design and provide actionable insights for targeted defense strategies.

As intelligence increases, so does its shadow. AI deception, in which systems induce false beliefs to secure self-beneficial outcomes, has evolved from a speculative concern to an empirically demonstrated risk across language models, AI agents, and emerging frontier systems. This project provides a comprehensive and up-to-date overview of the AI deception field, covering its core concepts, methodologies, genesis, and potential mitigations. First, we identify a formal definition of AI deception, grounded in signaling theory from studies of animal deception. We then review existing empirical studies and associated risks, highlighting deception as a sociotechnical safety challenge. We organize the landscape of AI deception research as a deception cycle, consisting of two key components: deception emergence and deception treatment. Deception emergence reveals the mechanisms underlying AI deception: systems with sufficient capability and incentive potential inevitably engage in deceptive behaviors when triggered by external conditions. Deception treatment, in turn, focuses on detecting and addressing such behaviors. On deception emergence, we analyze incentive foundations across three hierarchical levels and identify three essential capability preconditions required for deception. We further examine contextual triggers, including supervision gaps, distributional shifts, and environmental pressures. On deception treatment, we conclude detection methods covering benchmarks and evaluation protocols in static and interactive settings. Building on the three core factors of deception emergence, we outline potential mitigation strategies and propose auditing approaches that integrate technical, community, and governance efforts to address sociotechnical challenges and future AI risks. To support ongoing work in this area, we release a living resource at www.deceptionsurvey.com.

In this position paper, we argue that human evaluation of generative large language models (LLMs) should be a multidisciplinary undertaking that draws upon insights from disciplines such as user experience research and human behavioral psychology to ensure that the experimental design and results are reliable. The conclusions from these evaluations, thus, must consider factors such as usability, aesthetics, and cognitive biases. We highlight how cognitive biases can conflate fluent information and truthfulness, and how cognitive uncertainty affects the reliability of rating scores such as Likert. Furthermore, the evaluation should differentiate the capabilities and weaknesses of increasingly powerful large language models -- which requires effective test sets. The scalability of human evaluation is also crucial to wider adoption. Hence, to design an effective human evaluation system in the age of generative NLP, we propose the ConSiDERS-The-Human evaluation framework consisting of 6 pillars -- Consistency, Scoring Criteria, Differentiating, User Experience, Responsible, and Scalability.

Large Language Models have emerged many intellectual capacities. While numerous benchmarks assess their intelligence, limited attention has been given to their ability to explore, an essential capacity for discovering new information and adapting to novel environments in both natural and artificial systems. The extent to which LLMs can effectively explore, particularly in open-ended tasks, remains unclear. This study investigates whether LLMs can surpass humans in exploration during an open-ended task, using Little Alchemy 2 as a paradigm, where agents combine elements to discover new ones. Results show most LLMs underperform compared to humans, except for the o1 model, with those traditional LLMs relying primarily on uncertainty driven strategies, unlike humans who balance uncertainty and empowerment. Representational analysis of the models with Sparse Autoencoders revealed that uncertainty and choices are represented at earlier transformer blocks, while empowerment values are processed later, causing LLMs to think too fast and make premature decisions, hindering effective exploration. These findings shed light on the limitations of LLM exploration and suggest directions for improving their adaptability.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

This comprehensive report distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost "human-like" cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles in Cognitive Architecture Theory (CAT). We present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions associated with CAT (i.e. memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and meta-cognition) and identify gaps in the research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and meta-cognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions informed by active inference and global workspace theory to address them. We further introduce Epistemic World Models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied across video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.

Explainability and interpretability of AI models is an essential factor affecting the safety of AI. While various explainable AI (XAI) approaches aim at mitigating the lack of transparency in deep networks, the evidence of the effectiveness of these approaches in improving usability, trust, and understanding of AI systems are still missing. We evaluate multimodal explanations in the setting of a Visual Question Answering (VQA) task, by asking users to predict the response accuracy of a VQA agent with and without explanations. We use between-subjects and within-subjects experiments to probe explanation effectiveness in terms of improving user prediction accuracy, confidence, and reliance, among other factors. The results indicate that the explanations help improve human prediction accuracy, especially in trials when the VQA system's answer is inaccurate. Furthermore, we introduce active attention, a novel method for evaluating causal attentional effects through intervention by editing attention maps. User explanation ratings are strongly correlated with human prediction accuracy and suggest the efficacy of these explanations in human-machine AI collaboration tasks.

As Artificial Intelligence (AI) becomes ubiquitous, the need for Explainable AI (XAI) has become critical for transparency and trust among users. A significant challenge in XAI is catering to diverse users, such as data scientists, domain experts, and end-users. Recent research has started to investigate how users' characteristics impact interactions with and user experience of explanations, with a view to personalizing XAI. However, are we heading down a rabbit hole by focusing on unimportant details? Our research aimed to investigate how user characteristics are related to using, understanding, and trusting an AI system that provides explanations. Our empirical study with 149 participants who interacted with an XAI system that flagged inappropriate comments showed that very few user characteristics mattered; only age and the personality trait openness influenced actual understanding. Our work provides evidence to reorient user-focused XAI research and question the pursuit of personalized XAI based on fine-grained user characteristics.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown surprising proficiency in generating code snippets, promising to automate large parts of software engineering via artificial intelligence (AI). We argue that successfully deploying AI software engineers requires a level of trust equal to or even greater than the trust established by human-driven software engineering practices. The recent trend toward LLM agents offers a path toward integrating the power of LLMs to create new code with the power of analysis tools to increase trust in the code. This opinion piece comments on whether LLM agents could dominate software engineering workflows in the future and whether the focus of programming will shift from programming at scale to programming with trust.

As the field progresses toward Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), there is a pressing need for more comprehensive and insightful evaluation frameworks that go beyond aggregate performance metrics. This paper introduces a unified rating system that jointly models the difficulty of individual test cases and the competency of AI models (or humans) across vision, language, and action domains. Unlike existing metrics that focus solely on models, our approach allows for fine-grained, difficulty-aware evaluations through competitive interactions between models and tasks, capturing both the long-tail distribution of real-world challenges and the competency gap between current models and full task mastery. We validate the generalizability and robustness of our system through extensive experiments on multiple established datasets and models across distinct AGI domains. The resulting rating distributions offer novel perspectives and interpretable insights into task difficulty, model progression, and the outstanding challenges that remain on the path to achieving full AGI task mastery.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

Despite advances in AI's performance and interpretability, AI advisors can undermine experts' decisions and increase the time and effort experts must invest to make decisions. Consequently, AI systems deployed in high-stakes settings often fail to consistently add value across contexts and can even diminish the value that experts alone provide. Beyond harm in specific domains, such outcomes impede progress in research and practice, underscoring the need to understand when and why different AI advisors add or diminish value. To bridge this gap, we stress the importance of assessing the value AI advice brings to real-world contexts when designing and evaluating AI advisors. Building on this perspective, we characterize key pillars -- pathways through which AI advice impacts value -- and develop a framework that incorporates these pillars to create reliable, personalized, and value-adding advisors. Our results highlight the need for system-level, value-driven development of AI advisors that advise selectively, are tailored to experts' unique behaviors, and are optimized for context-specific trade-offs between decision improvements and advising costs. They also reveal how the lack of inclusion of these pillars in the design of AI advising systems may be contributing to the failures observed in practical applications.

We propose a framework for classifying the capabilities and behavior of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) models and their precursors. This framework introduces levels of AGI performance, generality, and autonomy, providing a common language to compare models, assess risks, and measure progress along the path to AGI. To develop our framework, we analyze existing definitions of AGI, and distill six principles that a useful ontology for AGI should satisfy. With these principles in mind, we propose "Levels of AGI" based on depth (performance) and breadth (generality) of capabilities, and reflect on how current systems fit into this ontology. We discuss the challenging requirements for future benchmarks that quantify the behavior and capabilities of AGI models against these levels. Finally, we discuss how these levels of AGI interact with deployment considerations such as autonomy and risk, and emphasize the importance of carefully selecting Human-AI Interaction paradigms for responsible and safe deployment of highly capable AI systems.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

There are an increasing number of domains in which artificial intelligence (AI) systems both surpass human ability and accurately model human behavior. This introduces the possibility of algorithmically-informed teaching in these domains through more relatable AI partners and deeper insights into human decision-making. Critical to achieving this goal, however, is coherently modeling human behavior at various skill levels. Chess is an ideal model system for conducting research into this kind of human-AI alignment, with its rich history as a pivotal testbed for AI research, mature superhuman AI systems like AlphaZero, and precise measurements of skill via chess rating systems. Previous work in modeling human decision-making in chess uses completely independent models to capture human style at different skill levels, meaning they lack coherence in their ability to adapt to the full spectrum of human improvement and are ultimately limited in their effectiveness as AI partners and teaching tools. In this work, we propose a unified modeling approach for human-AI alignment in chess that coherently captures human style across different skill levels and directly captures how people improve. Recognizing the complex, non-linear nature of human learning, we introduce a skill-aware attention mechanism to dynamically integrate players' strengths with encoded chess positions, enabling our model to be sensitive to evolving player skill. Our experimental results demonstrate that this unified framework significantly enhances the alignment between AI and human players across a diverse range of expertise levels, paving the way for deeper insights into human decision-making and AI-guided teaching tools.

AI assistants can impart value judgments that shape people's decisions and worldviews, yet little is known empirically about what values these systems rely on in practice. To address this, we develop a bottom-up, privacy-preserving method to extract the values (normative considerations stated or demonstrated in model responses) that Claude 3 and 3.5 models exhibit in hundreds of thousands of real-world interactions. We empirically discover and taxonomize 3,307 AI values and study how they vary by context. We find that Claude expresses many practical and epistemic values, and typically supports prosocial human values while resisting values like "moral nihilism". While some values appear consistently across contexts (e.g. "transparency"), many are more specialized and context-dependent, reflecting the diversity of human interlocutors and their varied contexts. For example, "harm prevention" emerges when Claude resists users, "historical accuracy" when responding to queries about controversial events, "healthy boundaries" when asked for relationship advice, and "human agency" in technology ethics discussions. By providing the first large-scale empirical mapping of AI values in deployment, our work creates a foundation for more grounded evaluation and design of values in AI systems.

Generative AI and misinformation research has evolved since our 2024 survey. This paper presents an updated perspective, transitioning from literature review to practical countermeasures. We report on changes in the threat landscape, including improved AI-generated content through Large Language Models (LLMs) and multimodal systems. Central to this work are our practical contributions: JudgeGPT, a platform for evaluating human perception of AI-generated news, and RogueGPT, a controlled stimulus generation engine for research. Together, these tools form an experimental pipeline for studying how humans perceive and detect AI-generated misinformation. Our findings show that detection capabilities have improved, but the competition between generation and detection continues. We discuss mitigation strategies including LLM-based detection, inoculation approaches, and the dual-use nature of generative AI. This work contributes to research addressing the adverse impacts of AI on information quality.

Predictable behavior from scaling advanced AI systems is an extremely desirable property. Although a well-established literature exists on how pretraining performance scales, the literature on how particular downstream capabilities scale is significantly muddier. In this work, we take a step back and ask: why has predicting specific downstream capabilities with scale remained elusive? While many factors are certainly responsible, we identify a new factor that makes modeling scaling behavior on widely used multiple-choice question-answering benchmarks challenging. Using five model families and twelve well-established multiple-choice benchmarks, we show that downstream performance is computed from negative log likelihoods via a sequence of transformations that progressively degrade the statistical relationship between performance and scale. We then reveal the mechanism causing this degradation: downstream metrics require comparing the correct choice against a small number of specific incorrect choices, meaning accurately predicting downstream capabilities requires predicting not just how probability mass concentrates on the correct choice with scale, but also how probability mass fluctuates on specific incorrect choices with scale. We empirically study how probability mass on the correct choice co-varies with probability mass on incorrect choices with increasing compute, suggesting that scaling laws for incorrect choices might be achievable. Our work also explains why pretraining scaling laws are commonly regarded as more predictable than downstream capabilities and contributes towards establishing scaling-predictable evaluations of frontier AI models.

This study compares the performance of AI-generated and human-written product descriptions using a multifaceted evaluation model. We analyze descriptions for 100 products generated by four AI models (Gemma 2B, LLAMA, GPT2, and ChatGPT 4) with and without sample descriptions, against human-written descriptions. Our evaluation metrics include sentiment, readability, persuasiveness, Search Engine Optimization(SEO), clarity, emotional appeal, and call-to-action effectiveness. The results indicate that ChatGPT 4 performs the best. In contrast, other models demonstrate significant shortcomings, producing incoherent and illogical output that lacks logical structure and contextual relevance. These models struggle to maintain focus on the product being described, resulting in disjointed sentences that do not convey meaningful information. This research provides insights into the current capabilities and limitations of AI in the creation of content for e-Commerce.

In computational cognitive modeling, capturing the full spectrum of human judgment and decision-making processes, beyond just optimal behaviors, is a significant challenge. This study explores whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can emulate the breadth of human reasoning by predicting both intuitive, fast System 1 and deliberate, slow System 2 processes. We investigate the potential of AI to mimic diverse reasoning behaviors across a human population, addressing what we call the "full reasoning spectrum problem". We designed reasoning tasks using a novel generalization of the Natural Language Inference (NLI) format to evaluate LLMs' ability to replicate human reasoning. The questions were crafted to elicit both System 1 and System 2 responses. Human responses were collected through crowd-sourcing and the entire distribution was modeled, rather than just the majority of the answers. We used personality-based prompting inspired by the Big Five personality model to elicit AI responses reflecting specific personality traits, capturing the diversity of human reasoning, and exploring how personality traits influence LLM outputs. Combined with genetic algorithms to optimize the weighting of these prompts, this method was tested alongside traditional machine learning models. The results show that LLMs can mimic human response distributions, with open-source models like Llama and Mistral outperforming proprietary GPT models. Personality-based prompting, especially when optimized with genetic algorithms, significantly enhanced LLMs' ability to predict human response distributions, suggesting that capturing suboptimal, naturalistic reasoning may require modeling techniques incorporating diverse reasoning styles and psychological profiles. The study concludes that personality-based prompting combined with genetic algorithms is promising for enhancing AI's 'human-ness' in reasoning.

Humans interact with the environment using a combination of perception - transforming sensory inputs from their environment into symbols, and cognition - mapping symbols to knowledge about the environment for supporting abstraction, reasoning by analogy, and long-term planning. Human perception-inspired machine perception, in the context of AI, refers to large-scale pattern recognition from raw data using neural networks trained using self-supervised learning objectives such as next-word prediction or object recognition. On the other hand, machine cognition encompasses more complex computations, such as using knowledge of the environment to guide reasoning, analogy, and long-term planning. Humans can also control and explain their cognitive functions. This seems to require the retention of symbolic mappings from perception outputs to knowledge about their environment. For example, humans can follow and explain the guidelines and safety constraints driving their decision-making in safety-critical applications such as healthcare, criminal justice, and autonomous driving. This article introduces the rapidly emerging paradigm of Neurosymbolic AI combines neural networks and knowledge-guided symbolic approaches to create more capable and flexible AI systems. These systems have immense potential to advance both algorithm-level (e.g., abstraction, analogy, reasoning) and application-level (e.g., explainable and safety-constrained decision-making) capabilities of AI systems.

The progress of AI is bottlenecked by the quality of evaluation, and powerful LLM-as-a-Judge models have proved to be a core solution. Improved judgment ability is enabled by stronger chain-of-thought reasoning, motivating the need to find the best recipes for training such models to think. In this work we introduce J1, a reinforcement learning approach to training such models. Our method converts both verifiable and non-verifiable prompts to judgment tasks with verifiable rewards that incentivize thinking and mitigate judgment bias. In particular, our approach outperforms all other existing 8B or 70B models when trained at those sizes, including models distilled from DeepSeek-R1. J1 also outperforms o1-mini, and even R1 on some benchmarks, despite training a smaller model. We provide analysis and ablations comparing Pairwise-J1 vs Pointwise-J1 models, offline vs online training recipes, reward strategies, seed prompts, and variations in thought length and content. We find that our models make better judgments by learning to outline evaluation criteria, comparing against self-generated reference answers, and re-evaluating the correctness of model responses.